Use padding with intro requests

svn:r1425
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2004-04-01 03:31:00 +00:00
parent d01497cf3c
commit fed8cb69bd

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@ -244,15 +244,11 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec
PK_ID is the hash of Bob's public key. RP is NUL-terminated. PK_ID is the hash of Bob's public key. RP is NUL-terminated.
The data is encrypted to Bob's PK as follows: Suppose Bob's PK is L octets The data is encrypted to Bob's PK as follows: Suppose Bob's PK is L octets
long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L, then it is encrypted long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L-42, then it is
directly (with no padding). If the data is at least as long as L, then a encrypted directly (with OAEP padding). If the data is at least as long
randomly generated 16-byte symmetric key is prepended to the data, after as L-42, then a randomly generated 16-byte symmetric key is prepended to
which the first L-16 bytes of the data are encrypted with Bob's PK; and the the data, after which the first L-16-42 bytes of the data are encrypted with
rest of the data is encrypted with the symmetric key. Bob's PK; and the rest of the data is encrypted with the symmetric key.
[There's very little here is that is recognizable by Bob to let him
know if he decrypted it correctly. Perhaps we should add OAEP padding
to the RSA -- there is space -RD]
1.9. Introduction: From the Introduction Point to Bob's OP 1.9. Introduction: From the Introduction Point to Bob's OP