Also, when we log about a failure from base32_decode(), we now
say that the length is wrong or that the characters were invalid:
previously we would just say that there were invalid characters.
Follow-up on 28913 work.
When retrying all SOCKS connection because new directory information just
arrived, do not BUG() if a connection in state AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT is
found to have a usable descriptor.
There is a rare case when this can happen as detailed in #28669 so the right
thing to do is put that connection back in circuit wait state so the
descriptor can be retried.
Fixes#28669
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This helper function marks an entry connection as pending for a circuit and
changes its state to AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT. The timestamps are set to
now() so it can be considered as new.
No behaviour change, this helper function will be used in next commit.
Part of #28669
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Use the helper function connection_ap_mark_as_waiting_for_renddesc()
introduced in previous commit everywhere in the code where an AP connection
state is transitionned to AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT.
Part of #28669
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
With the new refresh_service_descriptor() function we had both
refresh_service_descriptor() and update_service_descriptor() which is basically
the same thing.
This commit renames update_service_descriptor() to
update_service_descriptor_intro_points() to make it clear it's not a generic
refresh and it's only about intro points.
Commit changes no code.
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes#27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When storing a descriptor in the client cache, if we are about to replace an
existing descriptor, make sure to close every introduction circuits of the old
descriptor so we don't have leftovers lying around.
Ticket 27471 describes a situation where tor is sending an INTRODUCE1 cell on
an introduction circuit for which it doesn't have a matching intro point
object (taken from the descriptor).
The main theory is that, after a new descriptor showed up, the introduction
points changed which led to selecting an introduction circuit not used by the
service anymore thus for which we are unable to find the corresponding
introduction point within the descriptor we just fetched.
Closes#27471.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
It won't be used if there are no authorized client configured. We do that so
we can easily support the addition of a client with a HUP signal which allow
us to avoid more complex code path to generate that cookie if we have at least
one client auth and we had none before.
Fixes#27995
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Both client and service had their own code for this. Consolidate into one
place so we avoid duplication.
Closes#27549
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The main.c code is responsible for initialization and shutdown;
the mainloop.c code is responsible for running the main loop of Tor.
Splitting the "generic event loop" part of mainloop.c from the
event-loop-specific part is not done as part of this patch.
When sending the INTRODUCE1 cell, we acquire the needed data for the cell but
if the RP node_t has invalid data, we'll fail the send and completely kill the
SOCKS connection.
Instead, close the rendezvous circuit and return a transient error meaning
that Tor can recover by selecting a new rendezvous point. We'll also do the
same when we are unable to encode the INTRODUCE1 cell for which at that point,
we'll simply take another shot at a new rendezvous point.
Fixes#27774
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
There are now separate modules for:
* the list of router descriptors
* the list of authorities and fallbacks
* managing authority certificates
* selecting random nodes
That unit test makes sure we don't have pending SOCK request if the descriptor
turns out to be unusable.
Part of #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Client side, when a descriptor is finally fetched and stored in the cache, we
then go over all pending SOCKS request for that descriptor. If it turns out
that the intro points are unusable, we close the first SOCKS request but not
the others for the same .onion.
This commit makes it that we'll close all SOCKS requests so we don't let
hanging the other ones.
It also fixes another bug which is having a SOCKS connection in RENDDESC_WAIT
state but with a descriptor in the cache. At some point, tor will expire the
intro failure cache which will make that descriptor usable again. When
retrying all SOCKS connection (retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()), we
won't end up in the code path where we have already the descriptor for a
pending request causing a BUG().
Bottom line is that we should never have pending requests (waiting for a
descriptor) with that descriptor in the cache (even if unusable).
Fixees #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch changes HiddenServiceExportCircuitID so instead of being a
boolean it takes a string, which is the protocol. Currently only the
'haproxy' protocol is defined.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/4700
This commit makes it that the authorized clients in the descriptor are in
random order instead of ordered by how they were read on disk.
Fixes#27545
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
If a tor client gets a descriptor that it can't decrypt, chances are that the
onion requires client authorization.
If a tor client is configured with client authorization for an onion but
decryption fails, it means that the configured keys aren't working anymore.
In both cases, we'll log notice the former and log warn the latter and the
rest of the decryption errors are now at info level.
Two logs statement have been removed because it was redundant and printing the
fetched descriptor in the logs when 80% of it is encrypted wat not helping.
Fixes#27550
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
>>>> CID 1439133: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL)
>>>> Null-checking "fields" suggests that it may be null, but it
>>>> has already been dereferenced on all paths leading to the check.
>>>> CID 1439132: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL)
>>>> Null-checking "fields" suggests that it may be null, but it
>>>> has already been dereferenced on all paths leading to the check.
Return a newly allocated fake client authorization object instead of taking
the object as a parameter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When reloading tor, check if our the configured client authorization have
changed from what we previously had. If so, republish the updated descriptor.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously, the validation by decoding a created descriptor was disabled
because the interface had to be entirely changed and not implemented at the
time.
This commit re-enabled it because it is now implemented.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Parse the client authorization section from the descriptor, use the client
private key to decrypt the auth clients, and then use the descriptor cookie to
decrypt the descriptor.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit refactors the existing decryption code to make it compatible with
a new logic for when the client authorization is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Because this secret data building logic is not only used by the descriptor
encoding process but also by the descriptor decoding, refactor the function to
take both steps into account.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The new ClientOnionAuthDir option is introduced which is where tor looks to
find the HS v3 client authorization files containing the client private key
material.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously, we encrypted the descriptor without the descriptor cookie. This
commit, when the client auth is enabled, the descriptor cookie is always used.
I also removed the code that is used to generate fake auth clients because it
will not be used anymore.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We need to generate all the related keys when building the descriptor, so that
we can encrypt the descriptor.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In order to switch the default HS version from 2 to 3, we need tor to be smart
and be able to decide on the version by trying to load the service keys during
configuration validation.
Part of #27215
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Part of #27215, we need to call the ed_key_init_from_file function during
option_validate() which is before the global_options variable is set.
This commit make ed_key_init_from_file() stop using get_options() and instead
now has a or_options_t parameter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This is another attempt to fix 1437668. The assertion here should
be safe, since the rules of networkstatus_get_param() keep the value
it returns in range.
This commit won't build yet -- it just puts everything in a slightly
more logical place.
The reasoning here is that "src/core" will hold the stuff that every (or
nearly every) tor instance will need in order to do onion routing.
Other features (including some necessary ones) will live in
"src/feature". The "src/app" directory will hold the stuff needed
to have Tor be an application you can actually run.
This commit DOES NOT refactor the former contents of src/or into a
logical set of acyclic libraries, or change any code at all. That
will have to come in the future.
We will continue to move things around and split them in the future,
but I hope this lays a reasonable groundwork for doing so.
