In a couple of places, to implement the OOM-circuit-killer defense
against sniper attacks, we have counters to remember the age of
cells or data chunks. These timers were based on wall clock time,
which can move backwards, thus giving roll-over results for our age
calculation. This commit creates a low-budget monotonic time, based
on ratcheting gettimeofday(), so that even in the event of a time
rollback, we don't do anything _really_ stupid.
A future version of Tor should update this function to do something
even less stupid here, like employ clock_gettime() or its kin.
See 1d2179bc90 in master for details.
"""
Fall back to registered country if necessary.
When extracting geoip and geoip6 files from MaxMind's GeoLite2 Country
database, we only look at country->iso_code which is the two-character ISO
3166-1 country code of the country where MaxMind believes the end user is
located.
But if MaxMind thinks a range belongs to anonymous proxies, they don't put
anything there. Hence, we omit those ranges and resolve them all to '??'.
That's not what we want.
What we should do is first try country->iso_code, and if there's no such
key, try registered_country->iso_code which is the country in which the
ISP has registered the IP address.
In short: let's fill all A1 entries with what ARIN et. al think.
"""
When extracting geoip and geoip6 files from MaxMind's GeoLite2 Country
database, we only look at country->iso_code which is the two-character ISO
3166-1 country code of the country where MaxMind believes the end user is
located.
But if MaxMind thinks a range belongs to anonymous proxies, they don't put
anything there. Hence, we omit those ranges and resolve them all to '??'.
That's not what we want.
What we should do is first try country->iso_code, and if there's no such
key, try registered_country->iso_code which is the country in which the
ISP has registered the IP address.
In short: let's fill all A1 entries with what ARIN et. al think.
If the cert turns out to be invalid or if wget is otherwise unable to
verify it, it's going to return an error and not download the file for us.
Spotted by nickm.
It's possible for two threads to hit assertion failures at the same
time. If that happens, let's keep them from stomping on the same
cb_buf field.
Fixes bug 11048; bugfix on 0.2.5.2-alpha. Reported by "cypherpunks".
Back in 5e762e6a5c, non-exit servers
stopped launching DNS requests for users. So there's no need for them
to see if their DNS answers are hijacked.
Patch from Matt Pagan. I think this is a 965 fix.
For a client using a SocksPort connection and IPv6, the connect reply
from tor daemon did not handle AF_INET6 thus sending back the wrong
payload to the client.
A changes file is provided and this fixes#10987
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Since the first stat call is made for it to deliberately fail, and we
reference st.st_mode without st having valid data, st.st_mode can contain
garbage and cause chmod to fail with EINVAL. We rerun stat and ensure it
succeeded.
Also make use of tt_abort_perror, to properly convey failure reasons to
the user.
clang 3.4 introduced a new by-default warning about unused static
functions, which we triggered heavily for the hashtable and map function
generating macros. We can use __attribute__ ((unused)) (thanks nickm for
the suggestion :-) ) to silence these warnings.
When we have more than two return values, we should really be using
an enum rather than "-2 means this, -1 means that, 0 means this, and
1 or more means a number."
The latest GeoLite2 database includes a pointer from 2001::/32 to the root
node of the IPv4 address space in the tree. We need to exclude this whole
address space from geoip6, similar to how we exclude IPv4-mapped IPv6
addresses and the 6to4 mapping subnet.
If you had a resolv.conf file with a nameserver line containing no
nameserver IP, we would crash. That's not terrible, but it's not
desirable.
Fixes bug 8788; bugfix on 0.1.1.23. Libevent already has this fix.
This patch splits out some of the functions in OOM handling so that
it's easier to check them without involving the rest of Tor or
requiring that the circuits be "wired up".
It's increasingly apparent that we want to make sure we initialize our
PRNG nice and early, or else OpenSSL will do it for us. (OpenSSL
doesn't do _too_ bad a job, but it's nice to do it ourselves.)
We'll also need this for making sure we initialize the siphash key
before we do any hashes.
I've made an exception for cases where I'm sure that users can't
influence the inputs. This is likely to cause a slowdown somewhere,
but it's safer to siphash everything and *then* look for cases to
optimize.
This patch doesn't actually get us any _benefit_ from siphash yet,
since we don't really randomize the key at any point.
siphash is a hash function designed for producing hard-to-predict
64-bit outputs from short inputs and a 128-bit key. It's chosen for
security and speed.
See https://131002.net/siphash/ for more information on siphash.
Source: https://github.com/majek/csiphash/
(There is no longer meaningfully any such thing as a HS authority,
since we stopped uploading or downloading v0 hs descriptors in
0.2.2.1-alpha.)
Implements #10881, and part of #10841.
Apparently fedora currently has ECDH but not P224. This isn't a huge
deal, since we no longer use OpenSSL's P224 ever (see #9780 and
72c1e5acfe). But we shouldn't have segfaulting benchmarks really.
Fixes bug 10835; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
This patch removes an "if (chan)" that occurred at a place where
chan was definitely non-NULL. Having it there made some static
analysis tools conclude that we were up to shenanigans.
This resolves#9979.
