diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 97cce747a3..8b618d51f5 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.18-alpha - 2008-01-?? - If we've gone 12 hours since our last bandwidth check, and we estimate we have less than 50KB bandwidth capacity but we could handle more, do another bandwidth test. + - New config options WarnPlaintextPorts and RejectPlaintextPorts so + Tor can warn and/or refuse connections to ports commonly used with + vulnerable-plaintext protocols. o Minor features: - Don't answer "/tor/networkstatus-bridges" directory requests if diff --git a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt index 98e5114369..5448394a62 100644 --- a/doc/spec/control-spec.txt +++ b/doc/spec/control-spec.txt @@ -1300,9 +1300,22 @@ $Id$ to do so.} [Note: only REASON=CLOCK_JUMPED is implemented currently.] + DANGEROUS_PORT + "PORT=" port + "RESULT=" "REJECT" / "WARN" + A stream was initiated to a port that's commonly used for + vulnerable-plaintext protocols. If the Result is "reject", we + refused the connection; whereas if it's "warn", we allowed it. + + {Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they + happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so + correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle). They + might also want some sort of interface to let the user configure + their RejectPlaintextPorts and WarnPlaintextPorts config options.} + DANGEROUS_SOCKS - "PROTOCOL=SOCKS4/SOCKS5" - "ADDRESS=IP:port" + "PROTOCOL=" "SOCKS4" / "SOCKS5" + "ADDRESS=" IP:port A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port using one of the SOCKS approaches that doesn't support hostnames -- only raw IP addresses. If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(), diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 18264a4c4e..39ad4be4bb 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(RecommendedClientVersions, LINELIST, NULL), V(RecommendedServerVersions, LINELIST, NULL), V(RedirectExit, LINELIST, NULL), + V(RejectPlaintextPorts, CSV, ""), V(RelayBandwidthBurst, MEMUNIT, "0"), V(RelayBandwidthRate, MEMUNIT, "0"), V(RendExcludeNodes, STRING, NULL), @@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(V3AuthNIntervalsValid, UINT, "3"), VAR("VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL,VersioningAuthoritativeDir, "0"), V(VirtualAddrNetwork, STRING, "127.192.0.0/10"), + V(WarnPlaintextPorts, CSV, "23,109,110,143"), VAR("__AllDirActionsPrivate", BOOL, AllDirActionsPrivate, "0"), VAR("__DisablePredictedCircuits",BOOL,DisablePredictedCircuits, "0"), VAR("__LeaveStreamsUnattached",BOOL, LeaveStreamsUnattached, "0"), @@ -2898,6 +2900,14 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (validate_ports_csv(options->LongLivedPorts, "LongLivedPorts", msg) < 0) return -1; + if (validate_ports_csv(options->RejectPlaintextPorts, + "RejectPlaintextPorts", msg) < 0) + return -1; + + if (validate_ports_csv(options->WarnPlaintextPorts, + "WarnPlaintextPorts", msg) < 0) + return -1; + if (options->FascistFirewall && !options->ReachableAddresses) { if (options->FirewallPorts && smartlist_len(options->FirewallPorts)) { /* We already have firewall ports set, so migrate them to diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 9fc8da8fb0..8b5c7d608a 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static int connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(edge_connection_t *conn); static int connection_ap_process_natd(edge_connection_t *conn); static int connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn); static int address_is_in_virtual_range(const char *addr); +static int consider_plaintext_ports(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port); /** An AP stream has failed/finished. If it hasn't already sent back * a socks reply, send one now (based on endreason). Also set @@ -470,6 +471,7 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info) { if (conn->marked_for_close || conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP || + conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT || !conn->chosen_exit_optional) continue; edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); @@ -482,6 +484,9 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info) escaped_safe_str(edge_conn->socks_request->address)); conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0; tor_free(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */ + /* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't + * think it'll be using an enclave. */ + consider_plaintext_ports(edge_conn, edge_conn->socks_request->port); } }); } @@ -1182,6 +1187,32 @@ addressmap_get_mappings(smartlist_t *sl, time_t min_expires, } } +/** Check if conn is using a dangerous port. Then warn and/or + * reject depending on our config options. */ +static int +consider_plaintext_ports(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port) +{ + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + int reject = smartlist_string_num_isin(options->RejectPlaintextPorts, port); + + if (smartlist_string_num_isin(options->WarnPlaintextPorts, port)) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Application request to port %d: this port is " + "commonly used for unencrypted protocols. Please make sure " + "you don't send anything you would mind the rest of the " + "Internet reading!%s", port, reject ? " Closing." : ""); + control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "DANGEROUS_PORT PORT=%d RESULT=%s", + port, reject ? "REJECT" : "WARN"); + } + + if (reject) { + log_info(LD_APP, "Port %d listed in RejectPlaintextPorts. Closing.", port); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + /** Connection conn just finished its socks handshake, or the * controller asked us to take care of it. If circ is defined, * then that's where we'll want to attach it. Otherwise we have to @@ -1396,6 +1427,11 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, } } + /* warn or reject if it's using a dangerous port */ + if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) + if (consider_plaintext_ports(conn, socks->port) < 0) + return -1; + if (!conn->use_begindir) { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_port(socks->port, time(NULL)); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9b176b7fb4..fb61df6880 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ typedef enum { #define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET 12 #define END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 13 #define END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY 14 +#define END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY 15 /* These high-numbered end reasons are not part of the official spec, * and are not intended to be put in relay end cells. They are here @@ -2132,6 +2133,15 @@ typedef struct { /** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient * uptime. */ smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts; + /** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and + * unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the + * user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an + * observer somewhere on the Internet. */ + smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts; + /** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option + * controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status + * event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */ + smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts; /** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */ smartlist_t *TrackHostExits; int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index d5e81c1b72..d7d33f8741 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -600,7 +600,10 @@ connection_edge_end_reason_str(int reason) /** Translate reason (as from a relay 'end' cell) into an * appropriate SOCKS5 reply code. - * DODCDOC 0 + * + * A reason of 0 means that we're not actually expecting to send + * this code back to the socks client; we just call it 'succeeded' + * to keep things simple. */ socks5_reply_status_t connection_edge_end_reason_socks5_response(int reason) @@ -614,6 +617,8 @@ connection_edge_end_reason_socks5_response(int reason) return SOCKS5_HOST_UNREACHABLE; case END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED: return SOCKS5_CONNECTION_REFUSED; + case END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY: + return SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED; case END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY: return SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED; case END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY: