The fix is to move the two functions to format/parse base64
curve25519 public keys into a new "crypto_format.c" file. I could
have put them in crypto.c, but that's a big file worth splitting
anyway.
Fixes bug 8153; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha where I did the fix for 7869.
This is meant to avoid conflict with the built-in log() function in
math.h. It resolves ticket 7599. First reported by dhill.
This was generated with the following perl script:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
s/\blog\(LOG_(ERR|WARN|NOTICE|INFO|DEBUG)\s*,\s*/log_\L$1\(/g;
s/\blog\(/tor_log\(/g;
This is allowed by the C statndard, which permits you to represent
doubles any way you like, but in practice we have some code that
assumes that memset() clears doubles in structs. Noticed as part of
7802 review; see 8081 for more info.
It looks like there was a compilation error for 6826 on some
platforms. Removing even more now-uncallable code to handle detecting
libevent versions before 1.3e.
Fixes bug 8012; bug not in any released Tor.
This won't actually break them any worse than they were broken before:
it just removes a set of warnings that nobody was actually seeing, I
hope.
Closes 6826
This is an automatically generated commit, from the following perl script,
run with the options "-w -i -p".
s/smartlist_string_num_isin/smartlist_contains_int_as_string/g;
s/smartlist_string_isin((?:_case)?)/smartlist_contains_string$1/g;
s/smartlist_digest_isin/smartlist_contains_digest/g;
s/smartlist_isin/smartlist_contains/g;
s/digestset_isin/digestset_contains/g;
This patch moves curve25519_keypair_t from src/or/onion_ntor.h to
src/common/crypto_curve25519.h, and adds new functions to generate,
load, and store keypairs.
Previously, we only used the strong OS entropy source as part of
seeding OpenSSL's RNG. But with curve25519, we'll have occasion to
want to generate some keys using extremely-good entopy, as well as the
means to do so. So let's!
This patch refactors the OS-entropy wrapper into its own
crypto_strongest_rand() function, and makes our new
curve25519_secret_key_generate function try it as appropriate.
We want to use donna-c64 when we have a GCC with support for
64x64->uint128_t multiplying. If not, we want to use libnacl if we
can, unless it's giving us the unsafe "ref" implementation. And if
that isn't going to work, we'd like to use the
portable-and-safe-but-slow 32-bit "donna" implementation.
We might need more library searching for the correct libnacl,
especially once the next libnacl release is out -- it's likely to have
bunches of better curve25519 implementations.
I also define a set of curve25519 wrapper functions, though it really
shouldn't be necessary.
We should eventually make the -donna*.c files get build with
-fomit-frame-pointer, since that can make a difference.
This implements the server-side of proposal 198 by detecting when
clients lack the magic list of ciphersuites that indicates that
they're lying faking some ciphers they don't really have. When
clients lack this list, we can choose any cipher that we'd actually
like. The newly allowed ciphersuites are, currently, "All ECDHE-RSA
ciphers that openssl supports, except for ECDHE-RSA-RC4".
The code to detect the cipher list relies on on (ab)use of
SSL_set_session_secret_cb.
We already use this classification for deciding whether (as a server)
to do a v2/v3 handshake, and we're about to start using it for
deciding whether we can use good ciphersuites too.
This is less easy than you might think; we can't just look at the
client ciphers list, since openssl doesn't remember client ciphers if
it doesn't know about them. So we have to keep a list of the "v2"
ciphers, with the ones we don't know about removed.
We want to be saying fast_mem{cmp,eq,neq} when we're doing a
comparison that's allowed to exit early, or tor_mem{cmp,eq,neq} when
we need a data-invariant timing. Direct use of memcmp tends to imply
that we haven't thought about the issue.
This is a customizable extract-and-expand HMAC-KDF for deriving keys.
It derives from RFC5869, which derives its rationale from Krawczyk,
H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme",
Proceedings of CRYPTO 2010, 2010, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264>.
I'm also renaming the existing KDF, now that Tor has two of them.
This is the key derivation scheme specified in ntor.
There are also unit tests.
By default, "*" means "All IPv4 addresses" with
tor_addr_parse_mask_ports, so I won't break anything. But if the new
EXTENDED_STAR flag is provided, then * means "any address", *4 means
"any IPv4 address" (that is, 0.0.0.0/0), and "*6" means "any IPv6
address" (that is, [::]/0).
This is going to let us have a syntax for specifying exit policies in
torrc that won't drive people mad.
Also, add a bunch of unit tests for tor_addr_parse_mask_ports to test
these new features, and to increase coverage.
Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on
data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest
possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this
is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it
is, we can work on that in 0.2.4.
Fixes bug 7352.
This is based on code by yayooo for 7260, but:
- It allows for SIZEOF_PID_T == SIZEOF_SHORT
- It addresses some additional cases where we weren't getting any
warnings only because we were casting pid_t to int.
The implementation we added has a tendency to crash with lists of 0 or
one element. That can happen if we get a consensus vote, v2
consensus, consensus, or geoip file with 0 or 1 element. There's a
DOS opportunity there that authorities could exploit against one
another, and which an evil v2 authority could exploit against anything
downloading v2 directory information..
This fix is minimalistic: It just adds a special-case for 0- and
1-element lists. For 0.2.4 (the current alpha series) we'll want a
better patch.
This is bug 7191; it's a fix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 added an implementation of TLS session tickets, a
"feature" that let session resumption occur without server-side state
by giving clients an encrypted "ticket" that the client could present
later to get the session going again with the same keys as before.
OpenSSL was giving the keys to decrypt these tickets the lifetime of
the SSL contexts, which would have been terrible for PFS if we had
long-lived SSL contexts. Fortunately, we don't. Still, it's pretty
bad. We should also drop these, since our use of the extension stands
out with our non-use of session cacheing.
Found by nextgens. Bugfix on all versions of Tor when built with
openssl 1.0.0 or later. Fixes bug 7139.
In C, we technically aren't supposed to define our own things that
start with an underscore.
This is a purely machine-generated commit. First, I ran this script
on all the headers in src/{common,or,test,tools/*}/*.h :
==============================
use strict;
my %macros = ();
my %skipped = ();
FILE: for my $fn (@ARGV) {
my $f = $fn;
if ($fn !~ /^\.\//) {
$f = "./$fn";
}
$skipped{$fn} = 0;
open(F, $fn);
while (<F>) {
if (/^#ifndef ([A-Za-z0-9_]+)/) {
$macros{$fn} = $1;
next FILE;
}
}
}
print "#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p\n\n";
for my $fn (@ARGV) {
if (! exists $macros{$fn}) {
print "# No macro known for $fn!\n" if (!$skipped{$fn});
next;
}
if ($macros{$fn} !~ /_H_?$/) {
print "# Weird macro for $fn...\n";
}
my $goodmacro = uc $fn;
$goodmacro =~ s#.*/##;
$goodmacro =~ s#[\/\-\.]#_#g;
print "s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])$macros{$fn}(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_${goodmacro}/g;\n"
}
==============================
It produced the following output, which I then re-ran on those same files:
==============================
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ADDRESS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ADDRESS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_AES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_AES_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMPAT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMPAT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMPAT_LIBEVENT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMPAT_LIBEVENT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONTAINER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONTAINER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CRYPTO_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CRYPTO_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_DI_OPS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DI_OPS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MEMAREA_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MEMAREA_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MEMPOOL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MEMPOOL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_PROCMON_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_PROCMON_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORGZIP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORGZIP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORINT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORINT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_LOG_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORLOG_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORTLS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORTLS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_UTIL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_UTIL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_BUFFERS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_BUFFERS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CHANNEL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CHANNEL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CHANNEL_TLS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CHANNELTLS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITUSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITUSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMMAND_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMMAND_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONFIG_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONFIG_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_CONFPARSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONFPARSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_OR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_OR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONTROL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONTROL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CPUWORKER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CPUWORKER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRECTORY_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRECTORY_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRSERV_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRSERV_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRVOTE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRVOTE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DNS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DNS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DNSSERV_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DNSSERV_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_EVENTDNS_TOR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_EVENTDNS_TOR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_GEOIP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_GEOIP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_HIBERNATE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_HIBERNATE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MAIN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MAIN_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MICRODESC_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MICRODESC_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NETWORKSTATUS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NETWORKSTATUS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NODELIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NODELIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NTMAIN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NTMAIN_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ONION_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ONION_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_OR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_OR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_POLICIES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_POLICIES_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REASONS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REASONS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RELAY_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RELAY_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDCLIENT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDCLIENT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDCOMMON_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDCOMMON_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDMID_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDMID_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDSERVICE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDSERVICE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REPHIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REPHIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTERLIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERLIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTERPARSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERPARSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_ROUTERSET_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERSET_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_STATEFILE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_STATEFILE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_STATUS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_STATUS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_TRANSPORTS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TRANSPORTS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TEST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TEST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_NATPMP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_NATPMP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_UPNP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_UPNP_H/g;
==============================
The rationale for treating these files differently is that we should
be checking upstream for changes as applicable, and merging changes
upstream as warranted.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
The conflict was trivial, since no line of code actually changed in
both branches: There was a fmt_addr() that turned into fmt_addrport()
in bug7011, and a "if (!n_conn)" that turned into "if (!n_chan)" in
master.
Note: this is a squashed commit; see branch bug6465_rebased_v2 of user/andrea/tor.git for full history of the following 90 commits:
Add channel.c/channel.h for bug 6465
Fix make check-spaces in new channel.c/channel.h
Make sure new channel.h is in nodist_HEADERS and Makefile.nmake is up to date too
Add channel_state_t and state utility functions
Add channel_change_state()
Better comments in channel.h
Add CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING for channel_t
Fix wide line in channel.c
Add structures/prototypes for incoming cell handling
Implement channel_queue_cell() and channel_queue_var_cell()
Implement channel_process_cells()
Fix asserts in channel_queue_cell() and channel_queue_var_cell()
Add descriptive comments for channel_queue_cell() and channel_queue_var_cell()
Implement channel cell handler getters/setters
Queue outgoing writes when not in writeable state
Drain queues and test assertions when changing channel_t state
Add log_debug() messages for channel_t stuff
Add log_debug() messages for channel_t stuff
Add some channel_t metadata
Add time_t client_used to channel_t
Add channel_touched_by_client()
Declare a few channel_t metadata queries we'll have to implement later for use by circuitbuild.c
Add next_circ_id/circ_id_type to channel_t for use by circuitbuild.c
Count n_circuits in channel_t
Channel timestamp calls
Add create timestamp for channel.h
Declare some new metadata queries on channel_t
Add get_real_remote_descr() prototype
Move active_circuits stuff to channel_t, some other or.h and channel.h changes
Make channel_t refcounted and use global lists of active channels
Update channel_request_close() and channel_change_state() for channel_t registration mechanism
Handle closing channels sensibly
Add global_identifier for channels, channel_init() internal use function
Add timestamp_last_added_nonpadding to channel_t
Better comments in channel_init()
Correctly handle next_circ_id in channel_init()
Correctly handle next_circ_id in channel_init() and even compile this time
Appease make check-spaces
Update timestamps when writing cells to channel_t
Add channel_flush_some_cells() to call channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit()
Add registered channel lookup functions
Get rid of client_used in or_connection_t; it's in channel_t now
Get rid of circ_id_type in or_connection_t; implement channel_set_circ_id_type()
Eliminate is_bad_for_new_circs in or_connection_t; implement getter/setter for it in channel_t
Eliminate next_circ_id in or_connection_t in favor of channel_t
Handle packed cells in channel_t for relay.c
Add channel_identity_map and related functions
Handle add/remove from channel identity map on state transitions
Implement channel_is_local() and channel_mark_local()
Implement channel_is_client() and channel_mark_client()
Implement channel_is_outgoing() and channel_mark_outgoing()
Eliminate declaration for redundant channel_nonopen_was_started_here()
Add channel timestamps
Add channel timestamps, fix some make-check-spaces complaints
Remove redundant channel_was_started_here() function and initiated_remotely bit
Rename channel_get_remote_descr()/channel_get_real_remote_descr() to something clearer in channel.h
Replace channel_get_write_queue_len() with sufficient and easier to implement channel_has_queued_writes() in channel.h
Change return type of channel_is_bad_for_new_circs() to int for consistency
Implement channel_has_queued_writes()
Rename channel_touched_by_client() and client_used field for consistency with other timestamps in channel.{c,h}
Implement channel_get_actual_remote_descr() and channel_get_canonical_remote_descr() in channel.{c,h}
Implement channel_matches_extend_info() in channel.{c,h}
Implement channel_get_for_extend() and channel_is_better() in channel.{c,h}
Make channel_is_better() public in channel.{c,h}
Implement channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend() in channel.{c,h}
Implement channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() in channel.{c,h}
Demoronize get_remote_descr() method prototype - what the hell was I thinking there?
Timestamp channels in the right places in channel.c
Add missing tor_assert() in channel.c
Check if the lower layer accepted a cell in channel_write_cell() et al. of channel.c
Implement channel_flush_cells() in channel.c (w00t, it builds at last)
Call channel_timestamp_drained() at the right places in channel.c
Implement channel_run_cleanup()
Support optional channel_get_remote_addr() method and use it for GeoIP in channel_do_open_actions()
Get rid of channel refcounting; it'll be too complicated to handle it properly with all the pointers from circuits to channels, and closing from channel_run_cleanup() will work okay just like with connections
Doxygenate channel.c
Appease make check-spaces in channel.c
Fix superfluous semicolons in channel.c
Add/remove channels from identity digest map in all the right places in channel.c
The cell queues on channel_t must be empty when going to a CLOSED or ERROR state
Appease make check-spaces in channel.c
Add channel_clear/set_identity_digest() and some better logging to channel.{c,h}
Fix better logging to channel.c
Avoid SIGSEGV testing for queue emptiness in channel_flush_some_cells_from_outgoing_queue()
Remove TODO about checking cell queue in channel_free(); no need for it
Appease make check-spaces in channel.c
Add channel_free_all() and support functions
Check nullness of active_circuit_pqueue in channel_free()
Fix SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END usage in channel_process_cells()
Rearrange channel_t struct to use a union distinguishing listener from cell-bearing channels in channel.{c,h}
Now that crypto_pk_cmp_keys might return the result of tor_memcmp, there
is no guarantee that it will only return -1, 0, or 1. (It currently does
only return -1, 0, or 1, but that's a lucky accident due to details of the
current implementation of tor_memcmp and the particular input given to it.)
Fortunately, none of crypto_pk_cmp_keys's callers rely on this behaviour,
so changing its documentation is sufficient.
