Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
(Backport from 0.2.2's 5ed73e3807)
rransom noticed that a change of ORPort is just as bad as a change of IP
address from a client's perspective, because both mean that the relay is
not available to them while the new information hasn't propagated.
Change the bug1035 fix accordingly.
Also make sure we don't log a bridge's IP address (which might happen
when we are the bridge authority).
We detect and reject said attempts if there is no chosen exit node or
circuit: connecting to a private addr via a randomly chosen exit node
will usually fail (if all exits reject private addresses), is always
ill-defined (you're not asking for any particular host or service),
and usually an error (you've configured all requests to go over Tor
when you really wanted to configure all _remote_ requests to go over
Tor).
This can also help detect forwarding loop requests.
Found as part of bug2279.
If we got a signed digest that was shorter than the required digest
length, but longer than 20 bytes, we would accept it as long
enough.... and then immediately fail when we want to check it.
Fixes bug 2409; bug in 0.2.2.20-alpha; found by piebeer.
Previously if you wanted to say "All messages except network
messages", you needed to say "[*,~net]" and if you said "[~net]" by
mistake, you would get no messages at all. Now, if you say "[~net]",
you get everything except networking messages.
When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in
a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing
from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that
by always initializing keys when the state changes.
Fixes bug 2433.
When we stopped using svn, 0.2.1.x lost the ability to notice its svn
revision and report it in the version number. However, it kept
looking at the micro-revision.i file... so if you switched to master,
built tor, then switched to 0.2.1.x, you'd get a micro-revision.i file
from master reported as an SVN tag. This patch takes out the "include
the svn tag" logic entirely.
Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
This patch imposes (very long) limits on the length of a line in a
directory document, and on the length of a certificate. I don't
think it should actually be possible to overrun these remotely,
since we already impose a maximum size on any directory object we're
downloading, but a little defensive programming never hurt anybody.
Roger emailed me that doorss reported these on IRC, but nobody seems
to have put them on the bugtracker.
We need to make sure that the worst thing that a weird consensus param
can do to us is to break our Tor (and only if the other Tors are
reliably broken in the same way) so that the majority of directory
authorities can't pull any attacks that are worse than the DoS that
they can trigger by simply shutting down.
One of these worse things was the cbtnummodes parameter, which could
lead to heap corruption on some systems if the value was sufficiently
large.
This commit fixes this particular issue and also introduces sanity
checking for all consensus parameters.
Our public key functions assumed that they were always writing into a
large enough buffer. In one case, they weren't.
(Incorporates fixes from sebastian)
In dnsserv_resolved(), we carefully made a nul-terminated copy of the
answer in a PTR RESOLVED cell... then never used that nul-terminated
copy. Ouch.
Surprisingly this one isn't as huge a security problem as it could be.
The only place where the input to dnsserv_resolved wasn't necessarily
nul-terminated was when it was called indirectly from relay.c with the
contents of a relay cell's payload. If the end of the payload was
filled with junk, eventdns.c would take the strdup() of the name [This
part is bad; we might crash there if the cell is in a bad part of the
stack or the heap] and get a name of at least length
495[*]. eventdns.c then rejects any name of length over 255, so the
bogus data would be neither transmitted nor altered.
[*] If the name was less than 495 bytes long, the client wouldn't
actually be reading off the end of the cell.
Nonetheless this is a reasonably annoying bug. Better fix it.
Found while looking at bug 2332, reported by doorss. Bugfix on
0.2.0.1-alpha.
Previously, we only looked at up to 128 bytes. This is a bad idea
since socks messages can be at least 256+x bytes long. Now we look at
up to 512 bytes; this should be enough for 0.2.2.x to handle all valid
SOCKS messages. For 0.2.3.x, we can think about handling trickier
cases.
Fixes 2330. Bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
Right now, Tor routers don't save the maxima values from the
bw_history_t between sessions. That's no good, since we use those
values to determine bandwidth. This code adds a new BWHist.*Maximum
set of values to the state file. If they're not present, we estimate
them by taking the observed total bandwidth and dividing it by the
period length, which provides a lower bound.
This should fix bug 1863. I'm calling it a feature.
Previously, our state parsing code would fail to parse a bwhist
correctly if the Interval was anything other than the default
hardcoded 15 minutes. This change makes the parsing less incorrect,
though the resulting history array might get strange values in it if
the intervals don't match the one we're using. (That is, if stuff was
generated in 15 minute intervals, and we read it into an array that
expects 30 minute intervals, we're fine, since values can be combined
pairwise. But if we generate data at 30 minute intervals and read it
into 15 minute intervals, alternating buckets will be empty.)
Bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha.
An object, you'll recall, is something between -----BEGIN----- and
-----END----- tags in a directory document. Some of our code, as
doorss has noted in bug 2352, could assert if one of these ever
overflowed SIZE_T_CEILING but not INT_MAX. As a solution, I'm setting
a maximum size on a single object such that neither of these limits
will ever be hit. I'm also fixing the INT_MAX checks, just to be sure.
When using libevent 2, we use evdns_base_resolve_*(). When not, we
fake evdns_base_resolve_*() using evdns_resolve_*().
Our old check was looking for negative values (like libevent 2
returns), but our eventdns.c code returns 1. This code makes the
check just test for nonzero.
Note that this broken check was not for _resolve_ failures or even for
failures to _launch_ a resolve: it was for failures to _create_ or
_encode_ a resolve request.
Bug introduced in 81eee0ecfff3dac1e9438719d2f7dc0ba7e84a71; found by
lodger; uploaded to trac by rransom. Bug 2363. Fix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
We were decrementing "available" twice for each in-use address we ran
across. This would make us declare that we ran out of virtual
addresses when the address space was only half full.
On Windows, we never use pthreads, since it doesn't usually exist,
and when it does it tends to be a little weirdly-behaved. But some
mingw installations have a pthreads installed, so autoconf detects
pthread.h and tells us about it. This would make us include
pthread.h, which could make for trouble when the iffy pthread.h
tried to include config.h.
This patch changes compat.h so that we never include pthread.h on
Windows. Fixes bug 2313; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
If you had TIME_MAX > INT_MAX, and your "time_to_exhaust_bw =
accountingmax/expected_bandwidth_usage * 60" calculation managed to
overflow INT_MAX, then your time_to_consider value could underflow and
wind up being rediculously low or high. "Low" was no problem;
negative values got caught by the (time_to_consider <= 0) check.
"High", however, would get you a wakeup time somewhere in the distant
future.
The fix is to check for time_to_exhaust_bw overflowing INT_MAX, not
TIME_MAX: We don't allow any accounting interval longer than a month,
so if time_to_exhaust_bw is significantly larger than 31*24*60*60, we
can just clip it.
This is a bugfix on 0.0.9pre6, when accounting was first introduced.
It fixes bug 2146, unless there are other causes there too. The fix
is from boboper. (I tweaked it slightly by removing an assignment
that boboper marked as dead, and lowering a variable that no longer
needed to be function-scoped.)
The old logic would have us fetch from authorities if we were refusing
unknown exits and our exit policy was reject*. Instead, we want to
fetch from authorities if we're refusing unknown exits and our exit
policy is _NOT_ reject*.
Fixed by boboper. Fixes more of 2097. Bugfix on 0.2.2.16-alpha.
We use a hash of the identity key to seed a prng to tell when an
accounting period should end. But thanks to the bug998 changes,
clients no longer have server-identity keys to use as a long-term seed
in accounting calculations. In any case, their identity keys (as used
in TLS) were never never fixed. So we can just set the wakeup time
from a random seed instead there. Still open is whether everybody
should be random.
This patch fixes bug 2235, which was introduced in 0.2.2.18-alpha.
Diagnosed with help from boboper on irc.
Doing so could make Libevent call Libevent from inside a Libevent
logging call, which is a recipe for reentrant confusion and
hard-to-debug crashes. This would especially hurt if Libevent
debug-level logging is enabled AND the user has a controller
watching for low-severity log messages.
Fix bug 2190; fix on 0.1.0.2-rc.
Doing so could make Libevent call Libevent from inside a Libevent
logging call, which is a recipe for reentrant confusion and
hard-to-debug crashes. This would especially hurt if Libevent
debug-level logging is enabled AND the user has a controller
watching for low-severity log messages.
Fix bug 2190; fix on 0.1.0.2-rc.
Pick 5 seconds as the limit. 5 seconds is a compromise here between
making sure the user notices that the bad behaviour is (still) happening
and not spamming their log too much needlessly (the log message is
pretty long). We also keep warning every time if safesocks is
specified, because then the user presumably wants to hear about every
blocked instance.
(This is based on the original patch by Sebastian, then backported to
0.2.2 and with warnings split into their own function.)
Our checks that we don't exceed the 50 KB size limit of extra-info
descriptors apparently failed. This patch fixes these checks and reserves
another 250 bytes for appending the signature. Fixes bug 2183.
We would never actually enforce multiplicity rules when parsing
annotations, since the counts array never got entries added to it for
annotations in the token list that got added by earlier calls to
tokenize_string.
Found by piebeer.
We had a spelling discrepancy between the manpage and the source code
for some option. Resolve these in favor of the manpage, because it
makes more sense (for example, HTTP should be capitalized).
