It looks to be the case that Rust's standard allocator, jemalloc, is
incompatible with sanitizers. The incompatibility, for whatever reason,
seems to cause segfaults at runtime when jemalloc is linked with
sanitizers.
Without actually trying to figure out what's going on here this commit
instead takes the hammer of "let's remove jemalloc when testing". The
`tor_allocate` crate now by default switches to the system allocator
(eventually this will want to be the tor allocator). Most crates then
link to `tor_allocate` ot pick this up, but the `smartlist` crate had to
manually switch to the system allocator in testing and the `external`
crate had to be sure to link to `tor_allocate`.
The final gotcha here is that this patch also switches to
unconditionally passing `--target` to Cargo. For weird and arcane
reasons passing `--target` with the host target of the compiler (which
Cargo otherwise uses as the default) is different than not passing
`--target` at all. This ensure that our custom `RUSTFLAGS` with
sanitizer options doesn't make its way into build scripts, just the
final testing artifacts.
This is no longer necessary with upstream rust-lang/rust changes as well
as some local tweaks. Namely:
* The `-fsanitize=address`-style options are now passed via `-C
link-args` through `RUSTFLAGS`. This obviates the need for the shell
script.
* The `-C default-linker-libraries`, disabling `-nodefaultlibs`, is
passed through `RUSTFLAGS`, which is necessary to ensure that
`-fsanitize=address` links correctly.
* The `-C linker` option is passed to ensure we're using the same C
compiler as normal C code, although it has a bit of hackery to only
get the `gcc` out of `gcc -std=c99`
Allowing this didn't do any actual harm, since there aren't any
shared structures or leakable objects here. Still, it's bad style
and might cause trouble in the future.
Closes ticket 27856.
Various places in our code try to activate these events or check
their status, so we should make sure they're initialized as early as
possible. Fixes bug 27861; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
When freeing a configuration object from confparse.c in
dump_config(), we need to call the appropriate higher-level free
function (like or_options_free()) and not just config_free().
This only happens with options (since they're the one where
options_validate allocates extra stuff) and only when running
--dump-config with something other than minimal (since
OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL doesn't hit this code).
Fixes bug 27893; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
It differs from the rest of the rephist code in that it's actually
necessary for Tor to operate, so it should probably go somewhere
else. I'm not sure where yet, so I'll leave it in the same
directory, but give it its own file.
Since this is completely core functionality, I'm putting it in
core/mainloop, even though it depends on feature/hibernate. We'll
have to sort that out in the future.
The main.c code is responsible for initialization and shutdown;
the mainloop.c code is responsible for running the main loop of Tor.
Splitting the "generic event loop" part of mainloop.c from the
event-loop-specific part is not done as part of this patch.
The parts for handling cell formats should be in src/core/or.
The parts for handling onionskin queues should be in src/core/or.
Only the crypto wrapper belongs in src/core/crypto.
When sending the INTRODUCE1 cell, we acquire the needed data for the cell but
if the RP node_t has invalid data, we'll fail the send and completely kill the
SOCKS connection.
Instead, close the rendezvous circuit and return a transient error meaning
that Tor can recover by selecting a new rendezvous point. We'll also do the
same when we are unable to encode the INTRODUCE1 cell for which at that point,
we'll simply take another shot at a new rendezvous point.
Fixes#27774
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The result of CString::into_raw() is not safe to free
with free() except under finicky and fragile circumstances
that we definitely don't meet right now.
This was missed in be583a34a3.
When we close a socket via tor_tls_free(), we previously had no way
for our socket accounting logic to learn about it. This meant that
the socket accounting code would think we had run out of sockets,
and freak out.
Fixes bug 27795; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
In dirauth:
* bwauth.c reads and uses bandwidth files
* guardfraction.c reads and uses the guardfraction file
* reachability.c tests relay reachability
* recommend_pkg.c handles the recommended-packages lines.
* recv_descs.c handles fingerprint files and processing incoming
routerinfos that relays upload to us
* voteflag.c computes flag thresholds and sets those thresholds on
routerstatuses when computing votes
In control:
* fmt_serverstatus.c generates the ancient "v1 server status"
format that controllers expect.
In nodelist:
* routerstatus_fmt.c formats routerstatus entries for a consensus,
a vote, or for the controller.
Client side, when a descriptor is finally fetched and stored in the cache, we
then go over all pending SOCKS request for that descriptor. If it turns out
that the intro points are unusable, we close the first SOCKS request but not
the others for the same .onion.
This commit makes it that we'll close all SOCKS requests so we don't let
hanging the other ones.
It also fixes another bug which is having a SOCKS connection in RENDDESC_WAIT
state but with a descriptor in the cache. At some point, tor will expire the
intro failure cache which will make that descriptor usable again. When
retrying all SOCKS connection (retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()), we
won't end up in the code path where we have already the descriptor for a
pending request causing a BUG().
Bottom line is that we should never have pending requests (waiting for a
descriptor) with that descriptor in the cache (even if unusable).
Fixees #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
It is not enough to look at protover for v3 rendezvous support but also we
need to make sure that the curve25519 onion key is present or in other words
that the descriptor has been fetched and does contain it.
Fixes#27797.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
There are now separate modules for:
* the list of router descriptors
* the list of authorities and fallbacks
* managing authority certificates
* selecting random nodes
That unit test makes sure we don't have pending SOCK request if the descriptor
turns out to be unusable.
Part of #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Client side, when a descriptor is finally fetched and stored in the cache, we
then go over all pending SOCKS request for that descriptor. If it turns out
that the intro points are unusable, we close the first SOCKS request but not
the others for the same .onion.
This commit makes it that we'll close all SOCKS requests so we don't let
hanging the other ones.
It also fixes another bug which is having a SOCKS connection in RENDDESC_WAIT
state but with a descriptor in the cache. At some point, tor will expire the
intro failure cache which will make that descriptor usable again. When
retrying all SOCKS connection (retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()), we
won't end up in the code path where we have already the descriptor for a
pending request causing a BUG().
Bottom line is that we should never have pending requests (waiting for a
descriptor) with that descriptor in the cache (even if unusable).
Fixees #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The trunnel functions are written under the assumption that their
allocators can fail, so GCC LTO thinks they might return NULL. In
point of fact, they're using tor_malloc() and friends, which can't
fail, but GCC won't necessarily figure that out.
Fixes part of #27772.
Instead, have it call a mockable function. We don't want
crypto_strongest_rand() to be mockable, since doing so creates a
type error when we call it from ed25519-donna, which we do not build
in a test mode.
Fixes bug 27728; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha
This argument was added to match an older idea for the C api, but we
decided not to do it that way in C.
Fixes bug 27741; bugfix on 0.3.3.6 / TROVE-2018-005 fix.
Since the default cache directory is the same as the default data
directory, we don't want the default CacheDirectoryGroupReadable
value (0) to override an explicitly set "DataDirectoryGroupReadable
1".
To fix this, I'm making CacheDirectoryGroupReadable into an
autobool, and having the default (auto) value mean "Use the value of
DataDirectoryGroupReadable if the directories are the same, and 0
otherwise."
Fixes bug 26913; bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha when the CacheDirectory
option was introduced.
This shouldn't be a user-visible change: nobody has a 16 MB RSA
key that they're trying to use with Tor.
I'm doing this to fix CID 1439330 / ticket 27730, where coverity
complains (on 64-bit) that we are making a comparison that is never
true.
This patch moves the logic that adds the proxy headers to an earlier
point in the exit connection lifetime, which ensures that the
application data cannot be written to the outbuf before the proxy header
is added.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/4700
This patch changes HiddenServiceExportCircuitID so instead of being a
boolean it takes a string, which is the protocol. Currently only the
'haproxy' protocol is defined.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/4700
Without this patch we would encode the IPv6 address' last part as
::ffffffff instead of ::ffff:ffff when the GID is UINT32_MAX.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/4700
In hs_config.c, we do validate the permission of the hidden service directory
but we do not try to create it. So, in the event that the directory doesn't
exists, we end up in the loading key code path which checks for the
permission and possibly creates the directory. On failure, don't BUG() since
there is a perfectly valid use case for that function to fail.
Fixes#27335
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This is harder than with OpenSSL, since OpenSSL counts the bytes on
its own and NSS doesn't. To fix this, we need to define a new
PRFileDesc layer that has its own byte-counting support.
Closes ticket 27289.
On GCC and Clang, there's a feature to warn you about bad
conditionals like "if (a = b)", which should be "if (a == b)".
However, they don't warn you if there are extra parentheses around
"a = b".
Unfortunately, the tor_assert() macro and all of its kin have been
passing their inputs through stuff like PREDICT_UNLIKELY(expr) or
PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!(expr)), both of which expand to stuff with more
parentheses around "expr", thus suppressing these warnings.
To fix this, this patch introduces new macros that do not wrap
expr. They're only used when GCC or Clang is enabled (both define
__GNUC__), since they require GCC's "({statement expression})"
syntax extension. They're only used when we're building the
unit-test variant of the object files, since they suppress the
branch-prediction hints.
I've confirmed that tor_assert(), tor_assert_nonfatal(),
tor_assert_nonfatal_once(), BUG(), and IF_BUG_ONCE() all now give
compiler warnings when their argument is an assignment expression.
Fixes bug 27709.
Bugfix on 0.0.6, where we first introduced the "tor_assert()" macro.
.retain() would allocating a Vec of billions of integers and check them
one at a time to separate the supported versions from the unsupported.
This leads to a memory DoS.
Closes ticket 27206. Bugfix on e6625113c9.
Before 0.3.3.1-alpha, we would exit() in this case immediately. But
now that we leave tor_main() more conventionally, we need to make
sure we restore things so as not to cause a double free.
Fixes bug 27708; bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha.
Since we use a 32-bit approximation for millisecond conversion here,
we can't expect so much precision.
Fixes part of bug 27139; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha.
Multiply-then-divide is more accurate, but it runs into trouble when
our input is above INT32_MAX/numerator. So when our value is too
large, do divide-then-multiply instead.
Fixes part of bug 27139; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha.
We use an optimized but less accurate formula for converting coarse
time differences to milliseconds on 32-bit OSX platforms, so that we
can avoid 64-bit division.
The old numbers were off by 0.4%. The new numbers are off by .006%.
This should make the unit tests a bit cleaner, and our tolerances a
bit closer.
All node_get_all_orports() does is allocate and return a smartlist
with at most two tor_addr_port_t members that match ORPort's of
node configuration. This is harmful for memory efficiency, as it
allocates the same stuff every time it is called. However,
node_is_a_configured_bridge() does not need to call it, as it
already has all the information to check if there is configured
bridge for a given node.
The new code is arranged in a way that hopefully makes each succeeding
linear search through bridge_list less likely.
