If a hostname is supplied to tor-resolve which is too long, it will be
silently truncated, resulting in a different hostname lookup:
$ tor-resolve $(python -c 'print("google.com" + "m" * 256)')
If tor-resolve uses SOCKS5, the length is stored in an unsigned char,
which overflows in this case and leads to the hostname "google.com".
As this one is a valid hostname, it returns an address instead of giving
an error due to the invalid supplied hostname.
Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow.
Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor".
Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352),
commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012.
The length of auth_data from an INTRODUCE2 cell is checked when the
auth_type is recognized (1 or 2), but not for any other non-zero
auth_type. Later, auth_data is assumed to have at least
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN bytes, leading to a client-triggered out of bounds
read.
Fixed by checking auth_len before comparing the descriptor cookie
against known clients.
Fixes#15823; bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha.
Bug 21242 occurred because we asserted that extend_info_from_node()
had succeeded...even though we already had the code to handle such a
failure. We fixed that in 93b39c5162.
But there were four other cases in our code where we called
extend_info_from_node() and either tor_assert()ed that it returned
non-NULL, or [in one case] silently assumed that it returned
non-NULL. That's not such a great idea. This patch makes those
cases check for a bug of this kind instead.
Fixes bug 21372; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha when
extend_info_from_node() was introduced.
Once a second, we go over all services and consider the validity of the intro
points. Now, also try to remove expiring nodes that have no more circuit
associated to them. This is possible if we moved an intro point object
previously to that list and the circuit actually timed out or was closed by
the introduction point itself.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
