This is important, since otherwise an attacker can use timing info
to probe the internal network.
Also, add an option (ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) so that
TestingTorNetwork won't break.
Fix for bug 6710; bugfix on all released versions of Tor.
This is done to avoid spurious warns. Additional log lines are also
added to try to track down the codepaths where we are somehow overcounting
success counts.
Thanks to the changes we started making with SocksPort and friends
in 0.2.3.3-alpha, any of our code that did "if (options->Sockport)"
became wrong, since "SocksPort 0" would make that test true whereas
using the default SocksPort value would make it false. (We didn't
actually do "if (options->SockPort)" but we did have tests for
TransPort. When we moved DirPort, ORPort, and ControlPort over to
the same system in 0.2.3.9-alpha, the problem got worse, since our
code is littered with checks for DirPort and ORPort as booleans.
This code renames the current linelist-based FooPort options to
FooPort_lines, and adds new FooPort_set options which get set at
parse-and-validate time on the or_options_t. FooPort_set is true
iff we will actually try to open a listener of the given type. (I
renamed the FooPort options rather than leave them alone so that
every previous user of a FooPort would need to get inspected, and so
that any new code that forgetfully uses FooPort will need fail to
compile.)
Fix for bug 6507.
The defense counts the circuit failure rate for each guard for the past N
circuits. Failure is defined as the ability to complete a first hop, but not
finish completing the circuit all the way to the exit.
If the failure rate exceeds a certain amount, a notice is emitted.
If it exceeds a greater amount, a warn is emitted and the guard is disabled.
These values are governed by consensus parameters which we intend to tune as
we perform experiments and statistical simulations.
Also, try to resolve some doxygen issues. First, define a magic
"This is doxygen!" macro so that we take the correct branch in
various #if/#else/#endifs in order to get the right documentation.
Second, add in a few grouping @{ and @} entries in order to get some
variables and fields to get grouped together.
This tells the windows headers to give us definitions that didn't
exist before XP -- like the ones that we need for IPv6 support.
See bug #5861. We didn't run into this issue with mingw, since
mingw doesn't respect _WIN32_WINNT as well as it should for some of
its definitions.
This time, I follow grarpamp's suggestion and move the check for
.exit+AllowDotExit 0 to the top of connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach,
before any rewriting occurs. This way, .exit addresses are
forbidden as they arrive from a socks connection or a DNSPort
request, and not otherwise.
It _is_ a little more complicated than that, though. We need to
treat any .exit addresses whose source is TrackHostExits as meaning
that we can retry without that exit. We also need to treat any
.exit address that comes from an AutomapHostsOnResolve operation as
user-provided (and thus forbidden if AllowDotExits==0), so that
transitioning from AllowDotExits==1 to AllowDotExits==0 will
actually turn off automapped .exit addresses.
This fixes a side-channel attack on the (fortunately unused!)
BridgePassword option for bridge authorities. Fix for bug 5543;
bugfix on 0.2.0.14-alpha.
This is ticket 2479. Roger's original explanation was:
We have a series of bugs where relays publish a descriptor within
12 hours of their last descriptor, but the authorities drop it
because it's not different "enough" from the last one and it's
too close to the last one.
The original goal of this idea was to a) reduce the number of new
descriptors authorities accept (and thus have to store) and b)
reduce the total number of descriptors that clients and mirrors
fetch. It's a defense against bugs where relays publish a new
descriptor every minute.
Now that we're putting out one consensus per hour, we're doing
better at the total damage that can be caused by 'b'.
There are broader-scale design changes that would help here, and
we've had a trac entry open for years about how relays should
recognize that they're not in the consensus, or recognize when
their publish failed, and republish sooner.
In the mean time, I think we should change some of the parameters
to make the problem less painful.
This commit is completely mechanical; I used this perl script to make it:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i.bak -p
if (/^\s*\#/) {
s/MS_WINDOWS/_WIN32/g;
s/\bWIN32\b/_WIN32/g;
}
The Tor2webMode torrc option is still required to run a Tor client in
'tor2web mode', but now it can't be turned on at runtime in a normal build
of Tor. (And a tor2web build of Tor can't be used as a normal Tor client,
so we don't have to worry as much about someone distributing packages with
this particular pistol accessible to normal users.)
Comments below focus on changes, see diff for added code.
New type tor_addr_port_t holding an IP address and a TCP/UDP port.
New flag in routerinfo_t, ipv6_preferred. This should go in the
node_t instead but not now.
Replace node_get_addr() with
- node_get_prim_addr() for primary address, i.e. IPv4 for now
- node_get_pref_addr() for preferred address, IPv4 or IPv6.
Rename node_get_addr_ipv4h() node_get_prim_addr_ipv4h() for
consistency. The primary address will not allways be an IPv4 address.
Same for node_get_orport() -> node_get_prim_orport().
Rewrite node_is_a_configured_bridge() to take all OR ports into account.
Extend argument list to extend_info_from_node and
extend_info_from_router with a flag indicating if we want to use the
routers primary address or the preferred address. Use the preferred
address in as few situtations as possible for allowing clients to
connect to bridges over IPv6.
