When we added the check for key size, we required that the keys be
128 bytes. But RSA_size (which defers to BN_num_bytes) will return
128 for keys of length 1017..1024. This patch adds a new
crypto_pk_num_bits() that returns the actual number of significant
bits in the modulus, and uses that to enforce key sizes.
Also, credit the original bug3318 in the changes file.
Rename crypto_pk_check_key_public_exponent to crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok:
it's nice to name predicates s.t. you can tell how to interpret true
and false.
Conflicts in various places, mainly node-related. Resolved them in
favor of HEAD, with copying of tor_mem* operations from bug3122_memcmp_022.
src/common/Makefile.am
src/or/circuitlist.c
src/or/connection_edge.c
src/or/directory.c
src/or/microdesc.c
src/or/networkstatus.c
src/or/router.c
src/or/routerlist.c
src/test/test_util.c
Conflicts throughout. All resolved in favor of taking HEAD and
adding tor_mem* or fast_mem* ops as appropriate.
src/common/Makefile.am
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/directory.c
src/or/dirserv.c
src/or/dirvote.c
src/or/networkstatus.c
src/or/rendclient.c
src/or/rendservice.c
src/or/router.c
src/or/routerlist.c
src/or/routerparse.c
src/or/test.c
Here I looked at the results of the automated conversion and cleaned
them up as follows:
If there was a tor_memcmp or tor_memeq that was in fact "safe"[*] I
changed it to a fast_memcmp or fast_memeq.
Otherwise if there was a tor_memcmp that could turn into a
tor_memneq or tor_memeq, I converted it.
This wants close attention.
[*] I'm erring on the side of caution here, and leaving some things
as tor_memcmp that could in my opinion use the data-dependent
fast_memcmp variant.
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
(Backport from 0.2.2's 5ed73e3807)
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
Our public key functions assumed that they were always writing into a
large enough buffer. In one case, they weren't.
(Incorporates fixes from sebastian)
It's all too easy in C to convert an unsigned value to a signed one,
which will (on all modern computers) give you a huge signed value. If
you have a size_t value of size greater than SSIZE_T_MAX, that is way
likelier to be an underflow than it is to be an actual request for
more than 2gb of memory in one go. (There's nothing in Tor that
should be trying to allocate >2gb chunks.)
In a2bb0bf we started using a separate client identity key. When we are
in "public server mode" (that means not a bridge) we will use the same
key. Reusing the key without doing the proper refcounting leads to a
segfault on cleanup during shutdown. Fix that.
Also introduce an assert that triggers if our refcount falls below 0.
That should never happen.
This should make us conflict less with system files named "log.h".
Yes, we shouldn't have been conflicting with those anyway, but some
people's compilers act very oddly.
The actual change was done with one "git mv", by editing
Makefile.am, and running
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs perl -i -pe 'if (/^#include.*\Wlog.h/) {s/log.h/torlog.h/; }'
This should never happen unless openssl is buggy or some of our
assumptions are deeply wrong, but one of those might have been the
cause of the not-yet-reproducible bug 1209. If it ever happens again,
let's get some info we can use.
Some *_free functions threw asserts when passed NULL. Now all of them
accept NULL as input and perform no action when called that way.
This gains us consistence for our free functions, and allows some
code simplifications where an explicit null check is no longer necessary.
In 5e4d53d535 we made it so that
crypto_cipher_set_key cannot fail. The call will now
always succeed, to returning a boolean for success/failure makes
no sense.
In C, the code "char x[10]; if (x) {...}" always takes the true branch of
the if statement. Coverity notices this now.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to make sure that an operation
we wanted to do would suceed. Those cases are now always-true.
In some cases, we were testing arrays to see if something was _set_.
Those caes are now tests for strlen(s), or tests for
!tor_mem_is_zero(d,len).
See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
This patch introduces a new type called document_signature_t to represent the
signature of a consensus document. Now, each consensus document can have up
to one document signature per voter per digest algorithm. Also, each
detached-signatures document can have up to one signature per <voter,
algorithm, flavor>.
Apparently the Android developers dumped OpenSSL's support for hardware
acceleration in order to save some memory, so you can't build programs using
engines on Android.
[Patch revised by nickm]
This shouldn't be necessary, but apparently the Android cross-compiler
doesn't respect -I as well as it should. (-I is supposed to add to the
*front* of the search path. Android's gcc wrapper apparently likes to add to
the end. This is broken, but we need to work around it.)
(This would be everywhere running OpenSSL 0.9.7x and earlier, including
all current Macintosh users.)
The code is based on Tom St Denis's LibTomCrypt implementation,
modified to be way less general and use Tor's existing facilities. I
picked this one because it was pretty fast and pretty free, and
because Python uses it too.
crypto_global_init gets called. Also have it be crypto_global_init
that calls crypto_seed_rng, so we are not dependent on OpenSSL's
RAND_poll in these fiddly cases.
Should fix bug 907. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre6. Backport candidate.
svn:r18210
The subversion $Id$ fields made every commit force a rebuild of
whatever file got committed. They were not actually useful for
telling the version of Tor files in the wild.
svn:r17867
Fix all remaining shorten-64-to-32 errors in src/common. Some were genuine problems. Many were compatibility errors with libraries (openssl, zlib) that like predate size_t. Partial backport candidate.
svn:r13665
Be more thorough about memory poisoning and clearing. Add an in-place version of aes_crypt in order to remove a memcpy from relay_crypt_one_payload.
svn:r13414
