- Make sure we check at least two guards for descriptor before making
circuits. We typically use the first primary guard for circuits, but
it can also happen that we use the second primary guard (e.g. if we
pick our first primary guard as an exit), so we should make sure we
have descriptors for both of them.
- Remove BUG() from the guard_has_descriptor() check since we now know
that this can happen in rare but legitimate situations as well, and we
should just move to the next guard in that case.
(But use bash if it's available.)
This is a workaround until we remove bash-specific code in 19699.
Fixes bug 21581; bugfix on 21562, not in any released version of tor.
Previously I'd made a bad assumption in the implementation of
prop271 in 0.3.0.1-alpha: I'd assumed that there couldn't be two
guards with the same identity. That's true for non-bridges, but in
the bridge case, we allow two bridges to have the same ID if they
have different addr:port combinations -- in order to have the same
bridge ID running multiple PTs.
Fortunately, this assumption wasn't deeply ingrained: we stop
enforcing the "one guard per ID" rule in the bridge case, and
instead enforce "one guard per <id,addr,port>".
We also needed to tweak our implementation of
get_bridge_info_for_guard, since it made the same incorrect
assumption.
Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
Since 0.2.4.11-alpha (in 0196647970) we've tried to randomize
the start time to up to some time in the past. But unfortunately we
allowed the start time to be in the future as well, which isn't
really legit.
The new behavior lets the start time be be up to
MAX(cert_lifetime-2days, 0) in the past, but never in the future.
Fixes bug 21420; bugfix on 0.2.4.11-alpha.
When encoding a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, we were using the sizeof() on a
pointer instead of using the real size of the destination buffer leading to an
overflow passing an enormous value to the signing digest function.
Fortunately, that value was only used to make sure the destination buffer
length was big enough for the key size and in this case it always was because
of the overflow.
Fixes#21553
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Instead of returning 404 error code, this led to a NULL pointer being used and
thus a crash of tor.
Fixes#21471
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Fixes bug 20894; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
We already applied a workaround for this as 20834, so no need to
freak out (unless you didn't apply 20384 yet).
Fix for TROVE-2017-001 and bug 21278.
(Note: Instead of handling signed ints "correctly", we keep the old
behavior, except for the part where we would crash with -ftrapv.)
According to 21116, it seems to be needed for Wheezy Raspbian build. Also,
manpage of socket(2) does confirm that this errno value should be catched as
well in case of no support from the OS of IPv4 or/and IPv6.
Fixes#21116
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
