We had a spelling discrepancy between the manpage and the source code
for some option. Resolve these in favor of the manpage, because it
makes more sense (for example, HTTP should be capitalized).
Specifically, a circ attempt that we'd launched while the network was
down could timeout after we've marked our entrynodes up, marking them
back down again. The fix is to annotate as bad the OR conns that were
around before we did the retry, so if a circuit that's attached to them
times out we don't do anything about it.
At best, this patch helps us avoid sending queued relayed cells that
would get ignored during the time between when a destroy cell is
sent and when the circuit is finally freed. At worst, it lets us
release some memory a little earlier than it would otherwise.
Fix for bug #1184. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
Back when we changed the idea of a connection being "too old" for new
circuits into the connection being "bad" for new circuits, we didn't
actually change the info messages. This led to telling the user that
we were labelling connections as "too old" for being worse than
connections that were actually older than them.
Found by Scott on or-talk.
...to let us
rate-limit client connections as they enter the network. It's
controlled in the consensus so we can turn it on and off for
experiments. It's starting out off. Based on proposal 163.
The new rule is: safe_str_X() means "this string is a piece of X
information; make it safe to log." safe_str() on its own means
"this string is a piece of who-knows-what; make it safe to log".
Some *_free functions threw asserts when passed NULL. Now all of them
accept NULL as input and perform no action when called that way.
This gains us consistence for our free functions, and allows some
code simplifications where an explicit null check is no longer necessary.
To fix a major security problem related to incorrect use of
SSL/TLS renegotiation, OpenSSL has turned off renegotiation by
default. We are not affected by this security problem, however,
since we do renegotiation right. (Specifically, we never treat a
renegotiated credential as authenticating previous communication.)
Nevertheless, OpenSSL's new behavior requires us to explicitly
turn renegotiation back on in order to get our protocol working
again.
Amusingly, this is not so simple as "set the flag when you create
the SSL object" , since calling connect or accept seems to clear
the flags.
For belt-and-suspenders purposes, we clear the flag once the Tor
handshake is done. There's no way to exploit a second handshake
either, but we might as well not allow it.
The big change is to add a function to display the current SSL handshake
state, and to log it everywhere reasonable. (A failure in
SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A is different from one in
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A.)
This patch also adds a new log domain for OR handshaking, so you can pull out
all the handshake log messages without having to run at debug for everything.
For example, you'd just say "log notice-err [handshake]debug-err file
tor.log".
Added a sanity check in config.c and a check in directory.c
directory_initiate_command_rend() to catch any direct connection attempts
when a socks proxy is configured.
The rest of the code was only including event.h so that it could see
EV_READ and EV_WRITE, which we were using as part of the
connection_watch_events interface for no very good reason.
