Also, try to resolve some doxygen issues. First, define a magic
"This is doxygen!" macro so that we take the correct branch in
various #if/#else/#endifs in order to get the right documentation.
Second, add in a few grouping @{ and @} entries in order to get some
variables and fields to get grouped together.
Conflicts throughout. All resolved in favor of taking HEAD and
adding tor_mem* or fast_mem* ops as appropriate.
src/common/Makefile.am
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/directory.c
src/or/dirserv.c
src/or/dirvote.c
src/or/networkstatus.c
src/or/rendclient.c
src/or/rendservice.c
src/or/router.c
src/or/routerlist.c
src/or/routerparse.c
src/or/test.c
Here I looked at the results of the automated conversion and cleaned
them up as follows:
If there was a tor_memcmp or tor_memeq that was in fact "safe"[*] I
changed it to a fast_memcmp or fast_memeq.
Otherwise if there was a tor_memcmp that could turn into a
tor_memneq or tor_memeq, I converted it.
This wants close attention.
[*] I'm erring on the side of caution here, and leaving some things
as tor_memcmp that could in my opinion use the data-dependent
fast_memcmp variant.
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
(Backport from 0.2.2's 5ed73e3807)
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
Our public key functions assumed that they were always writing into a
large enough buffer. In one case, they weren't.
(Incorporates fixes from sebastian)
If your relay can't keep up with the number of incoming create cells, it
would log one warning per failure into your logs. Limit warnings to 1 per
minute.
See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
The subversion $Id$ fields made every commit force a rebuild of
whatever file got committed. They were not actually useful for
telling the version of Tor files in the wild.
svn:r17867
Be more thorough about memory poisoning and clearing. Add an in-place version of aes_crypt in order to remove a memcpy from relay_crypt_one_payload.
svn:r13414
Initial attempts to track down bug 600, and refactor possibly offending code. 1) complain early if circuit state is set to OPEN when an onionskin is pending. 2) refactor onionskin field into one only used when n_conn is pending, and a separate onionskin field waiting for attention by a cpuworker. This might even fix the bug. More likely, it will make it fail with a more useful core.
svn:r13394
Removing the last DOCDOC comment hurt so much that I had to use Doxygen to identify undocumented macros and comments, and add 150 more DOCDOCs to point out where they were. Oops. Hey, kids! Fixing some of these could be your first Tor patch!
svn:r9477
circuit_t into origin_circuit_t and or_circuit_t. I fixed some
segaults; there may be more. We still need to move more rendezvous
stuff into subtypes.
This is a trial run for splitting up connection_t; if the approach is
insane, please say so soon so we can do something smarter.
Also, this discards the old HALF_OPEN code, which nobody seems to
want.
svn:r6817
we screwed up the formatting in wild and unpredictable ways.
fix it before it becomes convention to format logs in wild and
unpredictable ways.
still need to do src/common/ someday.
svn:r5551
