Accurately identify client connections by their lack of peer authentication

This means that we bail out earlier if asked to extend to a client.

Follow-up to 21407.
Fixes bug 21406; bugfix on 0.2.4.23.
This commit is contained in:
teor 2017-03-01 16:23:02 +11:00 committed by Nick Mathewson
parent 9340035873
commit f9af7e8bd0
4 changed files with 19 additions and 4 deletions

5
changes/bug21406 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Minor bugfixes (code correctness):
- Accurately identify client connections using their lack of peer
authentication. This means that we bail out earlier if asked to extend
to a client. Follow-up to 21407.
Fixes bug 21406; bugfix on 0.2.4.23.

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@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ struct channel_s {
unsigned int is_bad_for_new_circs:1; unsigned int is_bad_for_new_circs:1;
/** True iff we have decided that the other end of this connection /** True iff we have decided that the other end of this connection
* is a client. Channels with this flag set should never be used * is a client or bridge relay. Connections with this flag set should never
* to satisfy an EXTEND request. */ * be used to satisfy an EXTEND request. */
unsigned int is_client:1; unsigned int is_client:1;
/** Set if the channel was initiated remotely (came from a listener) */ /** Set if the channel was initiated remotely (came from a listener) */

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@ -1654,6 +1654,10 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero( tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
/* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
* relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
* there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);

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@ -344,8 +344,14 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan)
int len; int len;
created_cell_t created_cell; created_cell_t created_cell;
/* Make sure we never try to use the OR connection on which we /* If the client used CREATE_FAST, it's probably a tor client or bridge
* received this cell to satisfy an EXTEND request, */ * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (in most cases, we
* won't have an authenticated peer ID for the extend).
* Public relays on 0.2.9 and later will use CREATE_FAST if they have no
* ntor onion key for this relay, but that should be a rare occurrence.
* Clients on 0.3.1 and later avoid using CREATE_FAST as much as they can,
* even during bootstrap, so the CREATE_FAST check is most accurate for
* earlier tor client versions. */
channel_mark_client(chan); channel_mark_client(chan);
memset(&created_cell, 0, sizeof(created_cell)); memset(&created_cell, 0, sizeof(created_cell));