This time, set the SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION flag on every
version before OpenSSL 0.9.8l. I can confirm that the option value (0x0010)
wasn't reused until OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3.
The src and dest of a memcpy() call aren't supposed to overlap,
but we were sometimes calling tor_addr_copy() as a no-op.
Also, tor_addr_assign was a redundant copy of tor_addr_copy(); this patch
removes it.
We implemented ratelimiting for warnings going into the logfile, but didn't
rate-limit controller events. Now both log warnings and controller events
are rate-limited.
Tor has tor_lookup_hostname(), which prefers ipv4 addresses automatically.
Bug 1244 occured because gethostbyname() returned an ipv6 address, which
Tor cannot handle currently. Fixes bug 1244; bugfix on 0.0.2pre25.
Reported by Mike Mestnik.
The problem was that we didn't allocate enough memory on 32-bit
platforms with 64-bit time_t. The memory leak occured every time
we fetched a hidden service descriptor we've fetched before.
When calculating the is_exit flag for a routerinfo_t, we don't need
to call exit_policy_is_general_exit() if router_exit_policy_rejects_all()
tells us it definitely is an exit. This check is much cheaper than
running exit_policy_is_general_exit().
exit_policy_is_general_exit() assumed that there are no redundancies
in the passed policy, in the sense that we actively combine entries
in the policy to really get rid of any redundancy. Since we cannot
do that without massively rewriting the policy lines the relay
operators set, fix exit_policy_is_general_exit().
Fixes bug 1238, discovered by Martin Kowalczyk.
In brief: you mustn't use the SSL3_FLAG solution with anything but 0.9.8l,
and you mustn't use the SSL_OP solution with anything before 0.9.8m, and
you get in _real_ trouble if you try to set the flag in 1.0.0beta, since
they use it for something different.
For the ugly version, see my long comment in tortls.c
We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
[backported]
We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
We accidentally freed the internal buffer for bridge stats when we
were writing the bridge stats file or honoring a control port
request for said data. Change the interfaces for
geoip_get_bridge_stats* to prevent these problems, and remove the
offending free/add a tor_strdup.
Fixes bug 1208.
I believe that since we were allocating *cp while holding a mutex,
coverity deduced that *cp must be protected by that mutex, and later
flipped out when we didn't use it that way. If this is so, we can
solve our problems by moving the *cp = tor_strdup(buf) part outside of
the mutex-protected code.
It's a bit confusing to have a loop where another function,
confusingly named "*_free", is responsible for advancing the loop
variable (or rather, for altering a structure so that the next time
the loop variable's initializer is evaluated it evaluates to something
different.)
Not only has this confused people: it's also confused coverity scan.
Let's fix that.
This was freaking out some relay operators without good reason, as
it is nothing the relay operator can do anything about anyways.
Quieting this warning suggested by rieo.
We were checking for msg==NULL, but not lib or proc. This case can
only occur if we have an error whose string we somehow haven't loaded,
but it's worth coding defensively here.
Spotted by rieo on IRC.
The OutboundBindAddress option is useful for making sure that all of
your outbond connections use a given interface. But when connecting
to 127.0.0.1 (or ::1 even) it's important to actually have the
connection come _from_ localhost, since lots of programs running on
localhost use the source address to authenticate that the connection
is really coming from the same host.
Our old code always bound to OutboundBindAddress, whether connecting
to localhost or not. This would potentially break DNS servers on
localhost, and socks proxies on localhost. This patch changes the
behavior so that we only look at OutboundBindAddress when connecting
to a non-loopback address.
this case can now legitimately happen, if you have a cached v2 status
from moria1, and you run with the new list of dirservers that's missing
the old moria1. it's nothing to worry about; the file will die off in
a month or two.
The following commit:
commit e56747f9cf
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date: Tue Dec 15 14:32:55 2009 -0500
Refactor a bit so that it is safe to include math.h, and mostly not needed.
introduced this line:
tor_resolve_LDADD = -lm ../common/libor.a @TOR_LIB_WS32@
which caused the build to fail, because only ../common/libor.a
(via the embedded ../common/util.o via ../common/util.c)
referenced libm's `lround' and `log' symbols, so that the
linker (GNU ld) didn't bother to import those symbols before
reading ../common/libor.a, thus leaving those symbols undefined.
The solution was to swap the order, producing the line:
tor_resolve_LDADD = ../common/libor.a -lm @TOR_LIB_WS32@
Signed-off-by: Michael Witten <mfwitten@gmail.com>
...to let us
rate-limit client connections as they enter the network. It's
controlled in the consensus so we can turn it on and off for
experiments. It's starting out off. Based on proposal 163.
Specifically, there are two cases: a) are we willing to start a new
circuit at a node not in your ExitNodes config option, and b) are we
willing to make use of a circuit that's already established but has an
unsuitable exit.
Now we discard all your circuits when you set ExitNodes, so the only
way you could end up with an exit circuit that ends at an unsuitable
place is if we explicitly ran out of exit nodes, StrictNodes was 0,
and we built this circuit to solve a stream that needs solving.
Fixes bug in dc322931, which would ignore the just-built circuit because
it has an unsuitable exit.
Before it would prepend your requested entrynodes to your list of guard
nodes, but feel free to use others after that. Now it chooses only
from your EntryNodes if any of those are available, and only falls back
to others if a) they're all down and b) StrictNodes is not set.
Also, now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNode at each consensus
fetch (rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as the
network changes).
The goal here is to make users less likely to set StrictNodes, since
it's doing closer to what they expect it should be doing.
We do this in too many places throughout the code; it's time to start
clamping down.
Also, refactor Karsten's patch to use strchr-then-strndup, rather than
malloc-then-strlcpy-then-strchr-then-clear.
Fix statistics on client numbers by country as seen by bridges that were
broken in 0.2.2.1-alpha. Also switch to reporting full 24-hour intervals
instead of variable 12-to-48-hour intervals.
The HSAuthorityRecordStats option was used to track statistics of overall
hidden service usage on the version 0 hidden service authorities. With the
version 2 hidden service directories being deployed and version 0
descriptors being phased out, these statistics are not as useful anymore.
Goodbye, you fine piece of software; my first major code contribution to
Tor.
The new rule is: safe_str_X() means "this string is a piece of X
information; make it safe to log." safe_str() on its own means
"this string is a piece of who-knows-what; make it safe to log".
The rule is now: take the value from the CircuitPriorityHalflife
config option if it is set. If it zero, disable the cell_ewma
algorithm. If it is set, use it to calculate the scaling factor.
If it is not set, look for a CircPriorityHalflifeMsec parameter in the
consensus networkstatus. If *that* is zero, then disable the cell_ewma
algorithm; if it is set, use it to calculate the scaling factor.
If it is not set at all, disable the algorithm.
In connection_dir_client_reached_eof, we make sure that we either
return when we get an http status code of 503 or handle the problem
and set it to 200. Later we check if the status code is 503. Remove
that check.
There are two big changes here:
- We store active circuits in a priority queue for each or_conn,
rather than doing a linear search over all the active circuits
before we send each cell.
- Rather than multiplying every circuit's cell-ewma by a decay
factor every time we send a cell (thus normalizing the value of a
current cell to 1.0 and a past cell to alpha^t), we instead
only scale down the cell-ewma every tick (ten seconds atm),
normalizing so that a cell sent at the start of the tick has
value 1.0).
Each circuit is ranked in terms of how many cells from it have been
relayed recently, using a time-weighted average.
This patch has been tested this on a private Tor network on PlanetLab,
and gotten improvements of 12-35% in time it takes to fetch a small
web page while there's a simultaneous large data transfer going on
simultaneously.
[Commit msg by nickm based on mail from Ian Goldberg.]
This changes the pqueue API by requiring an additional int in every
structure that we store in a pqueue to hold the index of that structure
within the heap.
Some *_free functions threw asserts when passed NULL. Now all of them
accept NULL as input and perform no action when called that way.
This gains us consistence for our free functions, and allows some
code simplifications where an explicit null check is no longer necessary.
It turns out that OpenSSL 0.9.8m is likely to take a completely
different approach for reenabling renegotiation than OpenSSL 0.9.8l
did, so we need to work with both. :p Fixes bug 1158.
(patch by coderman; commit message by nickm)
Do not segfault when writing buffer stats when we haven't observed a
single circuit to report about. This is a minor bug that would only show
up in testing environments with no traffic and with reduced stats
intervals.
Avoid crashing if the client is trying to upload many bytes and the
circuit gets torn down at the same time, or if the flip side
happens on the exit relay. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha; fixes bug 1150.
New config option "CircuitStreamTimeout" to override our internal
timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from
a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly
slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60.
On this OSX version, there is a stub mlockall() function
that doesn't work, *and* the declaration for it is hidden by
an '#ifdef _P1003_1B_VISIBLE'. This would make autoconf
successfully find the function, but our code fail to build
when no declaration was found.
This patch adds an additional test for the declaration.
This fixes bug 1147:
bionic doesn't have an actual implementation of mlockall();
mlockall() is merely in the headers but not actually in the library.
This prevents Tor compilation with the bionic libc for Android handsets.
To fix a major security problem related to incorrect use of
SSL/TLS renegotiation, OpenSSL has turned off renegotiation by
default. We are not affected by this security problem, however,
since we do renegotiation right. (Specifically, we never treat a
renegotiated credential as authenticating previous communication.)
Nevertheless, OpenSSL's new behavior requires us to explicitly
turn renegotiation back on in order to get our protocol working
again.
Amusingly, this is not so simple as "set the flag when you create
the SSL object" , since calling connect or accept seems to clear
the flags.
For belt-and-suspenders purposes, we clear the flag once the Tor
handshake is done. There's no way to exploit a second handshake
either, but we might as well not allow it.
This commit implements a new config option: 'DisableAllSwap'
This option probably only works properly when Tor is started as root.
We added two new functions: tor_mlockall() and tor_set_max_memlock().
tor_mlockall() attempts to mlock() all current and all future memory pages.
For tor_mlockall() to work properly we set the process rlimits for memory to
RLIM_INFINITY (and beyond) inside of tor_set_max_memlock().
We behave differently from mlockall() by only allowing tor_mlockall() to be
called one single time. All other calls will result in a return code of 1.
It is not possible to change DisableAllSwap while running.
A sample configuration item was added to the torrc.complete.in config file.
A new item in the man page for DisableAllSwap was added.
Thanks to Moxie Marlinspike and Chris Palmer for their feedback on this patch.
Please note that we make no guarantees about the quality of your OS and its
mlock/mlockall implementation. It is possible that this will do nothing at all.
It is also possible that you can ulimit the mlock properties of a given user
such that root is not required. This has not been extensively tested and is
unsupported. I have included some comments for possible ways we can handle
this on win32.
If your relay can't keep up with the number of incoming create cells, it
would log one warning per failure into your logs. Limit warnings to 1 per
minute.
In 5e4d53d535 we made it so that
crypto_cipher_set_key cannot fail. The call will now
always succeed, to returning a boolean for success/failure makes
no sense.
This was left over from an early draft of the microdescriptor code; it
began to populate the signatures array of a networkstatus vote, even
though there's no actual need to do that for a vote.
In its zeal to keep me from saying memset(x, '0', sizeof(x)), Coverity
disallows memset(x, 48, sizeof(x)). Fine. I'll choose a different
magic number, see if I care!
In C, the code "char x[10]; if (x) {...}" always takes the true branch of
the if statement. Coverity notices this now.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to make sure that an operation
we wanted to do would suceed. Those cases are now always-true.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to see if something was _set_.
Those caes are now tests for strlen(s), or tests for
!tor_mem_is_zero(d,len).
If all authorities restart at once right before a consensus vote, nobody
will vote about "Running", and clients will get a consensus with no usable
relays. Instead, authorities refuse to build a consensus if this happens.
The first happens on an error case when a controller wants an
impossible directory object. The second happens when we can't write
our fingerprint file.
The code for these was super-wrong, but will only break things when we
reset an option on a platform where sizeof(time_t) is different from
sizeof(int).
See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
This patch introduces a new type called document_signature_t to represent the
signature of a consensus document. Now, each consensus document can have up
to one document signature per voter per digest algorithm. Also, each
detached-signatures document can have up to one signature per <voter,
algorithm, flavor>.
Previously, we insisted that a valid signature must be a signature of
the expected digest. Now we accept anything that starts with the
expected digest. This lets us include another digest later.
When we tried to use the deprecated non-threadsafe evdns
interfaces in Libevent 2 without using the also-deprecated
event_init() interface, Libevent 2 would sensibly crash, since it
has no guess where to find the Libevent library.
Here we use the evdns_base_*() functions instead if they're
present, and fake them if they aren't.
This is a possible fix for bug 1023, where if we vote (or make a v2
consensus networkstatus) right after we come online, we can call
rep_hist_note_router_unreachable() on every router we haven't connected
to yet, and thereby make all their uptime values reset.
This seems to be happening to me a lot on a garbage DSL line.
We may need to come up with 2 threshholds: a high short onehop
count and a lower longer count.
Don't count one-hop circuits when we're estimating how long it
takes circuits to build on average. Otherwise we'll set our circuit
build timeout lower than we should. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha.
Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
none of which are very big.
Previously, tor-gencert would call RSA_generate_key() directly.
This won't work on Android, which removes the (deprecated since
OpenSSL 0.9.8) function. We can't call RSA_generate_key_ex()
unconditionally either, since that didn't exist before 0.9.8.
Instead, we must call our own crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits,
which knows how to call RSA_generate_key or RSA_generate_key_ex as
appropriate.
[Based on patch by Nathan Freitas]
Apparently the Android developers dumped OpenSSL's support for hardware
acceleration in order to save some memory, so you can't build programs using
engines on Android.
[Patch revised by nickm]
This shouldn't be necessary, but apparently the Android cross-compiler
doesn't respect -I as well as it should. (-I is supposed to add to the
*front* of the search path. Android's gcc wrapper apparently likes to add to
the end. This is broken, but we need to work around it.)
Found by coverity
test_mem_op_hex was leaking memory, which showed up in a few
tests.
Also, the dir_param test had a memleak of its own.
Found by Coverity
