Since 0.2.4.11-alpha (in 0196647970) we've tried to randomize
the start time to up to some time in the past. But unfortunately we
allowed the start time to be in the future as well, which isn't
really legit.
The new behavior lets the start time be be up to
MAX(cert_lifetime-2days, 0) in the past, but never in the future.
Fixes bug 21420; bugfix on 0.2.4.11-alpha.
Teor thinks that this connection_dirserv_add_dir_bytes_to_outbuf()
might be the problem, if the "remaining" calculation underflows. So
I'm adding a couple of checks there, and improving the casts.
When encoding a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, we were using the sizeof() on a
pointer instead of using the real size of the destination buffer leading to an
overflow passing an enormous value to the signing digest function.
Fortunately, that value was only used to make sure the destination buffer
length was big enough for the key size and in this case it always was because
of the overflow.
Fixes#21553
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
strto* and _atoi64 accept +, -, and various whitespace before numeric
characters. And permitted whitespace is different between POSIX and Windows.
Fixes bug 21507 and part of 21508; bugfix on 0.0.8pre1.
This patch makes us store the number of sent and received RELAY_DATA
cells used for directory connections. We log the numbers after we have
received an EOF in connection_dir_client_reached_eof() from the
directory server.
Instead of returning 404 error code, this led to a NULL pointer being used and
thus a crash of tor.
Fixes#21471
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Fixes bug 20894; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
We already applied a workaround for this as 20834, so no need to
freak out (unless you didn't apply 20384 yet).
This should be "impossible" without making a SHA1 collision, but
let's not keep the assumption that SHA1 collisions are super-hard.
This prevents another case related to 21278. There should be no
behavioral change unless -ftrapv is on.
I think this one probably can't underflow, since the input ranges
are small. But let's not tempt fate.
This patch also replaces the "cmp" functions here with just "eq"
functions, since nothing actually checked for anything besides 0 and
nonzero.
Related to 21278.
Fix for TROVE-2017-001 and bug 21278.
(Note: Instead of handling signed ints "correctly", we keep the old
behavior, except for the part where we would crash with -ftrapv.)
This is a purely cosmetic patch that changes RELAY_BEGINDIR in various
comments to RELAY_BEGIN_DIR, which should make it easier to grep for the
symbols.
According to 21116, it seems to be needed for Wheezy Raspbian build. Also,
manpage of socket(2) does confirm that this errno value should be catched as
well in case of no support from the OS of IPv4 or/and IPv6.
Fixes#21116
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch ensures that we log the size of the inbuf when a directory
client have reached EOF on the connection.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21206
This patch makes the log-statements in `connection_dir_client_reached_eof`
more explicit by writing "body size" instead of just "size" which could
be confused as being the size of the entire response, which would
include HTTP status-line and headers.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21206
This patch adds a debug log statement when sending a request to a
directory server. The information logged includes: the payload size (if
available), the total size of the request, the address and port of the
directory server, and the purpose of the directory connection.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21206
If a hostname is supplied to tor-resolve which is too long, it will be
silently truncated, resulting in a different hostname lookup:
$ tor-resolve $(python -c 'print("google.com" + "m" * 256)')
If tor-resolve uses SOCKS5, the length is stored in an unsigned char,
which overflows in this case and leads to the hostname "google.com".
As this one is a valid hostname, it returns an address instead of giving
an error due to the invalid supplied hostname.
