When looking for an introduction circuit in circuit_get_best(), we log an info
message if we are about to launch a new intro circuit in parallel. However,
the condition was considering marked for close circuit leading to the function
triggering the log info even though there is actually no valid intro circuit.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Make a single entry point for the entire HS subsystem when a client circuit
opens (every HS version).
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Right now there's a single warn_if_unnamed flag for
router_get_consensus_status_by_nickname() and
node_get_by_nickname(), that is nearly always 1. I've turned it
into an 'unsigned' bitfield, and inverted its sense. I've added the
flags argument to node_get_by_hex_id() too, though it does nothing
there right now.
I've removed the router_get_consensus_status_by_nickname() function,
since it was only used in once place.
This patch changes the warning behavior of GETINFO ns/name/<name>,
since all other name lookups from the controller currently warn.
Later I'm going to add more flags, for ed25519 support.
Add a common function for both legacy and prop224 hidden service to increment
and decrement the rendezvous stream counter on an origin circuit.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This introduces a callback to relaunch a service rendezvous circuit when a
previous one failed to build or expired.
It unifies the legacy function rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() with one for
specific to prop224. There is now only one entry point for that which is
hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point() supporting both legacy and prop224
circuits.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Add the entry point from the circuit subsystem of "circuit has opened" which
is for all type of hidden service circuits. For the introduction point, this
commit actually adds the support for handling those circuits when opened and
sending ESTABLISH_INTRO on a circuit.
Rendevzou point circuit aren't supported yet at this commit.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit adds the functionality for a service to build its descriptor.
Also, a global call to build all descriptors for all services is added to the
service scheduled events.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit paves the way for the e2e circuit unittests.
Add a stub for the prop224 equivalent of rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended().
That function was needed for tests, since the legacy function would get
called when we attach streams and our client-side tests would crash with
assert failures on rend_data.
This also introduces hs_client.[ch] to the codebase.
The legacy HS circuit code uses rend_data to match between circuits and
streams. We refactor some of that code so that it understands hs_ident
as well which is used for prop224.
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This unifies CircuitIdleTimeout and PredictedCircsRelevanceTime into a single
option, and randomizes it.
It also gives us control over the default value as well as relay-to-relay
connection lifespan through the consensus.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/or/config.c
src/or/main.c
src/test/testing_common.c
That way, when we are parsing the options and LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is set
to 0, we don't assert trying to get the options list with get_options().
Fixes#21062
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch doesn't cover every case; omitted cases are marked with
"XXXX prop271", as usual. It leaves both the old interface and the
new interface for guard status notification, since they don't
actually work in the same way: the new API wants to be told when a
circuit has failed or succeeded, whereas the old API wants to know
when a channel has failed or succeeded.
I ran into some trouble with directory guard stuff, since when we
pick the directory guard, we don't actually have a circuit to
associate it with. I solved that by allowing guard states to be
associated with directory connections, not just circuits.
This patch is just:
* Code movement
* Adding headers here and there as needed
* Adding a bridges_free_all() with a call to it.
It breaks compilation, since the bridge code needed to make exactly
2 calls into entrynodes.c internals. I'll fix those in the next
commit.
Single onion services and Tor2web deliberately create long-term one-hop
circuits to their intro and rend points, respectively.
These log messages are intended to diagnose issue 8387, which relates to
circuits hanging around forever for no reason.
Fixes bug 20613; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha. Reported by "pastly".
In order to implement proposal 224, we need the data structure rend_data_t to
be able to accomodate versionning that is the current version of hidden
service (2) and the new version (3) and future version.
For that, we implement a series of accessors and a downcast function to get
the v2 data structure. rend_data_t becomes a top level generic place holder.
The entire rend_data_t API has been moved to hs_common.{c|h} in order to
seperate code that is shared from between HS versions and unshared code (in
rendcommon.c).
Closes#19024
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
base16_decodes() now returns the number of decoded bytes. It's interface
changes from returning a "int" to a "ssize_t". Every callsite now checks the
returned value.
Fixes#14013
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
So, back long ago, XXX012 meant, "before Tor 0.1.2 is released, we
had better revisit this comment and fix it!"
But we have a huge pile of such comments accumulated for a large
number of released versions! Not cool.
So, here's what I tried to do:
* 0.2.9 and 0.2.8 are retained, since those are not yet released.
* XXX+ or XXX++ or XXX++++ or whatever means, "This one looks
quite important!"
* The others, after one-by-one examination, are downgraded to
plain old XXX. Which doesn't mean they aren't a problem -- just
that they cannot possibly be a release-blocking problem.
When we connect to a hidden service as a client we may need three internal
circuits, one for the descriptor retrieval, introduction, and rendezvous.
Let's try to make sure we have them. Closes#13239.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Modify callers to correctly handle these new NULL returns:
* fix assert in onion_extend_cpath
* warn and discard circuit in circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch
* warn, discard circuit, and tell controller in handle_control_extendcircuit
Now we only re-scan the list in the cases we did before: when we
have a new circuit that we should try attaching to, or when we have
added a new stream that we haven't tried to attach yet.
This is part of 17590.
Long ago we used to call connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit()
only in a few places, since connection_ap_attach_pending() attaches
all the pending connections, and does so regularly. But this turned
out to have a performance problem: it would introduce a delay to
launching or connecting a stream.
We couldn't just call connection_ap_attach_pending() every time we
make a new connection, since it walks the whole connection list. So
we started calling connection_ap_attach_pending all over, instead!
But that's kind of ugly and messes up our callgraph.
So instead, we now have connection_ap_attach_pending() use a list
only of the pending connections, so we can call it much more
frequently. We have a separate function to scan the whole
connection array to see if we missed adding anything, and log a
warning if so.
Closes ticket #17590
This controls the circuit dirtyness reset behavior added for Tor
Browser's user experience fix (#15482). Unlike previous iterations
of this patch, the tunable actually works, and is documented.
Only applies to connections with SOCKS auth set, so that non-web Tor
activity is not affected.
Simpler version of Nick's patch because the randomness worried me, and I'm not
otherwise sure why we want a max here.
When we ran out of intro points for a hidden service (which could
happen on a newnym), we would change the connection's state back to
"waiting for hidden service descriptor." But this would make an
assertion fail if we went on to call circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch
again.
This fixes bug 16013; I believe the bug was introduced in
38be533c69, where we made it possible for
circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() to change the connection's state.
When set, this limits the maximum number of simultaneous streams per
rendezvous circuit on the server side of a HS, with further RELAY_BEGIN
cells being silently ignored.
This can be modified via "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit", which
if set will cause offending rendezvous circuits to be torn down instead.
Addresses part of #16052.
Stop using an onion address since it's not indexed with that anymore in the
last hid serv request cache. Instead use a base32 encoded descriptor ID
contained in the rend_data_t object.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Tor can now build circuits from a consensus with no exits.
But if it tries to build exit circuits, they fail and flood the logs.
The circuit types in the Exit Circuits list below will only be
built if the current consensus has exits. If it doesn't,
only the Internal Circuits will be built. (This can change
with each new consensus.)
Fixes bug #13814, causes fewer path failures due to #13817.
Exit Circuits:
Predicted Exit Circuits
User Traffic Circuits
Most AP Streams
Circuits Marked Exit
Build Timeout Circuits (with exits)
Internal Circuits:
Hidden Service Server Circuits
Hidden Service Client Circuits
Hidden Service AP Streams
Hidden Service Intro Point Streams
Circuits Marked Internal
Build Timeout Circuits (with no exits)
Other Circuits?
In circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(), for a rendezvous circuit,
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened() but circuit_has_opened() is preferred here
since it will call the right function for a specific circuit purpose.
Furthermore, a controller event is triggered where the former did not.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Allow clients to use optimistic data when connecting to a hidden service,
which should cut out the initial round-trip for client-side programs
including Tor Browser.
(Now that Tor 0.2.2.x is obsolete, all hidden services should support
server-side optimistic data.)
See proposal 181 for details. Implements ticket 13211.
Clients are now willing to send optimistic circuit data (before they
receive a 'connected' cell) to relays of any version. We used to
only do it for relays running 0.2.3.1-alpha or later, but now all
relays are new enough.
Resolves ticket 13153.
