Fixes bug 26480; bug appeared when we re-enabled the geoip tests on
windows. Bug originally introduced by our fix to 25787; bug not in
any released Tor.
This patch fixes a memory leak in new_establish_intro_cell() that could
happen if a test assertion fails and the *cell_out value isn't properly
free'd.
See: Coverity CID 1437445
This patch fixes a memory leak in hs_helper_build_hs_desc_impl() where
if a test assertion would fail we would leak the storage that `desc`
points to.
See: Coverity CID 1437448
This patch fixes a potential memory leak in test_hs_auth_cookies() if a
test-case fails and we goto the done label where no memory clean up is
done.
See: Coverity CID 1437453
This patch fixes a potential memory leak in
hs_helper_build_intro_point() where a `goto done` is called before the
`intro_point` variable have been assigned to the value of the `ip`
variable.
See: Coverity CID 1437460
See: Coverity CID 1437456
This patch:
- introduces an fdio module for low-level fd functions that don't
need to log.
- moves the responsibility for opening files outside of torlog.c,
so it won't need to call tor_open_cloexec.
Out-of-tree builds could fail to run the rust tests if built in
offline mode. cargo expects CARGO_HOME to point to the .cargo
directory, not the directory containing .cargo.
Fixes bug 26455; bug not in any released tor.
When I wrote the first one of these, it needed the path of the geoip
file. But that doesn't translate well in at least two cases:
- Mingw, where the compile-time path is /c/foo/bar and the
run-time path is c:\foo\bar.
- Various CI weirdnesses, where we cross-compile a test binary,
then copy it into limbo and expect it to work.
Together, these problems precluded these tests running on windows.
So, instead let's just generate some minimal files ourselves, and
test against them.
Fixes bug 25787
We'd like to feature gate code that calls C from Rust, as a workaround
to several linker issues when running `cargo test` (#25386), and we
can't feature gate anything out of test code if `cargo test` is called
with `--all-features`.
* FIXES#26400: https://bugs.torproject.org/26400
Previously we had code like this for bad things happening from
signal handlers, but it makes sense to use the same logic to handle
cases when something is happening at a level too low for log.c to be
involved.
My raw_assert*() stuff now uses this code.
We had accumulated a bunch of cruft here. Now let's only include
src and src/ext. (exception: src/trunnel is autogenerated code, and
need to include src/trunnel.)
This commit will break the build hard. The next commit will fix it.
We need this trick because some of our Rust tests depend on our C
code, which in turn depend on other native libraries, which thereby
pulls a whole mess of our build system into "cargo test".
To solve this, we add a build script (build.rs) to set most of the
options that we want based on the contents of config.rust. Some
options can't be set, and need to go to the linker directly: we use
a linker replacement (link_rust.sh) for these. Both config.rust and
link_rust.sh are generated by autoconf for us.
This patch on its own should enough to make the crypto test build,
but not necessarily enough to make it pass.
After the big or.h refactoring, one single unit test file was missing two
headers for node_t and microdesc_t.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Also make sure that we're actually running the test from within the right
cwd, like we do when we're building. This seems necessary to avoid
an error when running offline.
Amusingly, it appears that we had this bug before: we just weren't
noticing it, because of bug 26258.
Some versions of GCC complain that the bfn_mock_node_get_by_id
function might return NULL, but we're assuming that it won't.
(We're assuming it won't return NULL because we know in the tests
that we're passing it valid IDs.)
To make GCC happy, tt_assert() that each node_t is set before using
it.
Fixes a second case of bug26269; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES#25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES#25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
We alloc/free X.509 structures in three ways:
1) X509 structure allocated with X509_new() and X509_free()
2) Fake X509 structure allocated with fake_x509_malloc() and fake_x509_free()
May contain valid pointers inside.
3) Empty X509 structure shell allocated with tor_malloc_zero() and
freed with tor_free()
Since we're going to be disabling the second-elapsed callback, we're
going to sometimes have long periods when no events file, and so the
current second is not updated. Handle that by having a better means
to detect "clock jumps" as opposed to "being idle for a while".
Tolerate far more of the latter.
Part of #26009.
Previously the coverage on this function was mostly accidental,
coming as it did from test_entryconn.c. These new tests use mocking
to ensure that we actually hit the different failure and retry cases
of addressmap_get_virtual_address(), and make our test coverage a
bit more deterministic.
Closes ticket 25993.
Previously, an authority with a clock more than 60 seconds ahead could
cause a client with a correct clock to warn that the client's clock
was behind. Now the clocks of a majority of directory authorities
have to be ahead of the client before this warning will occur.
Relax the early-consensus check so that a client's clock must be 60
seconds behind the earliest time that a given sufficiently-signed
consensus could possibly be available.
Add a new unit test that calls warn_early_consensus() directly.
Fixes bug 25756; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha.
construct_consensus() in test_routerlist.c created votes using a
timestamp from time(). Tests that called construct_consensus() might
have nondeterministic results if they rely on time() not changing too
much on two successive calls.
Neither existing of the two existing tests that calls
construct_consensus is likely to have a failure due to this problem.
Our previous algorithm had a nonzero probability of picking no
events to cancel, which is of course incorrect. The new code uses
Vitter's good old reservoir sampling "algorithm R" from 1985.
Fixes bug 26008; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
This functionality was covered only accidentally by our voting-test
code, and as such wasn't actually tested at all. The tests that
called it made its coverage nondeterministic, depending on what time
of day you ran the tests.
Closes ticket 26014.
This is needed for libressl-2.6.4 compatibility, which we broke when
we merged a15b2c57e1 to fix bug 19981. Fixes bug 26005; bug
not in any released Tor.
This test was using the current time to pick the time period number,
and a randomly generated hs key. Therefore, it sometimes picked an
index that would wrap around the example dht, and sometimes would
not.
The fix here is just to fix the time period and the public key.
Fixes bug 25997; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
