This is a fix for bug 8844, where eugenis correctly notes that there's
a sentinel value at the end of the list-of-freelists that's never
actually checked. It's a bug since the first version of the chunked
buffer code back in 0.2.0.16-alpha.
This would probably be a crash bug if it ever happens, but nobody's
ever reported something like this, so I'm unsure whether it can occur.
It would require write_to_buf, write_to_buf_zlib, read_to_buf, or
read_to_buf_tls to get an input size of more than 32K. Still, it's a
good idea to fix this kind of thing!
This is meant to avoid conflict with the built-in log() function in
math.h. It resolves ticket 7599. First reported by dhill.
This was generated with the following perl script:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
s/\blog\(LOG_(ERR|WARN|NOTICE|INFO|DEBUG)\s*,\s*/log_\L$1\(/g;
s/\blog\(/tor_log\(/g;
Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on
data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest
possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this
is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it
is, we can work on that in 0.2.4.
Fixes bug 7352.
Also, try to resolve some doxygen issues. First, define a magic
"This is doxygen!" macro so that we take the correct branch in
various #if/#else/#endifs in order to get the right documentation.
Second, add in a few grouping @{ and @} entries in order to get some
variables and fields to get grouped together.
Fixes bug #4528 "read_to_buf_tls(): Inconsistency in code".
This check was added back in 0.1.0.3-rc, but somehow we forgot to
leave it in when we refactored read_to_buf_tls in 0.1.0.5-rc.
(patch by Arturo; commit message and changes file by nickm)
This commit is completely mechanical; I used this perl script to make it:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i.bak -p
if (/^\s*\#/) {
s/MS_WINDOWS/_WIN32/g;
s/\bWIN32\b/_WIN32/g;
}
Also, define all commands > 128 as variable-length when using
v3 or later link protocol. Running into a var cell with an
unrecognized type is no longer a bug.
Previously Tor would always claim to have been given a hostname
by the client, while actually only verifying that the client
is using SOCKS4A or SOCKS5 with hostnames. Both protocol versions
allow IP addresses, too, in which case the log messages were wrong.
Fixes#4094.
This behavior is normal when we want more data than the evbuffer
actually has for us. We'll ask for (say) 7 bytes, get only 5
(because that's all there is), try to parse the 5 bytes, and get
told "no, I want 7". One option would be to bail out early whenever
want_length is > buflen, but sometimes we use an over-large
want_length. So instead, let's just remove the warning here: it's
not a bug after all.
The conflicts are with the proposal 171 circuit isolation code, and
they're all trivial: they're just a matter of both branches adding
some unrelated code in the same places.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/or/connection.c
The problem was that we weren't initializing want_length to 0 before
calling parse_socks() the first time, so it looked like we were
risking an infinite loop when in fact we were safe.
Fixes 3615; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
Previously, fetch_from_buf_socks() might return 0 if there was still
data on the buffer and a subsequent call to fetch_from_buf_socks()
would return 1. This was making some of the socks5 unit tests
harder to write, and could potentially have caused misbehavior with
some overly verbose SOCKS implementations. Now,
fetch_from_buf_socks() does as much processing as it can, and
returns 0 only if it really needs more data. This brings it into
line with the evbuffer socks implementation.
We added this back in 0649fa14 in 2006, to deal with the case where
the client unconditionally sent us authentication data. Hopefully,
that's not needed any longer, since we now can actually parse
authentication data.
This change also requires us to add and use a pair of
allocator/deallocator functions for socks_request_t, instead of
using tor_malloc_zero/tor_free directly.
In the code as it stood, we would accept any number of socks5
username/password authentication messages, regardless of whether we
had actually negotiated username/password authentication. Instead,
we should only accept one, and only if we have really negotiated
username/password authentication.
This patch also makes some fields of socks_request_t into uint8_t,
for safety.
This lets us make a lot of other stuff const, allows the compiler to
generate (slightly) better code, and will make me get slightly fewer
patches from folks who stick mutable stuff into or_options_t.
const: because not every input is an output!
On win64, sockets are of type UINT_PTR; on win32 they're u_int;
elsewhere they're int. The correct windows way to check a socket for
being set is to compare it with INVALID_SOCKET; elsewhere you see if
it is negative.
On Libevent 2, all callbacks take sockets as evutil_socket_t; we've
been passing them int.
This patch should fix compilation and correctness when built for
64-bit windows. Fixes bug 3270.
Previously, we only looked at up to 128 bytes. This is a bad idea
since socks messages can be at least 256+x bytes long. Now we look at
up to 512 bytes; this should be enough for 0.2.2.x to handle all valid
SOCKS messages. For 0.2.3.x, we can think about handling trickier
cases.
Fixes 2330. Bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
C99 allows a syntax for structures whose last element is of
unspecified length:
struct s {
int elt1;
...
char last_element[];
};
Recent (last-5-years) autoconf versions provide an
AC_C_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER test that defines FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER
to either no tokens (if you have c99 flexible array support) or to 1
(if you don't). At that point you just use offsetof
[STRUCT_OFFSET() for us] to see where last_element begins, and
allocate your structures like:
struct s {
int elt1;
...
char last_element[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
};
tor_malloc(STRUCT_OFFSET(struct s, last_element) +
n_elements*sizeof(char));
The advantages are:
1) It's easier to see which structures and elements are of
unspecified length.
2) The compiler and related checking tools can also see which
structures and elements are of unspecified length, in case they
wants to try weird bounds-checking tricks or something.
3) The compiler can warn us if we do something dumb, like try
to stack-allocate a flexible-length structure.
evbuffer_pullup does nothing and returns NULL if the caller asks it to
linearize more data than the buffer contains.
Introduced in 9796b9bfa6.
Reported by piebeer; fixed with help from doors.
If a SOCKS5 client insists on authentication, allow it to
negotiate a connection with Tor's SOCKS server successfully.
Any credentials the client provides are ignored.
This allows Tor to work with SOCKS5 clients that can only
support 'authenticated' connections.
Also add a bunch of basic unit tests for SOCKS4/4a/5 support
in buffers.c.
Pick 5 seconds as the limit. 5 seconds is a compromise here between
making sure the user notices that the bad behaviour is (still) happening
and not spamming their log too much needlessly (the log message is
pretty long). We also keep warning every time if safesocks is
specified, because then the user presumably wants to hear about every
blocked instance.
(This is based on the original patch by Sebastian, then backported to
0.2.2 and with warnings split into their own function.)
Sending a log message to a control port can cause Tor to allocate a buffer,
thereby changing the length of the freelist behind buf_shrink_freelists's back,
thereby causing an assertion to fail.
Fixes bug #1125.
Sending a log message to a control port can cause Tor to allocate a buffer,
thereby changing the length of the freelist behind buf_shrink_freelists's back,
thereby causing an assertion to fail.
Fixes bug #1125.
