Use padding with intro requests

svn:r1425
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2004-04-01 03:31:00 +00:00
parent d01497cf3c
commit fed8cb69bd

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@ -244,15 +244,11 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec
PK_ID is the hash of Bob's public key. RP is NUL-terminated.
The data is encrypted to Bob's PK as follows: Suppose Bob's PK is L octets
long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L, then it is encrypted
directly (with no padding). If the data is at least as long as L, then a
randomly generated 16-byte symmetric key is prepended to the data, after
which the first L-16 bytes of the data are encrypted with Bob's PK; and the
rest of the data is encrypted with the symmetric key.
[There's very little here is that is recognizable by Bob to let him
know if he decrypted it correctly. Perhaps we should add OAEP padding
to the RSA -- there is space -RD]
long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L-42, then it is
encrypted directly (with OAEP padding). If the data is at least as long
as L-42, then a randomly generated 16-byte symmetric key is prepended to
the data, after which the first L-16-42 bytes of the data are encrypted with
Bob's PK; and the rest of the data is encrypted with the symmetric key.
1.9. Introduction: From the Introduction Point to Bob's OP