The server-side clipping now clamps to one of two values, both
for what to report, and how long to cache.
Additionally, we move some defines to dns.h, and give them better
names.
It is no longer possible for the IPv6 preference options to differ from the
IPv6 usage: preferring IPv6 implies possibly using IPv6.
Also remove the corresponding unit test warning message checks.
(But keep the unit tests themselves - they now run without warnings.)
This commit adds 3 unit tests which validates a wrong signature length, a
wrong authentication key length and a wrong MAC in the cell.
Closes#20992
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Some DNS NXDOMAIN hijackers hijack truly ridiculous domains, like
"invalid-stuff!!" or "1.2.3.4.5". This would provoke unit test
failures where we used addresses like that to force
tor_addr_lookup() to fail. The fix, for testing, is to mock
tor_addr_lookup() with a variant that always fails when it gets
a name with a !.
Fixes bugs 20862 and 20863.
The abort handler masks the exit status of the backtrace generator by
capturing the abort signal from the backtrace handler and exiting with
zero. Because the output of the backtrace generator is meant to be piped
to `bt_test.py`, its exit status is unimportant and is currently
ignored.
The abort handler calls `exit(3)` which is not asynchronous-signal-safe
and calling it in this context is undefined behavior [0].
Closes ticket 21026.
[0] https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/x/34At
Since both the client and service will use that data structure to store the
descriptor decoded data, only the public keys are common to both.
Fixes#20572.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This is an important thing I hadn't considered when writing prop271:
sometimes you have to restrict what guard you use for a particular
circuit. Most frequently, that would be because you plan to use a
certain node as your exit, and so you can't choose that for your
guard.
This change means that the upgrade-waiting-circuits algorithm needs
a slight tweak too: circuit A cannot block circuit B from upgrading
if circuit B needs to follow a restriction that circuit A does not
follow.
George pointed out that (-1,0,1) for (never usable, maybe usable
later, usable right now) was a pretty rotten convention that made
the code harder to read.
This includes:
* making bridge_info_t exposed but opaque
* allowing guards where we don't know an identity
* making it possible to learn the identity of a guard
* creating a guard that lacks a node_t
* remembering a guard's address and port.
* Looking up a guard by address and port.
* Only enforcing the rule that we need a live consensus to update
the "listed" status for guards when we are not using bridges.
Currently, this code doesn't actually have the contexts behave
differently, (except for the legacy context), but it does switch
back and forth between them nicely.
Some of these will get torrc options to override them too; this
is just the mechanical conversion.
Also, add documentation for a couple of undocumented (but now used)
parameters.
Act I.
" But that I am forbid
To tell the secrets of my prison-house,
I could a tale unfold..."
Here's the bug: sometimes, rend_cache/store_v2_desc_as_client would
say:
"Dec 15 08:31:26.147 [warn] rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client():
Bug: Couldn't decode base32 [scrubbed] for descriptor id. (on Tor
0.3.0.0-alpha-dev 4098bfa260)"
When we merged ade5005853 back in 0.2.8.1-alpha, we added that
test: it mangles the hidden service ID for a hidden service, and
ensures that when the descriptor ID doesn't match the descriptor's
key, we don't store the descriptor.
How did it mangle the descriptor ID? By doing
desc_id_base32[0]++;
So, if the hidden service ID started with z or 7, we'd wind up with an
invalid base32 string, and get the warning. And if it started with
any other character, we wouldn't.
That there is part 1 of the bug: in 2/32 cases, we'd get a BUG
warning. But we wouldn't display it, since warnings weren't shown
from the unit tests.
Act II.
"Our indiscretion sometime serves us well,
When our deep plots do pall"
Part two: in 0.2.9.3-alpha, for part of #19999, we turned on BUG
warnings in the unit tests, so that we'd actually start seeing them.
At this point we also began to consider each BUG warning that made
it through the unit tests to be an actual bug. So before this
point, we wouldn't actually notice anything happening in those 2/32
cases.
So, at this point it was a nice random _visible_ bug.
Act III.
"Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own"
In acbb60cd63, which was part of my prop220 work, I
changed how RSA key generation worked in the unit tests. While
previously we'd use pre-made RSA keys in some cases, this change
made us use a set of pregenerated RSA keys for _all_ 1024 or 2048
keys, and to return them in a rotation when Tor tried to generate a
key.
And now we had the heisenbug: anything that affected the number of
pregenerated keys that we had yielded before reaching
rend_cache/store_v2_desc_as_client would make us return a different
key, which would give us a different base32 ID, which would make the
bug occur, or not. So as we added or removed test cases, the bug
might or might not happen.
So yeah. Don't mangle a base32 ID like that. Do it this way instead.
The new HS circuitmap API replaces old public functions as follows:
circuit_clear_rend_token -> hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit
circuit_get_rendezvous -> hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ
circuit_get_intro_point -> hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2
circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie -> hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ
circuit_set_intro_point_digest -> hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2
This commit also removes the old rendinfo code that is now unused.
It also fixes the broken rendinfo unittests.
Circuit object wasn't freed correctly. Also, the cpath build state object
needed to be zeroed else we were freeing garbage pointers.
Closes#20936
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This was breaking the build on debian precise, since it thought that
using a 'const int' to dimension an array made that array
variable-size, and made us not get protection.
Bug not in any released version of Tor.
I will insist that this one wasn't my fault.
"Variables won't. Constants aren't." -- Osborn's Law
If a node can prove its Ed25519 identity, don't consider connections
to it canonical unless they match both identities.
Includes link handshake changes needed to avoid crashing with bug
warnings, since the tests now reach more parts of the code.
Closes ticket 20355
Coverity doesn't like it when there are paths to the end of the
function where something doesn't get freed, even when those paths
are only reachable on unit test failure.
Fixes CID 1372899 and CID 1372900. Bug not in any released Tor.
Instead, refuse to start tor if any hidden service key has been used in
a different hidden service anonymity mode.
Fixes bug 20638; bugfix on 17178 in 0.2.9.3-alpha; reported by ahf.
The original single onion service poisoning code checked poisoning state
in options_validate, and poisoned in options_act. This was problematic,
because the global array of hidden services had not been populated in
options_validate (and there were ordrering issues with hidden service
directory creation).
This patch fixes this issue in rend_service_check_dir_and_add, which:
* creates the directory, or checks permissions on an existing directory, then
* checks the poisoning state of the directory, then
* poisons the directory.
When validating, only the permissions checks and the poisoning state checks
are perfomed (the directory is not modified).
To do this, it makes sense to treat legacy guards as a separate
guard_selection_t *, and handle them separately. This also means we
add support here for having multiple guard selections.
Note that we don't persist pathbias information yet; that will take
some refactoring.
This patch doesn't cover every case; omitted cases are marked with
"XXXX prop271", as usual. It leaves both the old interface and the
new interface for guard status notification, since they don't
actually work in the same way: the new API wants to be told when a
circuit has failed or succeeded, whereas the old API wants to know
when a channel has failed or succeeded.
I ran into some trouble with directory guard stuff, since when we
pick the directory guard, we don't actually have a circuit to
associate it with. I solved that by allowing guard states to be
associated with directory connections, not just circuits.
I expect we'll be ripping this out somewhere in 0.3.0, but let's
keep it around for a little while in case it turns out to be the
only way to avert disaster?
This code handles:
* Maintaining the sampled set, the filtered set, and the
usable_filtered set.
* Maintaining the confirmed and primary guard lists.
* Picking guards for circuits, and updating guard state when
circuit state changes.
Additionally, I've done code structure movement: even more constants
and structures from entrynodes.c have become ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
fields of entrynodes.h.
I've also included a bunch of documentation and a bunch of unit
tests. Coverage on the new code is pretty high.
I've noted important things to resolve before this branch is done
with the /XXXX.*prop271/ regex.
This patch is just:
* Code movement
* Adding headers here and there as needed
* Adding a bridges_free_all() with a call to it.
It breaks compilation, since the bridge code needed to make exactly
2 calls into entrynodes.c internals. I'll fix those in the next
commit.
The encoding code is very straightforward. The decoding code is a
bit tricky, but clean-ish. The sampling code is untested and
probably needs more work.
This field indicates if the service is a Single Onion Service if present in
the descriptor.
Closes#19642
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The test was broken and skipped because the hardcoded cross certificate didn't
include the dynamically generated signing key generated by the test. The only
way we could have fixed that is extracting the signing key from the hardcoded
string and put it in the descriptor object or dynamically generate the cross
certificate.
In the end, all this was kind of pointless as we already test the decoding of
multiple introduction points elsewhere and we don't gain anything with that
specific test thus the removal.
Fixes#20570
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
