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synced 2024-09-21 05:26:20 +02:00
Harden check_private_dir() to remove any potential race.
Remove any potential race between stat() and chmod(). Replace stat() with fstat(). Replace chmod() with fchmod()
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4e19133dcc
commit
f48c607fd9
@ -2029,9 +2029,10 @@ int
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check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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const char *effective_user)
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{
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int fd;
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int r;
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struct stat st;
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char *f;
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//char *f;
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#ifndef _WIN32
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unsigned unwanted_bits = 0;
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const struct passwd *pw = NULL;
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@ -2041,18 +2042,34 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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(void)effective_user;
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#endif
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/*
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* Goal is to harden the implementation by removing any
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* potential for race between stat() and chmod().
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* chmod() accepts filename as argument. If an attacker can move
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* the file between stat() and chmod(), a potential race exists.
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*
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* Several suggestions taken from:
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* https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/SecureCodingGuide/Articles/RaceConditions.html
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*/
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tor_assert(dirname);
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f = tor_strdup(dirname);
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clean_name_for_stat(f);
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log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", f);
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r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st);
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tor_free(f);
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if (r) {
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/* Open directory.
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* O_NOFOLLOW to ensure that it does not follow symbolic links */
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fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW);
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/* Was there an error? Maybe the directory does not exist? */
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if (fd == -1) {
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if (errno != ENOENT) {
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/* Other directory error */
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s cannot be read: %s", dirname,
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strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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/* Received ENOENT: Directory does not exist */
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/* Should we create the directory? */
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if (check & CPD_CREATE) {
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log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Creating directory %s", dirname);
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#if defined (_WIN32)
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@ -2064,23 +2081,51 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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r = mkdir(dirname, 0700);
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}
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#endif
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/* check for mkdir() error */
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if (r) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Error creating directory %s: %s", dirname,
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strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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} else if (!(check & CPD_CHECK)) {
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/* we just created the directory. try to open it again.
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* permissions on the directory will be checked again below.*/
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fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(dirname), O_NOFOLLOW);
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if ( fd == -1 ) return -1;
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} else if (!(check & CPD_CHECK)) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Directory %s does not exist.", dirname);
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return -1;
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}
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/* XXXX In the case where check==CPD_CHECK, we should look at the
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* parent directory a little harder. */
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return 0;
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}
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tor_assert(fd);
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//f = tor_strdup(dirname);
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//clean_name_for_stat(f);
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log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", dirname);
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//r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st);
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r = fstat(fd, &st);
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if (r == -1) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "fstat() on directory %s failed.", dirname);
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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//tor_free(f);
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/* check that dirname is a directory */
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if (!(st.st_mode & S_IFDIR)) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not a directory", dirname);
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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#ifndef _WIN32
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if (effective_user) {
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/* Look up the user and group information.
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@ -2097,7 +2142,6 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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running_uid = getuid();
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running_gid = getgid();
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}
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if (st.st_uid != running_uid) {
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const struct passwd *pw = NULL;
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char *process_ownername = NULL;
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@ -2113,6 +2157,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid);
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tor_free(process_ownername);
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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if ( (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ))
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@ -2129,6 +2174,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid);
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tor_free(process_groupname);
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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if (check & (CPD_GROUP_OK|CPD_GROUP_READ)) {
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@ -2141,6 +2187,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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if (check & CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Permissions on directory %s are too permissive.",
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dirname);
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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}
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Fixing permissions on directory %s", dirname);
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@ -2150,15 +2197,18 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
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new_mode |= 0050; /* Group should have rx */
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}
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new_mode &= ~unwanted_bits; /* Clear the bits that we didn't want set...*/
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if (chmod(dirname, new_mode)) {
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if (fchmod(fd, new_mode)) {
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log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not chmod directory %s: %s", dirname,
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strerror(errno));
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close(fd);
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return -1;
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} else {
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close(fd);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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#endif
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close(fd);
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return 0;
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}
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