This could result in bizarre window values. Report and patch
contributed pseudymously. Fixes part of bug 6271. This bug was
introduced before the first Tor release, in svn commit r152.
(bug 6271, part a.)
This reverts commit c32ec9c425.
It turns out the two sides of the circuit don't actually stay in sync,
so it is perfectly normal for the circuit window on the exit relay to
grow to 2000+. We should fix that bug and then reconsider this patch.
I only check on circuits, not streams, since bloating your stream
window past the initial circuit window can't help you much.
Also, I compare to CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX so we don't have surprising
races if we lower CIRCWINDOW_START for an experiment.
We were doing a tor_strclear() on client_keys_str when it might not
even be set.
Fix for bug 6255; bug not in any release of Tor. Thanks to katmagic
for finding this one!
With glibc 2.15 and clang 3.0, I get warnings from where we use the
strcpsn implementation in the header as strcspn(string, "="). This
is apparently because clang sees that part of the strcspn macro
expands to "="[2], and doesn't realize that that part of the macro
is only evaluated when "="[1] != 0.
The functions parse_{s,c}method_line() were using
tor_addr_port_lookup() which is capable of doing DNS lookups. DNS
lookups should not be necessary when parsing {C,S}METHOD lines.
We now catch bare {s that should be on the previous line with a do,
while, if, or for, and elses that should share a line with their
preceding }.
That is,
if (foo)
{
and
if (foo) {
...
}
else
are now detected.
We should think about maybe making Tor uncrustify-clean some day,
but configuring uncrustify is an exercise in bizarreness, and
reformatting huge gobs of Tor is always painful.
We can treat this case as an EAGAIN (probably because of an
unexpected internal NUL) rather than a crash-worthy problem.
Fixes bug 6225, again. Bug not in any released version of Tor.
Because the string output was no longer equal in length to
HEX_ERRNO_SIZE, the write() call would add some extra spaces and
maybe a NUL, and the NUL would trigger an assert in
get_string_from_pipe.
Fixes bug 6225; bug not in any released version of Tor.
The code that detected the source of a remapped address checked that
an address mapping's source was a given rewrite rule if addr_orig had
no .exit, and addr did have a .exit after processing that rule. But
addr_orig was formatted for logging: it was not the original address
at all, but rather was the address escaped for logging and possibly
replaced with "[scrubbed]".
This new logic will correctly set ADDRMAPSRC_NONE in the case when the
address starts life as a .exit address, so that AllowDotExit can work
again.
Fixes bug 6211; bugfix on 0.2.3.17-beta
It turns out this can happen. Even though there is no reason for
connections to be marked but reading, we leave them reading anyway,
so warning here is unwarranted. Let's turn that back on once we do
something sensible and disable reading when we mark. Bugfix for
6203 on Tor 0.2.3.17-beta.
Thanks to cypherpunks for pointing out the general stupidity of the
original code here.
Now it's an orthodox "goto err/done" exit path, and it isn't some
screwy thing where we stick err/done at the end of a loop and
duplicate our cleanup code.
Previously, a directory would check the latest NS consensus for
having the signatures the client wanted, and use that consensus's
valid_until time to set the HTTP lifetime. With this patch, the
directory looks at NS consensus or the microdesc consensus,
depending on what the client asked for.
I saw 72% on a test run with 26 circuits. 70% might be a little close to the
line. That, or min_circs is too low and we need to be more patient. We still
need to test/simulate more.
The defense counts the circuit failure rate for each guard for the past N
circuits. Failure is defined as the ability to complete a first hop, but not
finish completing the circuit all the way to the exit.
If the failure rate exceeds a certain amount, a notice is emitted.
If it exceeds a greater amount, a warn is emitted and the guard is disabled.
These values are governed by consensus parameters which we intend to tune as
we perform experiments and statistical simulations.
The warning message of validate_pluggable_transports_config() is
superseded by the changes in the warning message of
connection_or_connect() when the proxy credentials can't be found.
There is a bug causing busy loops in Libevent and infinite loops in
the Shadow simulator. A connection that is marked for close, wants
to flush, is held open to flush, but is rate limited (the token
bucket is empty) triggers the bug.
This commit fixes the bug. Details are below.
This currently happens on read and write callbacks when the active
socket is marked for close. In this case, Tor doesn't actually try
to complete the read or write (it returns from those methods when
marked), but instead tries to clear the connection with
conn_close_if_marked(). Tor will not close a marked connection that
contains data: it must be flushed first. The bug occurs when this
flush operation on the marked connection can not occur because the
connection is rate-limited (its write token bucket is empty).
The fix is to detect when rate limiting is preventing a marked
connection from properly flushing. In this case, it should be
flagged as read/write_blocked_on_bandwidth and the read/write events
de-registered from Libevent. When the token bucket gets refilled, it
will check the associated read/write_blocked_on_bandwidth flag, and
add the read/write event back to Libevent, which will cause it to
fire. This time, it will be properly flushed and closed.
The reason that both read and write events are both de-registered
when the marked connection can not flush is because both result in
the same behavior. Both read/write events on marked connections will
never again do any actual reads/writes, and are only useful to
trigger the flush and close the connection. By setting the
associated read/write_blocked_on_bandwidth flag, we ensure that the
event will get added back to Libevent, properly flushed, and closed.
Why is this important? Every Shadow event occurs at a discrete time
instant. If Tor does not properly deregister Libevent events that
fire but result in Tor essentially doing nothing, Libevent will
repeatedly fire the event. In Shadow this means infinite loop,
outside of Shadow this means wasted CPU cycles.
This is a feature removal: we no longer fake any ciphersuite other
than the not-really-standard SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
(0xfeff). This change will let servers rely on our actually
supporting what we claim to support, and thereby let Tor migrate to
better TLS ciphersuites.
As a drawback, Tor instances that use old openssl versions and
openssl builds with ciphers disabled will no longer give the
"firefox" cipher list.
Manually removed range 0.116.0.0 to 0.119.255.255 which Maxmind says is
assigned to AT. This is very likely a bug in their database, because
0.0.0.0/8 is a reserved range.
From what I can tell, this configuration is usually a mistake, and
leads people to think that all their traffic is getting proxied when
in fact practically none of it is. Resolves the issue behind "bug"
4663.
The function is not guaranteed to NUL-terminate its output. It
*is*, however, guaranteed not to generate more than two bytes per
multibyte character (plus terminating nul), so the general approach
I'm taking is to try to allocate enough space, AND to manually add a
NUL at the end of each buffer just in case I screwed up the "enough
space" thing.
Fixes bug 5909.
This feature can make Tor relays less identifiable by their use of the
mod_ssl DH group, but at the cost of some usability (#4721) and bridge
tracing (#6087) regressions.
We should try to turn this on by default again if we find that the
mod_ssl group is uncommon and/or we move to a different DH group size
(see #6088). Before we can do so, we need a fix for bugs #6087 and
Resolves ticket #5598 for now.
These include:
- Having a weird in_addr that can't be initialized with {0}
- Needing INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE instead of -1 for file handles.
- Having a weird dependent definition for struct stat.
- pid is signed, not unsigned.
These stats are currently discarded, but we might as well
hard-disable them on bridges, to be clean.
Fix for bug 5824; bugfix on 0.2.1.17-rc.
Patch originally by Karsten Loesing.
Also, try to resolve some doxygen issues. First, define a magic
"This is doxygen!" macro so that we take the correct branch in
various #if/#else/#endifs in order to get the right documentation.
Second, add in a few grouping @{ and @} entries in order to get some
variables and fields to get grouped together.
This code shouldn't have any effect in 0.2.3, since we already accept
(and handle) data received while we are expecting a renegotiation.
(That's because the 0.2.3.x handshake _does_ have data there instead of
the renegotiation.)
I'm leaving it in anyway, since if it breaks anything, we'll want it
broken in master too so we can find out about it. I added an XXX023
comment so that we can come back later and fix that.
This fixes a DoS issue where a client could send so much data in 5
minutes that they exhausted the server's RAM. Fix for bug 5934 and
6007. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc, which enabled the v2 handshake.
This fixes a warning in efb8a09f, where Debain Lenny's GCC doesn't get
that
for (i=0; i<3; ++i) {
const char *p;
switch(i) {
case 0:
p="X"; break;
case 1:
p="Y"; break;
case 2:
p="Z"; break;
}
printf("%s\n", p);
}
will never try to print an uninitialezed value.
Found by buildbots. Bug in no released versions of Tor.
It appears that when OpenSSL negotiates a 1.1 or 1.2 connection, and it
decides to renegotiate, the client will send a record with version "1.0"
rather than with the current TLS version. This would cause the
connection to fail whenever both sides had OpenSSL 1.0.1, and the v2 Tor
handshake was in use.
As a workaround, disable TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. When a later version of
OpenSSL is released, we can make this conditional on running a fixed
version of OpenSSL.
Alternatively, we could disable TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 only on the client
side. But doing it this way for now means that we not only fix TLS with
patched clients; we also fix TLS when the server has this patch and the
client does not. That could be important to keep the network running
well.
Fixes bug 6033.
This solves bug 5283, where client traffic could get sent over the
same circuit as an anonymized connection to a directory, even if
that circuit used an exit node unsuitable for clients. By marking
the directory connection as needs_internal, we ensure that the
(non-internal!) client-traffic connection won't be sent over the
same circuit.
Conflicts:
src/test/test_util.c
Merge the unit tests; I added some when I did this branch against
0.2.2, and then the test format changed and master added more tests.
Conflicts:
src/common/compat.h
Conflict was between replacement of MS_WINDOWS with _WIN32 in
master, and with removal of file_handle from tor_mmap_t struct in
close_file_mapping branch (for bug 5951 fix).
It turns out that if you set the third argument of
__attribute__(format) to 0, GCC and Clang will check the format
argument without expecting to find variadic arguments. This is the
correct behavior for vsnprintf, vasprintf, and vscanf.
I'm hoping this will fix bug 5969 (a clang warning) by telling clang that
the format argument to tor_vasprintf is indeed a format string.
On Windows, getsockname() on a nonblocking apparently won't work
until the connection is done connecting. On XP, it seems to fail by
reporting success and declaring that your address is INADDR_ANY. On the
Win8 preview, though, it fails more loudly and says WSAEINVAL.
Fix for bug 5374; bugfix on 0.1.1.14-alpha.
The parent of "/foo" is "/"; and "/" is its own parent.
This would cause Tor to fail if you tried to have a PF_UNIX control
socket in the root directory. That would be a stupid thing to do
for other reasons, but there's no reason to fail like _this_.
Bug found by Esteban Manchado Velázquez. Fix for bug 5089; bugfix on
Tor 0.2.2.26-beta. Unit test included.
Roger explains at
http://archives.seul.org/tor/talk/Nov-2011/msg00209.html :
"If you list your bridge as part of your family in the relay
descriptor, then everybody can learn your bridge fingerprint, and
they can look up your bridge's descriptor (and thus location) at
the bridge directory authority."
Now, we can't stop relays from listing bridges, but we can warn when
we notice a bridge listing anybody, which might help some.
This fixes bug 4657; it's a fix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, where bridges were
first introduced.
To hit this leak, you need to be a relay that gets a RESOLVE request
or an exit node getting a BEGIN or RESOLVE request. You must either
have unconfigured (and unconfigurable) nameservers, or you must have
somehow set DisableNetwork after a network request arrived but
before you managed to process it.
So, I doubt this is reached often. Still, a leak's a leak. Fix for
bug 5916; bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha and 0.1.2.1-alpha.
%f is correct; %lf is only needed with scanf. Apparently, on some
old BSDs, %lf is deprecated.
Didn't we do this before? Yes, we did. But we only got the
instances of %lf, not more complicated things like %.5lf . This
patch tries to get everything.
Based on a patch for 3894 by grarpamp.
These errors usually mean address exhaustion; reporting them as such
lets clients adjust their load to try other exits.
Fix for bug 4710; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc, which started using
END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT.
(When the correct answer is given in terms of seconds since the
epoch, it's hard to be sure that it really is the right answer
just by reading the code.)
* It seems parse_http_time wasn't parsing correctly any date with commas (RFCs
1123 and 850). Fix that.
* It seems parse_http_time was reporting the wrong month (they start at 0, not
1). Fix that.
* Add some tests for parse_http_time, covering all three formats.
Silences the log message:
[warn] {BUG} _connection_mark_unattached_ap(): Bug: stream (marked at connection_edge.c:2224) sending two socks replies?
after the client triggered the "Tor is not an HTTP Proxy" response.
No additional socks reply was sent, though.
Previously, we only did this check at startup, which could lead to
us holding a guard indefinitely, and give weird results. Fixes bug
5380; bugfix on 0.2.1.14-rc.
(Patch by Roger; changes file and commit message by Nick)
Previously, we skipped everything that got invoked from
options_init_from_torrc. But some of the stuff in
options_act_reversible and options_act is actually important, like
reopening the logs.
Now, a SIGHUP always makes the effects of an options_set() happen,
even though the options haven't changed.
Fix for bug 5095; bugfix on 0.2.1.9-alpha, which introduced
__ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP.
This would happen if the deliver window could become negative
because of an nonexistent connection. (Fortunately, _that_ can't
occur, thanks to circuit_consider_sending_sendme. Still, if we
change our windowing logic at all, we won't want this to become
triggerable.) Fix for bug 5541. Bugfix on 4a66865d, back from
0.0.2pre14. asn found this. Nice catch, asn!
We've been only treating SW_SERVER_HELLO_A as meaning that an SSL
handshake was happening. But that's not right: if the initial
attempt to write a ServerHello fails, we would get a callback in
state SW_SERVER_HELLO_B instead.
(That's "instead" and not "in addition": any failed attempt to write
the hello will fail and cause the info callback not to get written.)
Fix for bug 4592; bugfix on 0.2.0.13-alpha.
This tells the windows headers to give us definitions that didn't
exist before XP -- like the ones that we need for IPv6 support.
See bug #5861. We didn't run into this issue with mingw, since
mingw doesn't respect _WIN32_WINNT as well as it should for some of
its definitions.
MSVC warns if you declare a function as having a "int foo" argument
and then implement it with a "const int foo" argument, even though
the latter "const" is not a part of the function's interface.
Instead, allow packagers to put a 'TOR_BUILD_TAG' field in the
server descriptor to indicate a platform-specific value, if they
need to. (According to weasel, this was his use for the git- tag
previously.)
This is part of 2988
For uname-based detection, we now give only the OS name (e.g.,
"Darwin", "Linux".) For Windows, we give only the Operating System
name as inferred from dw(Major|Minor)version, (e.g., "Windows XP",
"Windows 7"), and whether the VER_NT_SERVER flag is set.
For ticket 2988.
This time, I follow grarpamp's suggestion and move the check for
.exit+AllowDotExit 0 to the top of connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach,
before any rewriting occurs. This way, .exit addresses are
forbidden as they arrive from a socks connection or a DNSPort
request, and not otherwise.
It _is_ a little more complicated than that, though. We need to
treat any .exit addresses whose source is TrackHostExits as meaning
that we can retry without that exit. We also need to treat any
.exit address that comes from an AutomapHostsOnResolve operation as
user-provided (and thus forbidden if AllowDotExits==0), so that
transitioning from AllowDotExits==1 to AllowDotExits==0 will
actually turn off automapped .exit addresses.
This patch changes the total serverdesc threshold from 25% to 75%
and the exit threshold from 33% to 50%. The goal is to make
initially constructed circuits less horrible, and to make initial
less awful (since fetching directory information in parallel with
whatever the user is trying to do can hurt their performance).
Implements ticket 3196.
We were doing an O(n) strlen in router_get_extrainfo_hash() for
every one we tried to parse. Instead, have
router_get_extrainfo_hash() take the length of the extrainfo as an
argument, so that when it's called from
extrainfo_parse_from_string(), it doesn't do a strlen() over the
whole pile of extrainfos.
Now that the pt code logs mp->argv[0] all over the place, we need to
be sure to set up mp->argv in our tests.
Bugfix on e603692adc, not in any released version.
If the authorities agreed on a sufficiently bad bwweightscale value
(<=0 or == INT32_MAX), the bandwidth algorithm could make the voters
assert while computing the consensus.
Fix for bug5786; bugfix on 0.2.2.17-alpha
The underlying strtoX functions handle overflow by saturating and
setting errno to ERANGE. If the min/max arguments to the
tor_parse_* functions are equal to the minimum/maximum of the
underlying type, then with the old approach, we wouldn't treat a
too-large value as genuinely broken.
Found this while looking at bug 5786; bugfix on 19da1f36 (in Tor
0.0.9), which introduced these functions.
(Note: It makes sense to use tor-gencert on Windows for testing
purposes only. If you are a directory authority operator, and you
are contemplating running tor-gencert on a Windows box in an actual
production environment, you are probably making a mistake.)
We had been checking for EINVAL, but that means that SOCK_* isn't
supported, not that the syscall itself is missing.
Bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha, which started to use accept4.
This is how IPv6 says "0.0.0.0" and something we will have to
translate into a globally reachable address before putting it in a
descriptor.
The fix is a short term solution until a real one is implemented.
Closes#5146.
I think that the trailing __ got added in false analogy to
HAVE_MACRO__func__, HAVE_MACRO__FUNC__, and HAVE_MACRO__FUNCTION__.
But those macros actually indicate the presence of __func__,
__FUNC__, and __FUNCTION__ respectively. The __ at the end of
HAVE_EXTERN_ENVIRON_DECLARED would only be appropriate if the
environ were declared__, whatever that means.
(As a side-note, HAVE_MACRO__func__ and so on should probably be
renamed HAVE_MACRO___func__ and so on. But that can wait.)
This is an identifier renaming only.
If the client uses a v2 cipherlist on the renegotiation handshake,
it looks as if they could fail to get a good cert chain from the
server, since they server would re-disable certificate chaining.
This patch makes it so the code that make the server side of the
first v2 handshake special can get called only once.
Fix for 4591; bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc.
They boil down to:
- MS_WINDOWS is dead and replaced with _WIN32, but we let a few
instances creep in when we merged Esteban's tests.
- Capitalizing windows header names confuses mingw.
- #ifdef 0 ain't C.
- One unit test wasn't compiled on windows, but was being listed
anyway.
- One unit test was checking for the wrong value.
Gisle Vanem found and fixed the latter 3 issues.
Fixes bug #4528 "read_to_buf_tls(): Inconsistency in code".
This check was added back in 0.1.0.3-rc, but somehow we forgot to
leave it in when we refactored read_to_buf_tls in 0.1.0.5-rc.
(patch by Arturo; commit message and changes file by nickm)
Instead of checking for 'rejected' and calling everything else okay,
let's check for 'outdated' and call everythign else a problem. This
way we don't risk missing future errors so much.
When logging a message that _looks_ like an error message at info, we
should mention that it isn't really a problem.
The bump from miniupnpc-1.5 to 1.6 changes the definition of
two functions used by tor-fw-helper-upnp.c, upnpDiscover() and
UPNP_AddPortMapping(). This patch addresses this and adds a
check in configure.in for backwards compatibility.
Thanks to Nickolay Kolchin-Semyonov for some hints.
X-Tor-Bug-URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5434
X-Gentoo-Bug-URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=376621
Signed-off-by: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
Previously, we would reset it at the drop of a hat -- every time a second
passes without any of the intro-point circs already launched for the
service failing.
Fixes bug 4607.
In general, whenever we can, we should be doing
base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), s, strlen(s)),
and not
base_64_decode(buf, expr1, s, expr2)
where we hope that expr1 is a good name for the size of buf and expr2
is a good formula for the length of the base64 expression in s.
Fixes coverity CID 508: coverity scan doesn't like checking a
variable for non-NULL after it has been definitely dereferenced.
This should take us back down to zero coverity issues.
* Document fmt_addr_impl() and friends.
* Parenthesize macro arguments.
* Rename get_first_listener_addrport_for_pt() to
get_first_listener_addrport_string().
* Handle port_cfg_t with no_listen.
* Handle failure of router_get_active_listener_port_by_type().
* Add an XXX to router_get_active_listener_port_by_type().
This is just refactoring work here. The old logic was kind of
convoluted, especially after the bug 5572 fix. We don't actually need to
distinguish so many cases here. Dropping detection of the
"!old_options || !old_options->DynamicDHGroups" case is fine because
that's the same that we'd do for clients.
Also add a changes file for bug 5572.
The message only means that we're publishing a new descriptor when we
are actually in some kind of server mode, and publication is on.
Fix for bug 3942; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
This fixes a side-channel attack on the (fortunately unused!)
BridgePassword option for bridge authorities. Fix for bug 5543;
bugfix on 0.2.0.14-alpha.
Introduce get_first_listener_addrport_for_pt() which returns a string
containing the addrport of the first listener we could find. Use it to
form the TOR_PT_ORPORT managed proxy protocol line.
This is ticket 2479. Roger's original explanation was:
We have a series of bugs where relays publish a descriptor within
12 hours of their last descriptor, but the authorities drop it
because it's not different "enough" from the last one and it's
too close to the last one.
The original goal of this idea was to a) reduce the number of new
descriptors authorities accept (and thus have to store) and b)
reduce the total number of descriptors that clients and mirrors
fetch. It's a defense against bugs where relays publish a new
descriptor every minute.
Now that we're putting out one consensus per hour, we're doing
better at the total damage that can be caused by 'b'.
There are broader-scale design changes that would help here, and
we've had a trac entry open for years about how relays should
recognize that they're not in the consensus, or recognize when
their publish failed, and republish sooner.
In the mean time, I think we should change some of the parameters
to make the problem less painful.
When we started RefuseUnknownExits back in 0.2.2.11-alpha, we
started making exits act like they cache directory info (since they
need an up-to-date idea of who is really a router). But this
included fetching needless (unrecognized) authorities' certs, which
doesn't make any sense for them.
This is related to, but not necessarily the same as, the issue that
Ian reported for bug #2297.
(This patch is based on a patch from a user who I believe has asked
not to be named. If I'm wrong about that, please add the
appropriate name onto the changelog.)
==
Nick here. I tweaked this patch a little to make it apply cleanly to
master, to extract some common code into a function, and to replace
snprintf with tor_snprintf.
-- nickm
One of our unit tests checks that they behave correctly (giving an
error) when the base is negative. But there isn't a guarantee that
strtol and friends actually handle negative bases correctly.
Found by Coverity Scan; fix for CID 504.
Coverity doesn't like the fact that we were storing the value of
parse_config_line_from_str() but not checking it in a couple of
cases.
Fixes CID 505 and 506.
Calling crypto_cipher_free(NULL) is always safe, since (by
convention) all of our xyz_free() functions treat xyz_free(NULL) as
a no-op.
Flagged by coverity scan; fixes CID 508 and 509.
A previous commit in the 5527 branch had moved
router_get_mutable_by_digest(digest_rcvd) to happen before we did
tor_assert(digest_rcvd), which would have defeated the purpose of
the assert.
Specifically, I believe it dates back to when extend cells had address:port
but no digest in them. The special edge case is certainly not worth the
complexity these days.
* This assertion fails when executing the whole suite, but not when executing
this test by itself
* Ideally I'd prefer starting with a guaranteed empty directory, but it's not
very important in this case as non-existence of other paths is being checked
explicitly
* Add several failing tests (embedded in an "#if 0" block) for behaviour that
doesn't match strtok_r
* Add another, passing, more interesting test
* Use test_eq_ptr(NULL, ...) instead of test_assert(NULL == ...)
* Add many new test cases, tweak/improve existing ones, reorganize them a bit
* Switch the parameters in all test_eq calls so the expected value is the first
* Change all the "r = tor_sscanf(...);\ntest_eq(1, r)" to the more compact
"test_eq(1, tor_sscanf(...))". It may be a tiny bit harder to find the
tor_sscanf calls (it's the long lines anyway), but it saves a lot of lines,
which should help readability.
* Switch some test_eq parameters so the expected is always the first parameter
* Drop some manual checks of compressed format magic numbers (they're pointless
and they make the unit tests less readable and more fragile, considering
we're already indirectly checking those magic numbers via the
detect_compression_method function)
* Add a couple of extra assertions
* The test currently fails, but it's commented out (with an "#if 0")
* As a broken octal actually gives a parse error, it seems fair that this
fails, too
This mitigates an attack proposed by wanoskarnet, in which all of a
client's bridges collude to restrict the exit nodes that the client
knows about. Fixes bug 5343.
In the distant past, connection_handle_read() could be called when there
are pending bytes in the TLS object during the main loop. The design
since then has been to always read all pending bytes immediately, so
read events only trigger when the socket actually has bytes to read.
Resolves bug 5324.
Since 0.2.3.1-alpha, we've supported the Linux extensions to socket(),
open(), socketpair(), and accept() that enable us to create an fd and
make it close-on-exec with a single syscall. This not only saves us a
syscall (big deal), but makes us less vulnerable to race conditions
where we open a socket and then exec before we can make it
close-on-exec.
But these extensions are not supported on all Linuxes: They were added
between 2.6.23 or so and 2.6.28 or so. If you were to build your Tor
against a recent Linux's kernel headers, and then run it with a older
kernel, you would find yourselve unable to open sockets. Ouch!
The solution here is that, when one of these syscalls fails with
EINVAL, we should try again in the portable way. This adds an extra
syscall in the case where we built with new headers and are running
with old ones, but it will at least allow Tor to work.
Fixes bug 5112; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
There is a facility (not used now in Tor) to avoid storing the hash
of a given type if it is a fast-to-calculate hash.
There are also a few ancient-openbsd compilation issues fixed here.
The fact that Tor says INLINE while Libevent says inline remains
unaddressed.
The big change here is a patch (first added to Libevent by Ed Day)
to make sure that the CreateProcess forked-test trick works even
when the main test program is invoked without its .exe suffix.
The invariant is: unconfigured_proxies_n is exactly the number of
managed_proxy_t not in state PT_PROTO_COMPLETED.
To maintain this, we need to stop overloading unconfigured_proxies_n
to also count managed_proxy_t items that are in PT_PROTO_COMPLETED but
which might need relaunching. To make it so we can detect those, we
introduce another variable.
This commit also adds a function to assert that we haven't broken the
invariant.
Fix for bug 5084; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha, I think.
In some cases, we solve this by doing a SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT before
calling managed_proxy_destroy. But for a trickier one, we just make a
copy of the list before iterating over it, so that changes to the
manage proxy list don't hurt our iteration.
This could be related to bug 5084.
in Makefile.am, we used it without quoting it, causing build failure if
your openssl/sed/sha1sum happened to live in a directory with a space in
it (very common on windows)
This reverts commit 55e8cae815.
The conversation from irc:
> weasel: i had intended to leave torrc.sample.in alone in maint-0.2.2,
since i don't want to make all your stable users have to deal with
a torrc change. but nickm changed it. is it in fact the case that a
change in that file means a change in the deb?
<weasel> it means you'll prompt every single user who ever touched
their torrc
<weasel> and they will be asked if they like your new version better
than what they have right now
<weasel> so it's not great
Instead I changed the website to redirect requests for the tor-manual
URL listed in maint-0.2.2's torrc.sample.in so the link will still work.
If we don't do this, [::] can be interpreted to mean all v4 and all
v6 addresses. Found by dcf. Fixes bug 4760. See RFC 3493 section
5.3 for more info.
There was one MS_WINDOWS that remained because it wasn't on a macro
line; a few remaining uses (and the definition!) in configure.in;
and a now-nonsensical stanza of eventdns_tor.h that previously
defined 'WIN32' if it didn't exist.
This commit is completely mechanical; I used this perl script to make it:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i.bak -p
if (/^\s*\#/) {
s/MS_WINDOWS/_WIN32/g;
s/\bWIN32\b/_WIN32/g;
}
Previously the client would ask the bridge for microdescriptors, which are
only supported in 0.2.3.x and later, and then fail to bootstrap when it
didn't get the answers it wanted. Fixes bug 4013; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
The fix here is to revert to using normal descriptors if any of our
bridges are known to not support microdescs. This is not ideal, a) because
we'll start downloading a microdesc consensus as soon as we get a bridge
descriptor, and that will waste time if we later get a bridge descriptor
that tells us we don't like microdescriptors; and b) by changing our mind
we're leaking to our other bridges that we have an old-version bridge.
The alternate fix would have been to change
we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits() to ask if *any* of our bridges
can support microdescriptors, and then change the directory logic that
picks a bridge to only select from those that do. For people living in
the future, where 0.2.2.x is obsolete, there won't be a difference.
Note that in either of these potential fixes, we have risk of oscillation
if our one funny-looking bridges goes away / comes back.
These were found by looking for tor_snprintf() instances that were
preceeded closely by tor_malloc(), though I probably converted some
more snprintfs as well.
(In every case, make sure that the length variable (if any) is
removed, renamed, or lowered, so that anything else that might have
assumed a longer buffer doesn't exist.)
These were found by looking for tor_snprintf() instances that were
followed closely by tor_strdup(), though I probably converted some
other snprintfs as well.
(To ensure correctness, in every case, make sure that the temporary
variable is deleted, renamed, or lowered in scope, so we can't have
any bugs related to accidentally relying on the no-longer-filled
variable.)
Fixes bug #4897, not yet in any release.
Using n_circ_id alone here (and below, when n_conn is NULL) really sucks,
but that's a separate bug which will need a changes/ file.
To solve bug 4779, we want to avoid OpenSSL 1.0.0's counter mode.
But Fedora (and maybe others) lie about the actual OpenSSL version,
so we can't trust the header to tell us if it's safe.
Instead, let's do a run-time test to see whether it's safe, and if
not, use our built-in version.
fermenthor contributed a pretty essential fixup to this patch. Thanks!
When we have an effective bandwidthrate configured so that we cannot
exceed our bandwidth limit in one accounting interval, don't disable
advertising the dirport. Implements ticket 2434.
MAX_DNS_LABEL_SIZE was only defined for old versions of openssl, which
broke the build. Spotted by xiando. Fixes bug 4413; not in any released
version.
The thing that's limited to 63 bytes is a "label", not a hostname.
Docment input constraints and behavior on bogus inputs.
Generally it's better to check for overflow-like conditions before
than after. In this case, it's not a true overflow, so we're okay,
but let's be consistent.
pedantic less->fewer in the documentation
Fixes bug 4413; bugfix on xxxx.
Hostname components cannot be larger than 63 characters.
This simple check makes certain randlen cannot overflow rand_bytes_len.
We used to do this as a workaround for older Tors, but now it's never
the correct thing to do (especially since anything that didn't
understand RELAY_EARLY is now deprecated hard).
This patch should make us reject every Tor that was vulnerable to
CVE-2011-0427. Additionally, it makes us reject every Tor that couldn't
handle RELAY_EARLY cells, which helps with proposal 110 (#4339).
Previously we required 1.0.0, but there was a bug in the 1.0.0 counter
mode. Found by Pascal. Fixes bug 4779.
A more elegant solution would be good here if somebody has time to code
one.
Back in #1240, r1eo linked to information about how this could happen
with older Linux kernels in response to nmap. Bugs #4545 and #4547
are about how our approach to trying to deal with this condition was
broken and stupid. Thanks to wanoskarnet for reminding us about #1240.
This is a fix for the abovementioned bugs, and is a bugfix on
0.1.0.3-rc.
Preprocessor directives should not be put inside the arguments
of a macro. This is not supported on older GCC releases (< 3.3)
thus broke compilation on Haiku (running gcc2).
test_util_spawn_background_ok() hardcoded the expected value
for ENOENT to 2. This isn't portable as error numbers are
platform specific, and particularly the hurd has ENOENT at
0x40000002.
Construct expected string at runtime, using the correct value
for ENOENT (closes: #4733).
If a relay is dormant at startup, it will call init_keys before
crypto_set_tls_dh_prime. This is bad. Let's make it not so bad, because
someday it *will* happen again.
It's inefficient, but the more efficient solution (only try to attach
streams aiming for this HS) would require far more complexity for a gain
that should be tiny.
The client's anonymity when accessing a non-HS address in tor2web-mode
would be easily nuked by inserting an inline image with a .onion URL, so
don't even pretend to access non-HS addresses through Tor.
The Tor2webMode torrc option is still required to run a Tor client in
'tor2web mode', but now it can't be turned on at runtime in a normal build
of Tor. (And a tor2web build of Tor can't be used as a normal Tor client,
so we don't have to worry as much about someone distributing packages with
this particular pistol accessible to normal users.)
- Link in libws32 and libiphlpapi, needed for libnatpmp (both in
./configure and when compiling tor-fw-helper-natpmp.c)
- Define STATICLIB under Windows, to allow tor-fw-helper-natpmp.c to link
- Don't include arpa/inet.h which isn't present in Mingw32 and doesn't
appear to be needed on either Windows or MacOS X
This resolves a loop warning on "MapAddress *.example.com
example.com", makes the rewrite log messages correct, and fixes the
behavior of "MapAddress *.a *.b" when just given "a" as an input.
MapAddress *.torproject.org torproject.org would have been interpreted
as a map from a domain to itself, and would have cleared the mapping.
Now we require not only a match of domains, but of wildcards.
Incidentally, we've got 30969 lines in master with a comma
in them, of which 1995 have a comma followed by a non-newline,
non-space character. So about 93% of our commas are right,
but we have a substantial number of "crowded" lines.
It might be nice to support this someday, but for now it would fail
with an infinite remap cycle. (If I say "remap * *.foo.exit",
then example.com ->
example.com.foo.exit ->
example.com.foo.exit.foo.exit ->
example.com.foo.exit.foo.exit.foo.exit -> ...)
In this new representation for wildcarded addresses, there are no
longer any 'magic addresses': rather, "a.b c.d", "*.a.b c.d" and
"*.a.b *.c.d" are all represented by a mapping from "a.b" to "c.d". we
now distinguish them by setting bits in the addressmap_entry_t
structure, where src_wildcard is set if the source address had a
wildcard, and dst_wildcard is set if the target address had a
wildcard.
This lets the case where "*.a.b *.c.d" or "*.a.b c.d" remap the
address "a.b" get handled trivially, and lets us simplify and improve
the addressmap_match_superdomains implementation: we can now have it
run in O(parts of address) rather than O(entries in addressmap).
1. Only allow '*.' in MapAddress expressions. Ignore '*ample.com' and '.example.com'.
This has resulted in a slight refactoring of config_register_addressmaps.
2. Add some more detail to the man page entry for AddressMap.
3. Fix initialization of a pointer to NULL rather than 0.
4. Update the unit tests to cater for the changes in 1 and test more explicitly for
recursive mapping.
1. Implement the following mapping rules:
MapAddress a.b.c d.e.f # This is what we have now
MapAddress .a.b.c d.e.f # Replaces any address ending with .a.b.c with d.e.f
MapAddress .a.b.c .d.e.f # Replaces the .a.b.c at the end of any addr with .d.e.f
(Note that 'a.b.c .d.e.f' is invalid, and will be rejected.)
2. Add tests for the new rules.
3. Allow proper wildcard annotation, i.e. '*.d.e' '.d.e' will still work.
4. Update addressmap_entry_t with an is_wildcard member.
This keeps the IP address and TCP for a given OR port together,
reducing the risk of using an address for one address family with a
port of another.
Make node_get_addr() a wrapper function for compatibility.
This is not as conservative as we could do it, f.ex. by looking at the
connection and only do this for connections to bridges. A non-bridge
should never have anything else than its primary IPv4 address set
though, so I think this is safe.
Don't touch the string representation in routerinfo_t->address.
Also, set or clear the routerinfo_t->ipv6_preferred flag based on the
address family of the bridge.
Comments below focus on changes, see diff for added code.
New type tor_addr_port_t holding an IP address and a TCP/UDP port.
New flag in routerinfo_t, ipv6_preferred. This should go in the
node_t instead but not now.
Replace node_get_addr() with
- node_get_prim_addr() for primary address, i.e. IPv4 for now
- node_get_pref_addr() for preferred address, IPv4 or IPv6.
Rename node_get_addr_ipv4h() node_get_prim_addr_ipv4h() for
consistency. The primary address will not allways be an IPv4 address.
Same for node_get_orport() -> node_get_prim_orport().
Rewrite node_is_a_configured_bridge() to take all OR ports into account.
Extend argument list to extend_info_from_node and
extend_info_from_router with a flag indicating if we want to use the
routers primary address or the preferred address. Use the preferred
address in as few situtations as possible for allowing clients to
connect to bridges over IPv6.
This code handles the new ORPort options, and incidentally makes all
remaining port types use the new port configuration systems.
There are some rough edges! It doesn't do well in the case where your
Address says one thing but you say to Advertise another ORPort. It
doesn't handle AllAddrs. It doesn't actually advertise anything besides
the first listed advertised IPv4 ORPort and DirPort. It doesn't do
port forwarding to them either.
It's not tested either, it needs more documentation, and it probably
forgets to put the milk back in the refrigerator.
Some controllers want this so they can mess with Tor's configuration
for a while via the control port before actually letting Tor out of
the house.
We do this with a new DisableNetwork option, that prevents Tor from
making any outbound connections or binding any non-control
listeners. Additionally, it shuts down the same functionality as
shuts down when we are hibernating, plus the code that launches
directory downloads.
To make sure I didn't miss anything, I added a clause straight to
connection_connect, so that we won't even try to open an outbound
socket when the network is disabled. In my testing, I made this an
assert, but since I probably missed something, I've turned it into a
BUG warning for testing.
This will mainly help distributors by giving a way to set system or package
defaults that a user can override, and that a later package can replace.
No promises about the particular future location or semantics for this:
we will probably want to tweak it some before 0.2.3.x-rc
The file is searched for in CONFDIR/torrc-defaults , which can be
overridden with the "--defaults-torrc" option on the command line.
This starts an effort to refactor torrc handling code to make it easier
to live with. It makes it possible to override exit policies from the
command line, and possible to override (rather than append to) socksport
lists from the command line.
It'll be necessary to make a "base" torrc implementation work at all.
Instead of only writing the dynamic DH prime modulus to a file, write
the whole DH parameters set for forward compatibility. At the moment
we only accept '2' as the group generator.
The DH parameters gets stored in base64-ed DER format to the
'dynamic_dh_params' file.
Let's *not* expose more cross-platform-compatibility structures, or
expect code to use them right.
Also, don't fclose() stdout_handle and stdin_handle until we do
tor_process_handle_destroy, or we risk a double-fclose.
We used to do init_keys() if DynamicDHGroups changed after a HUP, so
that the dynamic DH modulus was stored on the disk. Since we are now
doing dynamic DH modulus storing in crypto.c, we can simply initialize
the TLS context and be good with it.
Introduce a new function router_initialize_tls_context() which
initializes the TLS context and use it appropriately.
This shaves about 7% off our per-cell AES crypto time for me; the
effect for accelerated AES crypto should be even more, since the AES
calculation itself will make an even smaller portion of the
counter-mode performance.
(We don't want to do this for pre-1.0.0 OpenSSL, since our AES_CTR
implementation was actually faster than OpenSSL's there, by about
10%.)
Fixes issue #4526.
The function is over 10 or 20% on some of Moritz's profiles, depending
on how you could.
Since it's checking for a multi-hour timeout, this is safe to do.
Fixes bug 4518.
Completely disable stats if we aren't running as a relay. We won't
collect any anyway, so setting up the infrastructure for them and
logging about them is wrong. This also removes a confusing log
message that clients without a geoip db would have seen.
Fixes bug 4353.
When running with IOCP, we are in theory able to use userspace-
allocated buffers to avoid filling up the stingy amount of kernel
space allocated for sockets buffers.
The bufferevent_async implementation in Libevent provides this
ability, in theory. (There are likely to be remaining bugs). This
patch adds a new option that, when using IOCP bufferevents, sets
each socket's send and receive buffers to 0, so that we should use
this ability.
When all the bugs are worked out here, if we are right about bug 98,
this might solve or mitigate bug 98.
This option is experimental and will likely require lots of testing
and debugging.
This is a fancier bug4457 workaround for 0.2.3. In 0.2.2, we could
just tell Libevent "Don't enable locking!" so it wouldn't try to make
the event_base notifiable. But for IOCP, we need a notifiable base.
(Eventually, we'll want a notifiable base for other stuff, like
multithreaded crypto.) So the solution is to try a full-featured
initialization, and then retry with all the options turned off if that
fails.
Conflicts:
src/common/compat_libevent.c
Resolving conflict by not taking 7363eae13c ("Use the
EVENT_BASE_FLAG_NOLOCK flag to prevent socketpair() invocation"): in
Tor 0.2.3.x, we _do_ sometimes use notifiable event bases.
In Tor 0.2.2, we never need the event base to be notifiable, since we
don't call it from other threads. This is a workaround for bug 4457,
which is not actually a Tor bug IMO.
This thing was pretty pointless on versions of OpenSSL 0.9.8 and later,
and almost totally pointless on OpenSSL 1.0.0.
Also, favor EVP by default, since it lets us get hardware acceleration
where present. (See issue 4442)
The old behavior was susceptible to the compiler optimizing out our
assertion check, *and* could still overflow size_t on 32-bit systems
even when it did work.
Let's make it more obvious to the everyday reader that eventdns.c is
a) Based on Libevent's evdns.c
b) Slated for demolition
c) Supposed to keep API-compatibility with Libevent.
d) Not worth tweaking unless there's a bug.
- Rename tor_tls_got_server_hello() to tor_tls_got_client_hello().
- Replaced some aggressive asserts with LD_BUG logging.
They were the innocent "I believe I understand how these callbacks
work, and this assert proves it" type of callbacks, and not the "If
this statement is not true, computer is exploding." type of
callbacks.
- Added a changes file.
- Add a LOG_WARN message when registering the transports of a server
managed proxy, so that the bridge operator can see in what ports the
transports spawned and notify his/her clients.
The Right Way to expire an intro point is to establish a new one to
replace it, publish a new descriptor that doesn't list any expiring intro
points, and *then*, once our upload attempts for the new descriptor have
ended (whether in success or failure), close the expiring intro points.
Unfortunately, we can't find out when the new descriptor has actually been
uploaded, so we'll have to settle for a five-minute timer.
There should be no significant behaviour changes due to this commit (only
a log-message change or two), despite the rather massive overhaul, so this
commit doesn't include a changes/ file. (The commit that teaches
intro_point_should_expire_now to return non-zero gets a changes/ file,
though.)
We would stash the certs in the handshake state before checking them
for validity... and then if they turned out to be invalid, we'd give
an error and free them. Then, later, we'd free them again when we
tore down the connection.
Fixes bug 4343; fix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
This way, all of the DA operators can upgrade immediately, without nuking
every client's set of entry guards as soon as a majority of them upgrade.
Until enough guards have upgraded, a majority of dirauths should set this
config option so that there are still enough guards in the network. After
a few days pass, all dirauths should use the default.
It used to mean "Force": it would tell tor-resolve to ask tor to
resolve an address even if it ended with .onion. But when
AutomapHostsOnResolve was added, automatically refusing to resolve
.onion hosts stopped making sense. So in 0.2.1.16-rc (commit
298dc95dfd), we made tor-resolve happy to resolve anything.
The -F option stayed in, though, even though it didn't do anything.
Oddly, it never got documented.
Found while fixing GCC 4.6 "set, unused variable" warnings.
The patch for 3228 made us try to run init_keys() before we had loaded
our state file, resulting in an assert inside init_keys. We had moved
it too early in the function.
Now it's later in the function, but still above the accounting calls.
Previously we did this nearer to the end (in the old_options &&
transition_affects_workers() block). But other stuff cares about
keys being consistent with options... particularly anything which
tries to access a key, which can die in assert_identity_keys_ok().
Fixes bug 3228; bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha.
Conflicts:
src/or/config.c
When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in
a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing
from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that
by always initializing keys when the state changes.
Fixes bug 2433.
Conflicts:
src/or/config.c
We use a hash of the identity key to seed a prng to tell when an
accounting period should end. But thanks to the bug998 changes,
clients no longer have server-identity keys to use as a long-term seed
in accounting calculations. In any case, their identity keys (as used
in TLS) were never never fixed. So we can just set the wakeup time
from a random seed instead there. Still open is whether everybody
should be random.
This patch fixes bug 2235, which was introduced in 0.2.2.18-alpha.
Diagnosed with help from boboper on irc.
In a2bb0bf we started using a separate client identity key. When we are
in "public server mode" (that means not a bridge) we will use the same
key. Reusing the key without doing the proper refcounting leads to a
segfault on cleanup during shutdown. Fix that.
Also introduce an assert that triggers if our refcount falls below 0.
That should never happen.
We now require that:
- Only actual servers should ever call get_server_identity_key
- If you're being a client or bridge, the client and server keys should
differ.
- If you're being a public relay, the client and server keys
should be the same.
* Make tor_tls_context_new internal to tortls.c, and return the new
tor_tls_context_t from it.
* Add a public tor_tls_context_init wrapper function to replace it.
Conflicts:
src/or/main.c
src/or/router.c
SSL_read(), SSL_write() and SSL_do_handshake() can always progress the
SSL protocol instead of their normal operation, this means that we
must be checking for needless renegotiations after they return.
Introduce tor_tls_got_excess_renegotiations() which makes the
tls->server_handshake_count > 2
check for us, and use it in tor_tls_read() and tor_tls_write().
Cases that should not be handled:
* SSL_do_handshake() is only called by tor_tls_renegotiate() which is a
client-only function.
* The SSL_read() in tor_tls_shutdown() does not need to be handled,
since SSL_shutdown() will be called if SSL_read() returns an error.
From the code:
zlib 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 do some "clever" things with macros. Instead of
saying "(defined(FOO) ? FOO : 0)" they like to say "FOO-0", on the theory
that nobody will care if the compile outputs a no-such-identifier warning.
Sorry, but we like -Werror over here, so I guess we need to define these.
I hope that zlib 1.2.6 doesn't break these too.
Possible fix for bug 1526.
Since we check for naughty renegotiations using
tor_tls_t.server_handshake_count we don't need that semi-broken
function (at least till there is a way to disable rfc5746
renegotiations too).
Switch 'server_handshake_count' from a uint8_t to 2 unsigned int bits.
Since we won't ever be doing more than 3 handshakes, we don't need the
extra space.
Toggle tor_tls_t.got_renegotiate based on the server_handshake_count.
Also assert that when we've done two handshakes as a server (the initial
SSL handshake, and the renegotiation handshake) we've just
renegotiated.
Finally, in tor_tls_read() return an error if we see more than 2
handshakes.
The renegotiation callback was called only when the first Application
Data arrived, instead of when the renegotiation took place.
This happened because SSL_read() returns -1 and sets the error to
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ when a renegotiation happens instead of reading
data [0].
I also added a commented out aggressive assert that I won't enable yet
because I don't feel I understand SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ enough.
[0]: Look at documentation of SSL_read(), SSL_get_error() and
SSL_CTX_set_mode() (SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY section).
Introduce tor_tls_state_changed_callback(), which handles every SSL
state change.
The new function tor_tls_got_server_hello() is called every time we
send a ServerHello during a v2 handshake, and plays the role of the
previous tor_tls_server_info_callback() function.
When you're doing malloc(sizeof(int)), something may well have gone
wrong.
This technique is a bit abusive, but we're already relying on it
working correctly in geoip.c.
To get a better idea what's going on on Tonga, add some code to report
how often the most and least frequently fetched descriptor was fetched,
as well as 25, 50, 75 percentile.
Also ensure we only count bridge descriptors here.
- Add a tor_process_get_pid() function that returns the PID of a
process_handle_t.
- Conform to make check-spaces.
- Add some more documentation.
- Improve some log messages.
We used to try to terminate the managed proxy process even if it
failed while launching. We introduce a new managed proxy state, to
represent a *broken* and *not launched* proxy.
This is used for the bridge authority currently, to get a better
intuition on how many descriptors are actually fetched from it and how
many fetches happen in total.
Implements ticket 4200.
Fixes bug 4259, bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha. Bugfix by "Tey'".
Original message by submitter:
Changing nodes restrictions using a controller while Tor is doing
DNS resolution could makes Tor crashes (on WinXP at least). The
problem can be repeated by trying to reach a non-existent domain
using Tor:
curl --socks4a 127.0.0.1:9050 inexistantdomain.ext
.. and changing the ExitNodes parameter through the control port
before Tor returns a DNS resolution error (of course, the following
command won't work directly if the control port is password
protected):
echo SETCONF ExitNodes=TinyTurtle | nc -v 127.0.0.1 9051
Using a non-existent domain is needed to repeat the issue so that
Tor takes a few seconds for resolving the domain (which allows us to
change the configuration). Tor will crash while processing the
configuration change.
The bug is located in the addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts
method which iterates over the entries of the addresses map in order
to check whether the changes made to the configuration will impact
those entries. When a DNS resolving is in progress, the new_adress
field of the associated entry will be set to NULL. The method
doesn't expect this field to be NULL, hence the crash.
Previously, we would treat an intro circuit failure as a timeout iff the
circuit failed due to a mismatch in relay identity keys. (Due to a bug
elsewhere, we only recognize relay identity-key mismatches on the first
hop, so this isn't as bad as it could have been.)
Bugfix on commit eaed37d14c, not yet in any
release.
It's too risky to have a function where if you leave one parameter
NULL, it splits up address:port strings, but if you set it, it does
hostname resolution.
Under the new convention, having a tor_addr.*lookup function that
doesn't do hostname resolution is too close for comfort.
I used this script here, and have made no other changes.
s/tor_addr_parse_reverse_lookup_name/tor_addr_parse_PTR_name/g;
s/tor_addr_to_reverse_lookup_name/tor_addr_to_PTR_name/g;
Now let's have "lookup" indicate that there can be a hostname
resolution, and "parse" indicate that there wasn't. Previously, we
had one "lookup" function that did resolution; four "parse" functions,
half of which did resolution; and a "from_str()" function that didn't
do resolution. That's confusing and error-prone!
The code changes in this commit are exactly the result of this perl
script, run under "perl -p -i.bak" :
s/tor_addr_port_parse/tor_addr_port_lookup/g;
s/parse_addr_port(?=[^_])/addr_port_lookup/g;
s/tor_addr_from_str/tor_addr_parse/g;
This patch leaves aton and pton alone: their naming convention and
behavior is is determined by the sockets API.
More renaming may be needed.
Right now we can take the digests only of an RSA key, and only expect to
take the digests of an RSA key. The old tor_cert_get_id_digests() would
return a good set of digests for an RSA key, and an all-zero one for a
non-RSA key. This behavior is too error-prone: it carries the risk that
we will someday check two non-RSA keys for equality and conclude that
they must be equal because they both have the same (zero) "digest".
Instead, let's have tor_cert_get_id_digests() return NULL for keys we
can't handle, and make its callers explicitly test for NULL.
Our keys and x.509 certs are proliferating here. Previously we had:
An ID cert (using the main ID key), self-signed
A link cert (using a shorter-term link key), signed by the ID key
Once proposal 176 and 179 are done, we will also have:
Optionally, a presentation cert (using the link key),
signed by whomever.
An authentication cert (using a shorter-term ID key), signed by
the ID key.
These new keys are managed as part of the tls context infrastructure,
since you want to rotate them under exactly the same circumstances,
and since they need X509 certificates.
Also, define all commands > 128 as variable-length when using
v3 or later link protocol. Running into a var cell with an
unrecognized type is no longer a bug.
Without this patch, Tor wasn't sure whether it would be hibernating or
not, so it postponed opening listeners until after the privs had been
dropped. This doesn't work so well for low ports. Bug was introduced in
the fix for bug 2003. Fixes bug 4217, reported by Zax and katmagic.
Thanks!
One of its callers assumes a non-zero result indicates a permanent failure
(i.e. the current attempt to connect to this HS either has failed or is
doomed). The other caller only requires that this function's result
never equal -2.
Bug reported by Sebastian Hahn.
Change the default values for collecting directory request statistics and
inlcuding them in extra-info descriptors to 1.
Don't break if we are configured to collect directory request or entry
statistics and don't have a GeoIP database. Instead, print out a notice
and skip initializing the affected statistics code.
This is the cherry-picked 499661524b.
Previously Tor would always claim to have been given a hostname
by the client, while actually only verifying that the client
is using SOCKS4A or SOCKS5 with hostnames. Both protocol versions
allow IP addresses, too, in which case the log messages were wrong.
Fixes#4094.
Previously, we wouldn't refetch an HS's descriptor unless we didn't
have one at all. That was equivalent to refetching iff we didn't have
a usable one, but the next commit will make us keep some non-usable HS
descriptors around in our cache.
Code bugfix on the release that introduced the v2 HS directory system,
because rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc's documentation comment should
have described what it actually did, not what its behaviour happened
to be equivalent to; no behaviour change in this commit.
Otherwise, we can wind up munging our reference counts if we set it in
the middle of loading the nodes. This happens because
nodelist_set_consensus() and microdesc_reload_cache() are both in the
business of adjusting microdescriptors' references.
we don't need to check whether we don't have enough guards right after
concluding that we do have enough.
slight efficiency fix suggested by an anonymous fellow on irc.
We were doing "divide bandwidth by 1000, then multiply by msec", but
that would lose accuracy: instead of getting your full bandwidth,
you'd lose up to 999 bytes per sec. (Not a big deal, but every byte
helps.)
Instead, do the multiply first, then the division. This can easily
overflow a 32-bit value, so make sure to do it as a 64-bit operation.
GCC 4.2 and maybe other compilers optimize away unsigned integer
overflow checks of the form (foo + bar < foo), for all bar.
Fix one such check in `src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c'.
With managed proxies you would always get the error message:
"You have a Bridge line using the X pluggable transport, but there
doesn't seem to be a corresponding ClientTransportPlugin line."
because the check happened directly after parse_client_transport_line()
when managed proxies were not fully configured and their transports
were not registered.
The fix is to move the validation to run_scheduled_events() and make
sure that all managed proxies are configured first.
* Create mark/sweep functions for transports.
* Create a transport_resolve_conflicts() function that tries to
resolve conflicts when registering transports.
Previously the FooPort was ignored and the default used instead,
causing Tor to bind to the wrong port if FooPort and the default
port don't match or the CONN_TYPE_FOO_LISTENER has no default port.
Fixes#3936.
Right now we only force a new descriptor upload every 18 hours.
This can make servers become unlisted if they upload a descriptor at
time T which the authorities reject as being "too similar" to one
they uploaded before. Nothing will actually make the server upload a
new descriptor later on, until another 18 hours have passed.
This patch changes the upload behavior so that the 18 hour interval
applies only when we're listed in a live consensus with a descriptor
published within the last 18 hours. Otherwise--if we're not listed
in the live consensus, or if we're listed with a publication time
over 18 hours in the past--we upload a new descriptor every 90
minutes.
This is an attempted bugfix for #3327. If we merge it, it should
obsolete #535.
Conflicts:
src/or/connection.c
src/or/connection_edge.c
src/or/connection_edge.h
src/or/dnsserv.c
Some of these were a little tricky, since they touched code that
changed because of the prop171 fixes.
On some platforms, with non-blocking IO, on EOF you first
get EAGAIN, and then on the second read you get zero bytes
and EOF is set. However on others, the EOF flag is set as
soon as the last byte is read. This patch fixes the test
case in the latter scenario.
Add a "default" state which we use until we've decided whether we're
live or hibernating. This allows us to properly track whether we're
resuming a hibernation period or not. Fixes bug 2003.
After a stream reached eof, we fclose it, but then
test_util_spawn_background_partial_read() reads from it again, which causes
an error and thus another fclose(). Some platforms are fine with this, others
(e.g. debian-sid-i386) trigger a double-free() error. The actual code used by
Tor (log_from_pipe() and tor_check_port_forwarding()) handle this case
correctly.
Mainly used for testing reading from subprocesses. To be more generic
we now pass in a pointer to a process_handle_t rather than a Windows-
specific HANDLE.
For printf, %f and %lf are synonymous, since floats are promoted to
doubles when passed as varargs. It's only for scanf that we need to
say "%lf" for doubles and "%f" for floats.
Apparenly, some older compilers think it's naughty to say %lf and like
to spew warnings about it.
Found by grarpamp.
For bufferevents, we had all of connection_buckets_decrement() stubbed
out. But that's not actually right! The rephist_* parts were
essential for, inter alia, recording our own bandwidth. This patch
splits out the rephist parts of connection_buckets_decrement() into their
own function, and makes the bufferevent code call that new function.
Fixes bug 3803, and probably 3824 and 3826 too. Bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
Previously, if you were set up to use microdescriptors, and you
weren't a cache, you'd never fetch router descriptors (except for
bridges). Now FetchUselessDescriptors causes descriptors and
mirodescs to get cached. Also, FetchUselessDescriptors changes the
behavior of "UseMicrodescriptors auto" to be off, since there's no
point in saying "UseMicrodescriptors 1" when you have full descriptors
too.
Fix for bug 3851; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
Conventionally in Tor, structs are returned as pointers, so change
tor_spawn_background() to return the process handle in a pointer rather
than as return value.
Because tunneled connections are implemented with buffervent_pair,
writing to them can cause an immediate flush. This means that
added to them and then checking to see whether their outbuf is
empty is _not_ an adequate way to see whether you added anything.
This caused a problem in directory server connections, since they
would try spooling a little more data out, and then close the
connection if there was no queued data to send.
This fix should improve matters; it only closes the connection if
there is no more data to spool, and all of the spooling callbacks
are supposed to put the dirconn into dir_spool_none on completion.
This is bug 3814; Sebastian found it; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
When we're doing filtering ssl bufferevents, we want the rate-limits
to apply to the lowest level of the bufferevent stack, so that we're
actually limiting bytes sent on the network. Otherwise, we'll read
from the network aggressively, and only limit stuff as we process it.
- Update configure script to test for libminiupnpc along with the
libws2_32 and libiphlpapi libraries required by libminiupnpc
- When building tor-fw-helper, link in libiphlpapi
- Link in libminiupnpc statically becasue I could not get the DLL
to link properly
- Call WSAStartup before doing network operations
- Fix up a compiler warning about uninitialized backend_state
N.B. The changes to configure.in and Makefile.am will break on non-
Windows platforms.
This behavior is normal when we want more data than the evbuffer
actually has for us. We'll ask for (say) 7 bytes, get only 5
(because that's all there is), try to parse the 5 bytes, and get
told "no, I want 7". One option would be to bail out early whenever
want_length is > buflen, but sometimes we use an over-large
want_length. So instead, let's just remove the warning here: it's
not a bug after all.
* Use strcmpstart() instead of strcmp(x,y,strlen(y)).
* Warn the user if the managed proxy failed to launch.
* Improve function documentation.
* Use smartlist_len() instead of n_unconfigured_proxies.
* Split managed_proxy_destroy() to managed_proxy_destroy()
and managed_proxy_destroy_with_transports().
* Constification.
It turns out that it wasn't enough to set the configuration to
"auto", since the correct behavior for "auto" had been disabled in
microdesc.c. :p
(Hasn't been in a release yet, so doesn't need a changes entry.)
Also remove a few other related warnings that could occur during the ssl
handshake. We do this because the relay operator can't do anything about
them, and they aren't their fault.
Now we track *which* stream with ISO_STREAM set is associated to a
particular circuit, so that we won't think that stream is incompatible
with its circuit and launch another one a second later, and we use that
same field to mark circuits which have had an ISO_STREAM stream attached
to them, so that we won't ever put a second stream on that circuit.
Fixes bug 3695.
Only write a bridge-stats string if bridge stats have been
initialized. This behavior is similar to dirreq-stats, entry-stats,
etc.
Also add a few unit tests for the bridge-stats code.
This patch separates the generation of a dirreq-stats string from
actually writing it to disk. The new geoip_format_dirreq_stats()
generates a dirreq-stats string that geoip_dirreq_stats_write() writes
to disk. All the state changing (e.g., resetting the dirreq-stats
history and initializing the next measurement interval) takes place in
geoip_dirreq_stats_write(). That allows us to finally test the
dirreq-stats code better.
Now that formatting the buffer-stats string is separate from writing
it to disk, we can also decouple the logic to extract stats from
circuits and finally write some unit tests for the history code.
The new rep_hist_format_buffer_stats() generates a buffer-stats string
that rep_hist_buffer_stats_write() writes to disk. All the state
changing (e.g., resetting the buffer-stats history and initializing
the next measurement interval) takes place in
rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(). That allows us to finally test the
buffer-stats code better.
So far, if we didn't see a single circuit, we refrained from
generating a cell-stats string and logged a warning. Nobody will
notice the warning, and people will wonder why there's no cell-stats
string in the extra-info descriptor. The better behavior is to
generate a cell-stats string with all zeros.
Right now, we append statistics to files in the stats/ directory for
half of the statistics, whereas we overwrite these files for the other
half. In particular, we append buffer, dirreq, and entry stats and
overwrite exit, connection, and bridge stats.
Appending to files was useful when we didn't include stats in extra-info
descriptors, because otherwise we'd have to copy them away to prevent
Tor from overwriting them.
But now that we include statistics in extra-info descriptors, it makes
no sense to keep the old statistics forever. We should change the
behavior to overwriting instead of appending for all statistics.
Implements #2930.
They *are* non-NUL-terminated, after all (and they have to be, since
the SOCKS5 spec allows them to contain embedded NULs. But the code
to implement proposal 171 was copying them with tor_strdup and
comparing them with strcmp_opt.
Fix for bug on 3683; bug not present in any yet-released version.
Previously we'd just looked at the connection type, but that's
always CONN_TYPE_AP. Instead, we should be looking at the type of
the listener that created the connection.
Spotted by rransom; fixes bug 3636.
We'll still need to tweak it so that it looks for includes and
libraries somewhere more sensible than "where we happened to find
them on Erinn's system"; so that tests and tools get built too;
so that it's a bit documented; and so that we actually try running
the output.
Work done with Erinn Clark.
- pid, stdout/stderr_pipe now encapsulated in process_handle
- read_all replaced by tor_read_all_from_process_stdin/stderr
- waitpid replaced by tor_get_exit_code
Untested on *nix
Previously, if tor_addr_to_str() returned NULL, we would reuse the
last value returned by fmt_addr(). (This could happen if we were
erroneously asked to format an AF_UNSPEC address.) Now instead we
return "???".
The conflicts are with the proposal 171 circuit isolation code, and
they're all trivial: they're just a matter of both branches adding
some unrelated code in the same places.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/or/connection.c
The problem was that we weren't initializing want_length to 0 before
calling parse_socks() the first time, so it looked like we were
risking an infinite loop when in fact we were safe.
Fixes 3615; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
Back when I added this logic in 20c0581a79, the rule was that whenever
a circuit finished building, we cleared its isolation info. I did that
so that we would still use the circuit even if all the streams that
had previously led us to tentatively set its isolation info had closed.
But there were problems with that approach: We could pretty easily get
into a case where S1 had led us to launch C1 and S2 had led us to
launch C2, but when C1 finished, we cleared its isolation and attached
S2 first. Since C2 was still marked in a way that made S1
unattachable to it, we'd then launch another circuit needlessly.
So instead, we try the following approach now: when a circuit is done
building, we try to attach streams to it. If it remains unused after
we try attaching streams, then we clear its isolation info, and try
again to attach streams.
Thanks to Sebastian for helping me figure this out.
One-hop dirconn streams all share a session group, and get the
ISO_SESSIONGRP flag: they may share circuits with each other and
nothing else.
Anonymized dirconn streams get a new internal-use-only ISO_STREAM
flag: they may not share circuits with anything, including each other.
The new candidate rule, which arma suggested and I like, is that
the original address as received from the client connection or as
rewritten by the controller is the address that counts.
This is mainly meant as a way to keep clients from accidentally
DOSing themselves by (e.g.) enabling IsolateDestAddr or
IsolateDestPort on a port that they use for HTTP.
Our old "do we need to launch a circuit for stream S" logic was,
more or less, that if we had a pending circuit that could handle S,
we didn't need to launch a new one.
But now that we have streams isolated from one another, we need
something stronger here: It's possible that some pending C can
handle either S1 or S2, but not both.
This patch reuses the existing isolation logic for a simple
solution: when we decide during circuit launching that some pending
C would satisfy stream S1, we "hypothetically" mark C as though S1
had been connected to it. Now if S2 is incompatible with S1, it
won't be something that can attach to C, and so we'll launch a new
stream.
When the circuit becomes OPEN for the first time (with no streams
attached to it), we reset the circuit's isolation status. I'm not
too sure about this part: I wanted some way to be sure that, if all
streams that would have used a circuit die before the circuit is
done, the circuit can still get used. But I worry that this
approach could also lead to us launching too many circuits. Careful
thought needed here.
This is the meat of proposal 171: we change circuit_is_acceptable()
to require that the connection is compatible with every connection
that has been linked to the circuit; we update circuit_is_better to
prefer attaching streams to circuits in the way that decreases the
circuits' usefulness the least; and we update link_apconn_to_circ()
to do the appropriate bookkeeping.
The "nym epoch" of a stream is defined as the number of times that
NEWNYM had been called before the stream was opened. All streams
are isolated by nym epoch.
This feature should be redundant with existing signewnym stuff, but
it provides a good belt-and-suspenders way for us to avoid ever
letting any circuit type bypass signewnym.
This patch adds fields to track how streams should be isolated, and
ensures that those fields are set correctly. It also adds fields to
track what streams can go on a circuit, and adds functions to see
whether a streams can go on a circuit and update the circuit
accordingly. Those functions aren't yet called.
Proposal 171 gives us a new syntax for parsing client port options.
You can now have as many FooPort options as you want (for Foo in
Socks, Trans, DNS, NATD), and they can have address:port arguments,
and you can specify the level of isolation on those ports.
Additionally, this patch refactors the client port parsing logic to
use a new type, port_cfg_t. Previously, ports to be bound were
half-parsed in config.c, and later re-parsed in connection.c when
we're about to bind them. Now, parsing a port means converting it
into a port_cfg_t, and binding it uses only a port_cfg_t, without
needing to parse the user-provided strings at all.
We should do a related refactoring on other port types. For
control ports, that'll be easy enough. For ORPort and DirPort,
we'll want to do this when we solve proposal 118 (letting servers
bind to and advertise multiple ports).
This implements tickets 3514 and 3515.
This adds a little code complexity: we need to remember for each
node whether it supports the right feature, and then check for each
connection whether it's exiting at such a node. We store this in a
flag in the edge_connection_t, and set that flag at link time.
- Conform to make check-spaces
- Build without warnings from passing size_t to %d
- Use connection_get_inbuf_len(), not buf_datalen (otherwise bufferevents
won't work).
- Don't log that we're using this feature at warn.
Previously we were using router_get_by_id(foo) to test "do we have a
descriptor that will let us make an anonymous circuit to foo". But
that isn't right for microdescs: we should have been using node_t.
Fixes bug 3601; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.