Values greater than 100 would have had the same effect as 100, so
this doesn't actually change Tor's behavior; it just makes the
intent clearer. Fixes#40486; see also torspec#66.
This one happens every time we get a failure from
circuit_receive_relay_cell -- but for all the relevant failing cases
in that function, we already log in that function.
This resolves one case of #40400. Two cases remain.
Series 0.4.2.x, 0.4.3.x and 0.4.4.x will all be rejected at the
authority level at this commit.
Futhermore, the 0.4.5.x alphas and rc will also be rejected.
Closes#40480
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Coverity report: CID 1492322
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1492322: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN)
/src/core/or/congestion_control_flow.c: 399 in circuit_process_stream_xon()
393 }
394
395 log_info(LD_EDGE, "Got XON: %d", xon->kbps_ewma);
396
397 /* Adjust the token bucket of this edge connection with the drain rate in
398 * the XON. Rate is in bytes from kilobit (kpbs). */
>>> CID 1492322: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN)
>>> Potentially overflowing expression "xon_cell_get_kbps_ewma(xon) * 1000U" with type "unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "uint64_t" (64 bits, unsigned).
399 uint64_t rate = xon_cell_get_kbps_ewma(xon) * 1000;
400 if (rate == 0 || INT32_MAX < rate) {
401 /* No rate. */
402 rate = INT32_MAX;
403 }
404 token_bucket_rw_adjust(&conn->bucket, (uint32_t) rate, (uint32_t) rate);
Fixes#40478
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Fixes issue #22469 where port strings such as '0x00' get accepted, not
because the string gets converted to hex, but because the string is
silently truncated past the invalid character 'x'. This also causes
issues for strings such as '0x01-0x02' which look like a hex port range,
but in reality gets truncated to '0', which is definitely not what a
user intends.
Warn and reject such port strings as invalid.
Also, since we're throwing that "malformed port" warning a lot in the
function, wrap it up in a nice goto.
Fixes#22469
The connection_ap_attach_pending() function processes all pending
streams in the pending_entry_connections list. It first copy the pointer
and then allocates a brand new empty list.
It then iterates over that copy pointer to try to attach entry
connections onto any fitting circuits using
connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit().
That very function, for onion service, can lead to flagging _all_
streams of the same onion service to be put in state RENDDESC_WAIT from
CIRCUIT_WAIT. By doing so, it also tries to remove them from the
pending_entry_connections but at that point it is already empty.
Problem is that the we are iterating over the previous
pending_entry_connections which contains the streams that have just
changed state and are no longer in CIRCUIT_WAIT.
This lead to this bug warning occuring a lot on busy services:
May 01 08:55:43.000 [warn] connection_ap_attach_pending(): Bug:
0x55d8764ae550 is no longer in circuit_wait. Its current state is
waiting for rendezvous desc. Why is it on pending_entry_connections?
(on Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev )
This fix is minimal and basically allow a state to be not CIRCUIT_WAIT
and move on to the next one without logging a warning. Because the
pending_entry_connections is emptied before processing, there is no
chance for a streams to be stuck there forever thus it is OK to ignore
streams not in the right state.
Fixes#34083
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We only need to rate limit reading on edges for flow control, as per the rate
that comes in the XON from the other side. When we rate limit reading from the
edge source to this rate, we will only deliver that fast to the other side,
thus satisfying its rate request.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
