2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Nick Mathewson	d48cebc5e4	Try to clarify impact of bug 6537 ... I don't personally agree that this is likely to be easy to exploit, and some initial experimention I've done suggests that cache-miss times are just plain too fast to get useful info out of when they're mixed up with the rest of Tor's timing noise. Nevertheless, I'm leaving Robert's initial changelog entry in the git history so that he can be the voice of reason if I'm wrong. :)	2012-08-03 11:54:11 -04:00
Robert Ransom	308f6dad20	Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit ... Tor's and OpenSSL's current design guarantee that there are other leaks, but this one is likely to be more easily exploitable, and is easy to fix.	2012-08-03 11:49:51 -04:00