Check if the new pointer is the same as the old one: if it is, it's
probably a bug:
* the caller may have confused current and previous, or
* they may have forgotten to sr_srv_dup().
Putting NULL multiple times is allowed.
Part of 29706.
Refactor the shared random state's memory management so that it actually
takes ownership of the shared random value pointers.
Fixes bug 29706; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
Stop leaking parts of the shared random state in the shared-random unit
tests. The previous fix in 29599 was incomplete.
Fixes bug 29706; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
Fixes bug 29530, where the LOG_ERR messages were occurring when
we had no configured network, and so we were failing the unit tests
because of the recently-merged #28668.
Commit message edited by teor:
We backported 28668 and released it in 0.3.5.8.
This commit backports 29530 to 0.3.5.
Fixes bug 29530 in Tor 0.3.5.8.
This test was previously written to use the contents of the system
headers to decide whether INHERIT_NONE or INHERIT_ZERO was going to
work. But that won't work across different environments, such as
(for example) when the kernel doesn't match the headers. Instead,
we add a testing-only feature to the code to track which of these
options actually worked, and verify that it behaved as we expected.
Closes ticket 29541; bugfix not on any released version of Tor.
Fixes bug 29530, where the LOG_ERR messages were occurring when
we had no configured network, and so we were failing the unit tests
because of the recently-merged #28668.
Bug not in any released Tor.
This test fails in some environments; since the code isn't used in
0.4.0, let's disable it for now.
Band-aid solution for #29534; bug not in any released Tor.
malloc_options needs to be declared extern (and declaring it extern
means we need to initialize it separately)
Fixes bug 29145; bugfix on 0.2.9.3-alpha
Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <katterjohn@gmail.com>
This module is currently implemented to use the same technique as
libottery (later used by the bsds' arc4random replacement), using
AES-CTR-256 as its underlying stream cipher. It's backtracking-
resistant immediately after each call, and prediction-resistant
after a while.
Here's how it works:
We generate psuedorandom bytes using AES-CTR-256. We generate BUFLEN bytes
at a time. When we do this, we keep the first SEED_LEN bytes as the key
and the IV for our next invocation of AES_CTR, and yield the remaining
BUFLEN - SEED_LEN bytes to the user as they invoke the PRNG. As we yield
bytes to the user, we clear them from the buffer.
Every RESEED_AFTER times we refill the buffer, we mix in an additional
SEED_LEN bytes from our strong PRNG into the seed.
If the user ever asks for a huge number of bytes at once, we pull SEED_LEN
bytes from the PRNG and use them with our stream cipher to fill the user's
request.
Because the test is adding entries to the "rend_cache" directly, the
rend_cache_increment_allocation() was never called which made the
rend_cache_clean() call trigger that underflow warning:
rend_cache/clean: [forking] Nov 29 09:55:04.024 [warn] rend_cache_decrement_allocation(): Bug: Underflow in rend_cache_decrement_allocation (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev 2240fe63feb9a8cf)
The test is still good and valid.
Fixes#28660
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Using an anonymous mmap() is a good way to get pages that we can set
kernel-level flags on, like minherit() or madvise() or mlock().
We're going to use that so that we can make uninheritable locked
pages to store PRNG data.
Rewrite service_intro_point_new() to take a node_t. Since
node_get_link_specifier_smartlist() supports IPv6 link specifiers,
this refactor adds IPv6 addresses to onion service descriptors.
Part of 23576, implements 26992.
