Like the previous commit about the INTRODUCE_ACK status code, change all auth
key type to use the one defined in the trunnel file.
Standardize the use of these auth type to a common ABI.
Part of #30454
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This enum was the exact same as hs_intro_ack_status_t that was removed at the
previous commit. It was used client side when parsing the INTRODUCE_ACK cell.
Now, the entire code dealing with the INTRODUCE_ACK cell (both sending and
receiving) have been modified to all use the same ABI defined in the trunnel
introduce1 file.
Finally, the client will default to the normal behavior when receiving an
unknown NACK status code which is to note down that we've failed and re-extend
to the next intro point. This way, unknown status code won't trigger a
different behavior client side.
Part of #30454.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Remove the hs_intro_ack_status_t enum and move the value into trunnel. Only
use these values from now on in the intro point code.
Interestingly enough, the client side also re-define these values in hs_cell.h
with the hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t enum. Next commit will fix that and force
to use the trunnel ABI.
Part of #30454
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously we purged it in 1-hour increments -- but one-hour is the
maximum TTL for the cache! Now we do it in 25%-TTL increments.
Fixes bug 29617; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
Fortunately, in 0.3.5.1-alpha we improved logging for various
failure cases involved with onion service client auth.
Unfortunately, for this one, we freed the file right before logging
its name.
Fortunately, tor_free() sets its pointer to NULL, so we didn't have
a use-after-free bug.
Unfortunately, passing NULL to %s is not defined.
Fortunately, GCC 9.1.1 caught the issue!
Unfortunately, nobody has actually tried building Tor with GCC 9.1.1
before. Or if they had, they didn't report the warning.
Fixes bug 30475; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
The INTRODUCE1 trunnel definition file doesn't support that value so it can
not be used else it leads to an assert on the intro point side if ever tried.
Fortunately, it was impossible to reach that code path.
Part of #30454
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In 0.3.4 and later, these functions are declared in rephist.h:
STATIC uint64_t find_largest_max(bw_array_t *b);
STATIC void commit_max(bw_array_t *b);
STATIC void advance_obs(bw_array_t *b);
But in 0.2.9, they are declared in rephist.c and test_relay.c.
So compilers fail with a "must use 'struct' tag" error.
We add the missing struct typedef in test_relay.c, to match the
declarations in rephist.c.
(Merge commit 813019cc57 moves these functions into rephist.h instead.)
Fixes bug 30184; not in any released version of Tor.
When releasing OpenSSL patch-level maintenance updates,
we do not want to rebuild binaries using it.
And since they guarantee ABI stability, we do not have to.
Without this patch, warning messages were produced
that confused users:
https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1129411
Fixes bug 30190; bugfix on 0.2.4.2-alpha commit 7607ad2bec
Signed-off-by: Bernhard M. Wiedemann <bwiedemann@suse.de>
In 0.3.4 and later, we declare write_array as:
extern struct bw_array_t *write_array;
...
typedef struct bw_array_t bw_array_t;
But in 0.2.9, we declare write_array as:
typedef struct bw_array_t bw_array_t;
extern bw_array_t *write_array;
And then again in rephist.c:
typedef struct bw_array_t bw_array_t;
So some compilers fail with a duplicate declaration error.
We backport 684b396ce5, which removes the duplicate declaration.
And this commit deals with the undeclared type error.
Backports a single line from merge commit 813019cc57.
Fixes bug 30184; not in any released version of Tor.
Previously, our use of abort() would break anywhere that we didn't
include stdlib.h. This was especially troublesome in case where
tor_assert_nonfatal() was used with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL, since that
one seldom gets tested.
As an alternative, we could have just made this header include
stdlib.h. But that seems bloaty.
Fixes bug 30189; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha.
Unlike kill, timelimit can only signal the process it launches. So we need
timelimit to launch python, not make.
Closes ticket 30117; diagnostic for 29437.
The function compat_getdelim_ is used for tor_getline if tor is compiled
on a system that lacks getline and getdelim. These systems should be
very rare, considering that getdelim is POSIX.
If this system is further a 32 bit architecture, it is possible to
trigger a double free with huge files.
If bufsiz has been already increased to 2 GB, the next chunk would
be 4 GB in size, which wraps around to 0 due to 32 bit limitations.
A realloc(*buf, 0) could be imagined as "free(*buf); return malloc(0);"
which therefore could return NULL. The code in question considers
that an error, but will keep the value of *buf pointing to already
freed memory.
The caller of tor_getline() would free the pointer again, therefore
leading to a double free.
This code can only be triggered in dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
with a huge measured bandwith list file on a system that actually
allows to reach 2 GB of space through realloc.
It is not possible to trigger this on Linux with glibc or other major
*BSD systems even on unit tests, because these systems cannot reach
so much memory due to memory fragmentation.
This patch is effectively based on the penetration test report of
cure53 for curl available at https://cure53.de/pentest-report_curl.pdf
and explained under section "CRL-01-007 Double-free in aprintf() via
unsafe size_t multiplication (Medium)".
