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some more organization
svn:r3427
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@ -169,10 +169,17 @@ seems overkill (and/or insecure) based on the threat model we've picked.
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\section{Crossroads: Policy issues}
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\label{sec:crossroads-policy}
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\subsection{Tor and blacklists}
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Takedowns and efnet abuse and wikipedia complaints and irc
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networks.
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\subsection{Tor and file-sharing}
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Bittorrent and dmca. Should we add an IDS to autodetect protocols and
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snipe them? Takedowns and efnet abuse and wikipedia complaints and irc
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networks. Should we allow revocation of anonymity if a threshold of
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servers want to?
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snipe them?
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\subsection{Image and sustainability}
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Image: substantial non-infringing uses. Image is a security parameter,
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since it impacts user base and perceived sustainability.
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@ -185,8 +192,13 @@ collect enough money to pay its servers; JAP bandwidth is supported by
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continued money, and they periodically ask what they will do when it
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dries up.
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How much should Tor aim to do? Applications that leak data. We can say
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they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem.
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\subsection{Other}
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Tor's scope: How much should Tor aim to do? Applications that leak
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data. We can say they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem.
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Should we allow revocation of anonymity if a threshold of
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servers want to?
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Logging. Making logs not revealing. A happy coincidence that verbose
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logging is our \#2 performance bottleneck. Is there a way to detect
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@ -279,9 +291,13 @@ attacks. Would be nice to have hot-swap services, but hard to design.
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%\label{sec:crossroads-scaling}
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%P2P + anonymity issues:
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Incentives. Copy the page I wrote for the NSF proposal, and maybe extend
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\subsection{Incentives}
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Copy the page I wrote for the NSF proposal, and maybe extend
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it if we're feeling smart.
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\subsection{Usability}
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Usability: fc03 paper was great, except the lower latency you are the
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less useful it seems it is.
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A Tor gui, how jap's gui is nice but does not reflect the security
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@ -308,10 +324,14 @@ Restricted routes. How to propagate to everybody the topology? BGP
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style doesn't work because we don't want just *one* path. Point to
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Geoff's stuff.
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\subsection{ISP-class adversaries}
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Routing-zones. It seems that our threat model comes down to diversity and
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dispersal. But hard for Alice to know how to act. Many questions remain.
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The China problem. We have lots of users in Iran and similar (we stopped
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\subsection{The China problem}
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We have lots of users in Iran and similar (we stopped
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logging, so it's hard to know now, but many Persian sites on how to use
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Tor), and they seem to be doing ok. But the China problem is bigger. Cite
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Stefan's paper, and talk about how we need to route through clients,
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