The previous version of these functions had the following issues:
* they can't supply both the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in link specifiers,
* they try to fall back to a 3-hop path when the address for a direct
connection is unreachable, but this isn't supported by
launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(), so it fails.
But we can't fix these things in a bugfix release.
Instead, always put IPv4 addresses in link specifiers.
And if a v3 single onion service can't reach any intro points, fail.
This supports v3 hidden services on IPv4, dual-stack, and IPv6, and
v3 single onion services on IPv4 only.
Part of 23820, bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
The previous version of this function has the following issues:
* it doesn't choose between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses correctly, and
* it doesn't fall back to a 3-hop path when the address for a direct
connection is unreachable.
But we can't fix these things in a bugfix release.
Instead, treat IPv6 addresses like any other unrecognised link specifier
and ignore them. If there is no IPv4 address, return NULL.
This supports v3 hidden services on IPv4, dual-stack, and IPv6, and
v3 single onion services on IPv4 only.
Part of 23820, bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
Turns out that when reloading a tor configured with hidden service(s), we
weren't copying all the needed information between the old service object to
the new one.
For instance, the desc_is_dirty timestamp wasn't which could lead to the
service uploading its desriptor much later than it would need to.
The replaycache wasn't also moved over and some intro point information as
well.
Fixes#23790
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Bridge relays can use it to add a "bridge-distribution-request" line
to their bridge descriptor, which tells BridgeDB how they'd like their
bridge address to be given out.
Implements tickets 18329.
Fixes bug 23908; bugfix on 0.3.1.6-rc when we made the keypin
failure message really long.
Backport from 0.3.2's 771fb7e7ba,
where arma said "get rid of the scary 256-byte-buf landmine".
It _should_ work, and I don't see a reason that it wouldn't, but
just in case, add a 10 second timer to make tor die with an
assertion failure if it's supposed to exit but it doesn't.
This function was never about 'finishing' the event loop, but rather
about making sure that the code outside the event loop would be run
at least once.
Sometimes when we call exit(), it's because the process is
completely hopeless: openssl has a broken AES-CTR implementation, or
the clock is in the 1960s, or something like that.
But sometimes, we should return cleanly from tor_main() instead, so
that embedders can keep embedding us and start another Tor process.
I've gone through all the exit() and _exit() calls to annotate them
with "exit ok" or "XXXX bad exit" -- the next step will be to fix
the bad exit()s.
First step towards 23848.
At first, we put the tor_git_revision constant in tor_main.c, so
that we wouldn't have to recompile config.o every time the git
revision changed. But putting it there had unintended side effect
of forcing every program that wanted to link libor.a (including
test, test-slow, the fuzzers, the benchmarks, etc) to declare their
own tor_git_revision instance.
That's not very nice, especially since we want to start supporting
others who want to link against Tor (see 23846).
So, create a new git_revision.c file that only contains this
constant, and remove the duplicated boilerplate from everywhere
else.
Part of implementing ticket 23845.
This feature should help programs that want to launch and manage a
Tor process, as well as programs that want to launch and manage a
Tor instance in a separate thread. Right now, they have to open a
controlport, and then connect to it, with attendant authentication
issues. This feature allows them to just start with an
authenticated connection.
Bug 23900.
Create a function that tells us if we can fetch or not the descriptor for the
given service key.
No behavior change. Mostly moving code but with a slight change so the
function can properly work by returning a boolean and also a possible fetch
status code.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When we added HTTPTunnelPort, the answer that we give when you try
to use your SOCKSPort as an HTTP proxy became wrong. Now we explain
that Tor sorta _is_ an HTTP proxy, but a SOCKSPort isn't.
I have left the status line the same, in case anything is depending
on it. I have removed the extra padding for Internet Explorer,
since the message is well over 512 bytes without it.
Fixes bug 23678; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
Without this fix, changes from client to bridge don't trigger
transition_affects_workers(), so we would never have actually
initialized the cpuworkers.
Fixes bug 23693. Bugfix on 3bcdb26267 0.2.6.3-alpha, which
fixed bug 14901 in the general case, but not on the case where
public_server_mode() did not change.
Because our monotonic time interface doesn't play well with value set to 0,
always initialize to now() the scheduler_last_run at init() of the KIST
scheduler.
Fixes#23696
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When a channel is scheduled and flush cells returns 0 that is no cells to
flush, we flag it back in waiting for cells so it doesn't get stuck in a
possible infinite loop.
It has been observed on moria1 where a closed channel end up in the scheduler
where the flush process returned 0 cells but it was ultimately kept in the
scheduling loop forever. We suspect that this is due to a more deeper problem
in tor where the channel_more_to_flush() is actually looking at the wrong
queue and was returning 1 for an empty channel thus putting the channel in the
"Case 4" of the scheduler which is to go back in pending state thus
re-considered at the next iteration.
This is a fix that allows the KIST scheduler to recover properly from a not
entirelly diagnosed problem in tor.
Fixes#23676
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When we added single_conn_free_bytes(), we cleared the outbuf on a
connection without setting outbuf_flushlen() to 0. This could cause
an assertion failure later on in flush_buf().
Fixes bug 23690; bugfix on 0.2.6.1-alpha.
This caused a BUG log when we noticed that the circuit had no
channel. The likeliest culprit for exposing that behavior is
d769cab3e5, where we made circuit_mark_for_close() NULL out
the n_chan and p_chan fields of the circuit.
Fixes bug 8185; bugfix on 0.2.5.4-alpha, I think.
My current theory is that this is just a marked circuit that hasn't
closed yet, but let's gather more information in case that theory is
wrong.
Diagnostic for 8185.
If 6 SOCKS requests are opened at once, it would have triggered 6 fetches
which ultimately poke all 6 HSDir. We don't want that, if we have multiple
SOCKS requests for the same service, do one fetch only.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When purging last HSDir requests, we used time(NULL) for computing the
service blinded key but in all other places in our codebase we actually
use the consensus times. That can cause wrong behavior if the consensus
is in a different time period than time(NULL).
This commit is required for proper purging of HSDir requests.
The confparse field has type UINT, which corresponds to an int
type. We had uint32_t.
This shouldn't cause trouble in practice, since int happens to
4-bytes wide on every platform where an authority is running. It's
still wrong, though.
These should have been int, but we had listed them as unsigned.
That's an easy mistake to make, since "int" corresponds with either
INT or UINT in the configuration file.
This bug cannot have actually caused a problem in practice, since we
check those fields' values on load, and ensure that they are in
range 0..INT32_MAX.
New approach, suggested by Taylor: During testing builds, we
initialize a union member of an appropriate pointer type with the
address of the member field we're trying to test, so we can make
sure that the compiler doesn't warn.
My earlier approach invoked undefined behavior.
Also demote a log message that can occur under natural causes
(if the circuit subsystem is missing descriptors/consensus etc.).
The HS subsystem will naturally retry to connect to intro points,
so no need to make that log user-facing.
So we can track them more easily in the logs and match any open/close/free
with those identifiers.
Part of #23645
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This removes the "nickname" of the cannibalized circuit last hop as it is
useless. It now logs the n_circ_id and global identifier so we can match it
with other logging statement.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Prior to the log statement, the circuit n_circ_id value is zeroed so keep a
copy so we can log it at the end.
Part of #23645
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Make the "Exit" flag assignment only depend on whether the exit
policy allows connections to ports 80 and 443. Previously relays
would get the Exit flag if they allowed connections to one of
these ports and also port 6667.
Resolves ticket 23637.
Back in 0.2.4.3-alpha (e106812a77), when we switched from using
double to using uint64 for selecting by bandwidth, I got the math
wrong: I should have used llround(x), or (uint64_t)(x+0.5), but
instead I wrote llround(x+0.5). That means we would always round
up, rather than rounding to the closest integer
Fixes bug 23318; bugfix on 0.2.4.3-alpha.
The is_first_hop field should have been called used_create_fast,
but everywhere that we wanted to check it, we should have been
checking channel_is_client() instead.
The diff is confusing, but were two static scheduler functions that
needed moving to static comment block.
No code change. Thanks dgoulet for original commit
The clock_skew_warning() refactoring allowed calls from
or_state_load() to control_event_bootstrap_problem() to occur prior
bootstrap phase 0, causing an assertion failure. Initialize the
bootstrap status prior to calling clock_skew_warning() from
or_state_load().
or_state_load() was using an incorrect sign convention when calling
clock_skew_warning() to warn about state file clock skew. This caused
the wording of the warning to be incorrect about the direction of the
skew.
is_canonical doesn't mean "am I connected to the one true address of
this relay"; it means "does this relay tell me that the address I'm
connected to belong to it." The point is to prevent TCP-based MITM,
not to prevent the relay from multi-homing.
Related to 22890.
Authority IPv6 addresses were originally added in 0.2.8.1-alpha.
This leaves 3/8 directory authorities with IPv6 addresses, but there
are also 52 fallback directory mirrors with IPv6 addresses.
Resolves 19760.
