Add a new TrackHostExits directive to trigger addressmaps for
certain incoming socks addresses, for sites that break when your exit
keeps changing.
Redo the client-side dns cache so it's just an addressmap too.
svn:r3641
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
poll-but-sometimes-select mess. This will let us use faster async cores
(like epoll, kpoll, and /dev/poll), and hopefully work better on Windows
too.
There are some fairly nasty changes to main.c here; this will almost
certainly break something. But hey, that's what alphas are for.
svn:r3341
make it clearer which warns are bugs,
make the control log event match its specification,
point out a bug in how we deal with failure when renewing the tls context.
svn:r3138
that will handle each such port. (We can extend this to include addresses
if exit policies shift to require that.) Seed us with port 80 so web
browsers won't complain that Tor is "slow to start up".
This was necessary because our old circuit building strategy just involved
counting circuits, and as time went by we would build up a big pile of
circuits that had peculiar exit policies (e.g. only exit to 9001-9100)
which would take up space in the circuit pile but never get used.
Fix router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy: it was not treating a port of *
as always matching, so we were picking reject *:* nodes as exit nodes too.
If you haven't used a clean circuit in an hour, throw it away, just to
be on the safe side.
This means after 6 hours a totally unused Tor client will have no
circuits open.
svn:r3078
close, if we're planning to wait to flush it.
This is important because we were sending a socks reject back if we're
closing and hadn't already sent one, but it wasn't actually getting
written since the conn was already marked-for-close.
svn:r3074
Stop keeping track of num_retries for apconns, since they expire
after 60 seconds anyway.
When warning about retrying or giving up, print the address, so
the user knows which one it's talking about.
svn:r3073
waiting for its connected cell, we were calculating time from when the
ap_conn was created. So if it waited say 20 seconds before being attached,
then we would immediately decide that the circuit had timed out.
Also, make circuit_dump_by_conn() display actual circuit progress,
including circuits that haven't been attached to the conn yet but
hope to when it finishes connecting.
svn:r3072
