This commit introduces the consensus parameter "circ_max_cell_queue_size"
which controls the maximum number of cells a circuit queue should have.
The default value is currently 50000 cells which is above what should be
expected but keeps us a margin of error for padding cells.
Related to this is #9072. Back in 0.2.4.14-alpha, we've removed that limit due
to a Guard discovery attack. Ticket #25226 details why we are putting back the
limit due to the memory pressure issue on relays.
Fixes#25226
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Add to the Denial of Service section of the man page an explanation about the
three different mitigation Tor has.
Fixes#25248.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In d1874b4339, we adjusted this check so that we insist on
using routerinfos for bridges. That's almost correct... but if we
have a bridge that is also a regular relay, then we should use
insist on its routerinfo when connecting to it as a bridge
(directly), and be willing to use its microdescriptor when
connecting to it elsewhere in our circuits.
This bug is a likely cause of some (all?) of the (exit_ei == NULL)
failures we've been seeing.
Fixes bug 25691; bugfix on 0.3.3.4-alpha
This patch changes the algorithm of compute_real_max_mem_in_queues() to
use 0.4 * RAM iff the system has more than or equal to 8 GB of RAM, but
will continue to use the old value of 0.75 * RAM if the system have less
than * GB of RAM available.
This patch also adds tests for compute_real_max_mem_in_queues().
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/24782
This one happens if for some reason you start with DirPort enabled
but server mode turned off entirely.
Fixes a case of bug 23693; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha.
This patch lifts the list of default directory authorities from config.c
into their own auth_dirs.inc file, which is then included in config.c
using the C preprocessor.
Patch by beastr0.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/24854
Directory authorities no longer vote in favor of the Guard flag
for relays that don't advertise directory support.
Starting in Tor 0.3.0.1-alpha, Tor clients have been avoiding using
such relays in the Guard position, leading to increasingly broken load
balancing for the 5%-or-so of Guards that don't advertise directory
support.
Fixes bug 22310; bugfix on 0.3.0.6.
The anchor here was originally introduced to make sure that the
manpage would format correctly, but we had mistaken it for a section
anchor, and introduced a bogus section heading in 3563a2c819.
Fixes bug 25582; bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
If we failed to connect at the TCP level to a relay, note it down and refuse
to connect again for another 60 seconds.
Fixes#24767
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This update is needed to make it consistent with the behavior of
node_awaiting_ipv6(), which doesn't believe in the addresses from
routerinfos unless it actually plans to use those routerinfos.
Fixes bug 25213; bugfix on b66b62fb75 in 0.3.3.1-alpha,
which tightened up the definition of node_awaiting_ipv6().
There was a nonfatal assertion in pathbias_should_count that would
trigger if onehop_tunnel was set, but the desired_path_length was
greater than 1. This patch fixes that. Fixes bug 24903; bugfix on
0.2.5.2-alpha.
Make sure we actually only report client channel to the geoip cache instead of
looking if it is a known relay. Looking if it is a known relay can be
unreliable because they come and go from the consensus.
Fixes#24904
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Because of #25306 for which we are unable to reproduce nor understand how it
is possible, this commit removes the asserts() and BUG() on the missing
descriptors instead when rotating them.
This allows us to log more data on error but also to let tor recover
gracefully instead of dying.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch adds some additional logging to circuits_handle_oom() to give
us more information about which specific compression backend that is
using a certain amount of memory.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/25372
This should avoid most intermittent test failures on developer and CI machines,
but there could (and probably should) be a more elegant solution.
Also, this test was testing that the IP was created and its expiration time was
set to a time greater than or equal to `now+INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS+5`:
/* Time to expire MUST also be in that range. We add 5 seconds because
* there could be a gap between setting now and the time taken in
* service_intro_point_new. On ARM, it can be surprisingly slow... */
tt_u64_op(ip->time_to_expire, OP_GE,
now + INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS + 5);
However, this appears to be a typo, since, according to the comment above it,
adding five seconds was done because the IP creation can be slow on some
systems. But the five seconds is added to the *minimum* time we're comparing
against, and so it actually functions to make this test *more* likely to fail on
slower systems. (It should either subtract five seconds, or instead add it to
time_to_expire.)
* FIXES#25450: https://bugs.torproject.org/25450
The C code and the rust code had different separate integer overflow
bugs here. That suggests that we're better off just forbidding this
pathological case.
Also, add tests for expected behavior on receiving a bad protocol
list in a consensus.
Fixes another part of 25249.
This one can only be exploited if you can generate a correctly
signed consensus, so it's not as bad as 25074.
Fixes bug 25251; also tracked as TROVE-2018-004.
In some cases we had checked for it, but in others we had not. One
of these cases could have been used to remotely cause
denial-of-service against directory authorities while they attempted
to vote.
Fixes TROVE-2018-001.
since all it does is produce false positives
this commit should get merged into 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 *and* 0.3.1, even
though the code in the previous commit is already present in 0.3.1. sorry
for the mess.
[Cherry-picked]
since all it does is produce false positives
this commit should get merged into 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 *and* 0.3.1, even
though the code in the previous commit is already present in 0.3.1. sorry
for the mess.
This commit takes a piece of commit af8cadf3a9 and a piece of commit
46fe353f25, with the goal of making channel_is_client() be based on what
sort of connection handshake the other side used, rather than seeing
whether the other side ever sent a create_fast cell to us.
We had this safeguard around dos_init() but not when the consensus changes
which can modify consensus parameters and possibly enable the DoS mitigation
even if tor wasn't a public relay.
Fixes#25223
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Explicitly inform the operator of the rejected relay to set a valid email
address in the ContactInfo field and contact bad-relays@ mailing list.
Fixes#25170
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Explicitly inform the operator of the rejected relay to set a valid email
address in the ContactInfo field and contact bad-relays@ mailing list.
Fixes#25170
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
At this commit, the SocksSocketsGroupWritable option is renamed to
UnixSocksGroupWritable. A deprecated warning is triggered if the old option is
used and tor will use it properly.
Fixes#24343
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
On slow system, 1 msec between one read and the other was too tight. For
instance, it failed on armel with a 4msec gap:
https://buildd.debian.org/status/package.php?p=tor&suite=experimental
Increase to 10 msec for now to address slow system. It is important that we
keep this OP_LE test in so we make sure the msec/usec/nsec read aren't
desynchronized by huge gaps. We'll adjust again if we ever encounter a system
that goes slower than 10 msec between calls.
Fixes#25113
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Remove a series of connection counters that were only used when dumping the
rephist statistics with SIGUSR1 signal.
This reduces the or_history_t structure size.
Closes#25163
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Services can keep rendezvous circuits for a while so don't log them if tor is
a single onion service.
Fixes#25116
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
If the cache is using 20% of our maximum allowed memory, clean 10% of it. Same
behavior as the HS descriptor cache.
Closes#25122
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This reverts commit 9a06282546.
It appears that I misunderstood how the seccomp2 filter rules
interact. It appears that `SCMP_ACT_ERRNO()` always takes
precedence over `SCMP_ACT_ALLOW()` -- I had thought instead that
earlier rules would override later ones. But this change caused bug
25115 (not in any released Tor).
The accurate address of a connection is real_addr, not the addr member.
channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method() now returns real_addr instead.
Fixes#24952; bugfix on 707c1e2 in 0.2.4.11-alpha.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Tor preemptiely builds circuits and they can be cannibalized later in their
lifetime. A Guard node can become unusable (from our guard state) but we can
still have circuits using that node opened. It is important to not pick those
circuits for any usage through the cannibalization process.
Fixes#24469
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In 0.3.2.1-alpha, we've added notify_networkstatus_changed() in order to have
a way to notify other subsystems that the consensus just changed. The old and
new consensus are passed to it.
Before this patch, this was done _before_ the new consensus was set globally
(thus NOT accessible by getting the latest consensus). The scheduler
notification was assuming that it was set and select_scheduler() is looking at
the latest consensus to get the parameters it might needs. This was very wrong
because at that point it is still the old consensus set globally.
This commit changes the notify_networkstatus_changed() to be the "before"
function and adds an "after" notification from which the scheduler subsystem
is notified.
Fixes#24975
This is the quick fix that is keeping the channel in PENDING state so if we
ever try to reschedule the same channel, it won't happened.
Fixes#24700
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
It is possible in normal circumstances that a client fetches a descriptor
that has a lower revision counter than the one in its cache. This can happen
due to HSDir desync.
Fixes#24976
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In 0.3.2.1-alpha, we've added this function in order to have a way to notify
other subsystems that the consensus just changed. The old consensus and the
new one are passed to it.
Before this patch, this was done _before_ the new consensus was set globally
(thus NOT accessible by getting the latest consensus). The scheduler
notification was assuming that it was set and select_scheduler() is looking at
the latest consensus to get the parameters it might needs. This was very wrong
because at that point it is still the old consensus set globally.
With this commit, notify_networkstatus_changed() has been moved _after_ the
new consensus is set globally. The main obvious reasons is to fix the bug
described above and in #24975. The other reason is that this notify function
doesn't return anything which could be allowing the possibility of refusing to
set the new consensus on error. In other words, the new consensus is set right
after the notification whatever happens.
It does no harm or change in behavior to set the new consensus first and then
notify the subsystems. The two functions currently used are for the control
port using the old and new consensus and sending the diff. The second is the
scheduler that needs the new consensus to be set globally before being called.
Of course, the function has been documented accordinly to clearly state it is
done _after_ the new consensus is set.
Fixes#24975
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
