This commit implements a new config option: 'DisableAllSwap'
This option probably only works properly when Tor is started as root.
We added two new functions: tor_mlockall() and tor_set_max_memlock().
tor_mlockall() attempts to mlock() all current and all future memory pages.
For tor_mlockall() to work properly we set the process rlimits for memory to
RLIM_INFINITY (and beyond) inside of tor_set_max_memlock().
We behave differently from mlockall() by only allowing tor_mlockall() to be
called one single time. All other calls will result in a return code of 1.
It is not possible to change DisableAllSwap while running.
A sample configuration item was added to the torrc.complete.in config file.
A new item in the man page for DisableAllSwap was added.
Thanks to Moxie Marlinspike and Chris Palmer for their feedback on this patch.
Please note that we make no guarantees about the quality of your OS and its
mlock/mlockall implementation. It is possible that this will do nothing at all.
It is also possible that you can ulimit the mlock properties of a given user
such that root is not required. This has not been extensively tested and is
unsupported. I have included some comments for possible ways we can handle
this on win32.
If your relay can't keep up with the number of incoming create cells, it
would log one warning per failure into your logs. Limit warnings to 1 per
minute.
This was left over from an early draft of the microdescriptor code; it
began to populate the signatures array of a networkstatus vote, even
though there's no actual need to do that for a vote.
In its zeal to keep me from saying memset(x, '0', sizeof(x)), Coverity
disallows memset(x, 48, sizeof(x)). Fine. I'll choose a different
magic number, see if I care!
In C, the code "char x[10]; if (x) {...}" always takes the true branch of
the if statement. Coverity notices this now.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to make sure that an operation
we wanted to do would suceed. Those cases are now always-true.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to see if something was _set_.
Those caes are now tests for strlen(s), or tests for
!tor_mem_is_zero(d,len).
If all authorities restart at once right before a consensus vote, nobody
will vote about "Running", and clients will get a consensus with no usable
relays. Instead, authorities refuse to build a consensus if this happens.
The first happens on an error case when a controller wants an
impossible directory object. The second happens when we can't write
our fingerprint file.
The code for these was super-wrong, but will only break things when we
reset an option on a platform where sizeof(time_t) is different from
sizeof(int).
See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
The old flavored consensus URL format made it harder to decode URLs
based on their prefixes, and didn't take into account our "only give
it to me if it's signed by enough authorities" stuff.
The point of doing SHA256 twice is, generally, is to prevent message
extension attacks where an attacker who knows H(A) can calculate
H(A|B). But for attaching a signature to a document, the attacker
already _knows_ A, so trying to keep them from calculating H(A|B) is
pointless.
This patch introduces a new type called document_signature_t to represent the
signature of a consensus document. Now, each consensus document can have up
to one document signature per voter per digest algorithm. Also, each
detached-signatures document can have up to one signature per <voter,
algorithm, flavor>.
