This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
Authorities now assign the Guard flag to the fastest 25% of the
network (it used to be the fastest 50%). Also raise the consensus
weight that guarantees the Guard flag from 250 to 2000. For the
current network, this results in about 1100 guards, down from 2500.
This step paves the way for moving the number of entry guards
down to 1 (proposal 236) while still providing reasonable expected
performance for most users.
Implements ticket 12690.
Found because LibreSSL has OPENSSL_NO_COMP always-on, but this
conflicts with the way that _we_ turn off compression. Patch from
dhill, who attributes it to "OpenBSD". Fixes bug 12602; bugfix on
0.2.1.1-alpha, which introduced this turn-compression-off code.
I don't know whether we missed these or misclassified them when we
first made the "DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS" section, but they
really belong there.
Check for consistency between the queued destroy cells and the marked
circuit IDs. Check for consistency in the count of queued destroy
cells in several ways. Check to see whether any of the marked circuit
IDs have somehow been marked longer than the channel has existed.
And add a comment about why conditions that would cause us to drop a
cell should get checked before actions that would cause us to send a
destroy cell.
Spotted by 'cypherpunks'.
And note that these issues have been present since 0.0.8pre1 (commit
0da256ef), where we added a "shutting down" state, and started
responding to all create cells with DESTROY when shutting down.
Conflicts:
src/or/channel.c
src/or/circuitlist.c
src/or/connection.c
Conflicts involved removal of next_circ_id and addition of
unusable-circid tracking.
The point of the "idle timeout" for connections is to kill the
connection a while after it has no more circuits. But using "last
added a non-padding cell" as a proxy for that is wrong, since if the
last circuit is closed from the other side of the connection, we
will not have sent anything on that connection since well before the
last circuit closed.
This is part of fixing 6799.
When applied to 0.2.5, it is also a fix for 12023.
Instead of killing an or_connection_t that has had no circuits for
the last 3 minutes, give every or_connection_t a randomized timeout,
so that an observer can't so easily infer from the connection close
time the time at which its last circuit closed.
Also, increase the base timeout for canonical connections from 3
minutes to 15 minutes.
Fix for ticket 6799.
When we find a stranded one-hop circuit, log whether it is dirty,
log information about any streams on it, and log information about
connections they might be linked to.
This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
This code mis-handled the case where a circuit got the same circuit
ID in both directions. I found three instances of it in the
codebase, by grepping for [pn]_circ_id.
Because of the issue in command_process_relay_cell(), this would
have made roughly one circuit in a million completely nonfunctional.
Fixes bug 12195.
