When openssl is built with no-deprecated, the TLSv1_1_method()
function isn't visible in the headers. That's sad, because that
method is what we were looking at.
Instead, we now look at SSL_CIPHER_get_id(), which is present in
OpenSSL 1.0.1 and later, which is _not_ deprecated, and which is
also present in LibreSSL.
Fixes ticket 25353. Not a bugfix exactly -- we never really worked
with this configuration.
sizeof(ret) is the size of the pointer, not the size of what it
points to. Fortunately, we already have a function to compare
tor_addr_port_t values for equality.
Bugfix on c2c5b13e5d8a77e; bug not in any released Tor. Found by
clang's scan-build.
Now that we update our buckets on demand before reading or writing,
we no longer need to update them all every TokenBucketRefillInterval
msec.
When a connection runs out of bandwidth, we do need a way to
reenable it, however. We do this by scheduling a timer to reenable
all blocked connections for TokenBucketRefillInterval msec after a
connection becomes blocked.
(If we were using PerConnBWRate more, it might make sense to have a
per-connection timer, rather than a single timeout. But since
PerConnBWRate is currently (mostly) unused, I'm going to go for the
simpler approach here, since usually whenever one connection has
become blocked on bandwidth, most connections are blocked on
bandwidth.)
Implements ticket 25373.
Previously this was done as part of the refill callback, but there's
no real reason to do it like that. Since we're trying to remove the
refill callback completely, we can do this work as part of
record_num_bytes_transferred_impl(), which already does quite a lot
of this.
We used to do this 10x per second in connection_buckets_refill();
instead, we now do it when the bucket becomes empty. This change is
part of the work of making connection_buckets_refill() obsolete.
Closes ticket 25828; bugfix on 0.2.3.5-alpha.
We recently merged a circuit cell queue size safeguard. This commit adds the
number of killed circuits that have reached the limit to the DoS heartbeat. It
now looks like this:
[notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many
cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0
single hop clients refused.
Second thing that this patch does. It makes tor always print the DoS
mitigation heartbeat line (for a relay) even though no DoS mitigation have
been enabled. The reason is because we now kill circuits that have too many
cells regardless on if it is enabled or not but also it will give the operator
a chance to learn what is enabled with the heartbeat instead of suddenly
appearing when it is enabled by let say the consensus.
Fixes#25824
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Unfortunately, the units passed to
monotime_coarse_stamp_units_to_approx_msec() was always 0 due to a type
conversion.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit introduces the consensus parameter "circ_max_cell_queue_size"
which controls the maximum number of cells a circuit queue should have.
The default value is currently 50000 cells which is above what should be
expected but keeps us a margin of error for padding cells.
Related to this is #9072. Back in 0.2.4.14-alpha, we've removed that limit due
to a Guard discovery attack. Ticket #25226 details why we are putting back the
limit due to the memory pressure issue on relays.
Fixes#25226
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
