When we didn't do this before, we'd have some still-reachable memory
warnings, and we'd find ourselves crashing when we tried to
reinitialize libevent.
Part of 24581 (don't crash when restarting Tor in-process)
This commit was made mechanically by this perl script:
\#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
next if /^#define FREE_AND_NULL/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL\((\w+),/FREE_AND_NULL\(${1}_t, ${1}_free_,/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL_UNMATCHED\(/FREE_AND_NULL\(/;
This commit removes the old FREE_AND_NULL, and renames the old
FREE_AND_NULL_UNMATCHED so that it is now called FREE_AND_NULL.
This will break all the FREE_AND_NULL_* users; the next commit will
fix them.
Couple things happen in this commit. First, we do not re-queue a cell back in
the circuit queue if the write packed cell failed. Currently, it is close to
impossible to have it failed but just in case, the channel is mark as closed
and we move on.
The second thing is that the channel_write_packed_cell() always took ownership
of the cell whatever the outcome. This means, on success or failure, it needs
to free it.
It turns out that that we were using the wrong free function in one case and
not freeing it in an other possible code path. So, this commit makes sure we
only free it in one place that is at the very end of
channel_write_packed_cell() which is the top layer of the channel abstraction.
This makes also channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method() return a negative value
on error.
Two unit tests had to be fixed (quite trivial) due to a double free of the
packed cell in the test since now we do free it in all cases correctly.
Part of #23709
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Split hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(). One returns only established
circuits (hs_circuitmap_get_established_rend_circ_client_side()) and the other
returns all kinds of circuits.
Fixes#23459
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffernandezmancera@gmail.com>
Previously, circuit_stream_is_being_handled incorrectly reported
that (1) an exit port was "handled" by a circuit regardless of
whether the circuit was already isolated in some way, and
(2) that a stream could be "handled" by a circuit even if their
isolation settings were incompatible.
As a result of (1), in Tor Browser, circuit_get_unhandled_ports was
reporting that all ports were handled even though all non-internal
circuits had already been isolated by a SOCKS username+password.
Therefore, circuit_predict_and_launch_new was declining to launch
new exit circuits. Then, when the user visited a new site in Tor
Browser, a stream with new SOCKS credentials would be initiated,
and the stream would have to wait while a new circuit with those
credentials could be built. That wait was making the
time-to-first-byte longer than it needed to be.
Now, clean, not-yet-isolated circuit(s) will be automatically
launched ahead of time and be ready for use whenever a new stream
with new SOCKS credentials (or other isolation criteria) is
initiated.
Fixes bug 18859. Thanks to Nick Mathewson for improvements.
