If a node can prove its Ed25519 identity, don't consider connections
to it canonical unless they match both identities.
Includes link handshake changes needed to avoid crashing with bug
warnings, since the tests now reach more parts of the code.
Closes ticket 20355
(Only run the connection_or_group_set_badness_() function on groups
of channels that have the same RSA and Ed25519 identities.)
There's a possible opportunity here where we might want to set a
channel to "bad" if it has no ed25519 identity and some other
channel has some. Also there's an opportunity to add a warning if
we ever have an Ed mismatch on open connections with the same RSA
ID.
This function has never gotten testing for the case where an
identity had been set, and then got set to something else. Rather
than make it handle those cases, we forbid them.
If there is some horrible bug in our ed25519 link authentication
code that causes us to label every single ed25519-having node as
non-running, we'll be glad we had this. Otherwise we can remove it
later.
This patch makes two absolutely critical changes:
- If an ed25519 identity is not as expected when creating a channel,
we call that channel unsuccessful and close it.
- When a client creating a channel or an extend cell for a circuit, we
only include the ed25519 identity if we believe that the node on
the other side supports ed25519 link authentication (from
#15055). Otherwise we will insist on nodes without the right
link protocol authenticating themselves.
- When deciding to extend to another relay, we only upgrade the
extend to extend by ed25519 ID when we know the ed25519 ID _and_
we know that the other side can authenticate.
This patch also tells directory servers, when probing nodes, to
try to check their ed25519 identities too (if they can authenticate
by ed25519 identity).
Also, handle the case where we connect by RSA Id, and learn the
ED25519 ID for the node in doing so.
I need to be able to turn on Ed25519 support in client generation
of extend cells so I can test it, but leave it off-by-default until
enough clients support it for us to turn it on for a bunch at once.
This is part of #15056 / prop#220.
- forbid extending to the previous hop by Ed25519 ID.
- If we know the Ed25519 ID for the next hop and the client doesn't,
insist on the one from the consensus.
Right now, there's only a mechanism to look for a channel where the
RSA ID matches *and* the ED ID matches. We can add a separate map
later if we want.
Single onion services and Tor2web deliberately create long-term one-hop
circuits to their intro and rend points, respectively.
These log messages are intended to diagnose issue 8387, which relates to
circuits hanging around forever for no reason.
Fixes bug 20613; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha. Reported by "pastly".
It's not okay to use the same varargs list twice, and apparently
some windows build environments produce code here that would leave
tor_asprintf() broken. Fix for bug 20560; bugfix on 0.2.2.11-alpha
when tor_asprintf() was introduced.
This field indicates if the service is a Single Onion Service if present in
the descriptor.
Closes#19642
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
