This commit refactors the existing decryption code to make it compatible with
a new logic for when the client authorization is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Because this secret data building logic is not only used by the descriptor
encoding process but also by the descriptor decoding, refactor the function to
take both steps into account.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The new ClientOnionAuthDir option is introduced which is where tor looks to
find the HS v3 client authorization files containing the client private key
material.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously, we encrypted the descriptor without the descriptor cookie. This
commit, when the client auth is enabled, the descriptor cookie is always used.
I also removed the code that is used to generate fake auth clients because it
will not be used anymore.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We need to generate all the related keys when building the descriptor, so that
we can encrypt the descriptor.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The OpenSSL "RSA" object is currently 408 bytes compares to the ASN.1 encoding
which is 140 for a 1024 RSA key.
We save 268 bytes per descriptor (routerinfo_t) *and* microdescriptor
(microdesc_t). Scaling this to 6000 relays, and considering client usually
only have microdescriptors, we save 1.608 MB of RAM which is considerable for
mobile client.
This commit makes it that we keep the RSA onion public key (used for TAP
handshake) in ASN.1 format instead of an OpenSSL RSA object.
Changes is done in both routerinfo_t and microdesc_t.
Closes#27246
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
By removing Tor2Web, there is no way a client can be non anonymous so we
remove that function and the callsites.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In order to switch the default HS version from 2 to 3, we need tor to be smart
and be able to decide on the version by trying to load the service keys during
configuration validation.
Part of #27215
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Part of #27215, we need to call the ed_key_init_from_file function during
option_validate() which is before the global_options variable is set.
This commit make ed_key_init_from_file() stop using get_options() and instead
now has a or_options_t parameter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Bug description: For each descriptor, its revision counter is the OPE
ciphertext of the number of seconds since the start time of its SRV value.
This bug caused us to confuse the SRV start time in the middle of the lifetime
of a descriptor in some edge-cases, which caused descriptor rejects.
Bug cause: The bug occurs when we fetch a 23:00 consensus after
midnight (e.g. at 00:08 when not all dirauths have fetched the latest 00:00
consensus). In that case, the voting schedule (which was used for SRV start
time calculation) would return a valid-after past-midnight, whereas our
consensus would be pre-midnight, and that would confuse the SRV start time
computation which is used by HS revision counters (because we would reset the
start time of SRV, without rotating descriptors).
Bug fix: We now use our local consensus time to calculate the SRV start time,
instead of the voting schedule. The voting schedule does not work as originally
envisioned in this case, because it was created for voting by dirauths and not
for scheduling stuff on clients.
At the same time, sternly warn any person thinking about relying on
any particular format too strictly. If you do this, and your
program breaks, it is your bug, not mine.
This is another attempt to fix 1437668. The assertion here should
be safe, since the rules of networkstatus_get_param() keep the value
it returns in range.
