Update the port knocking SPA document to have more details. Still needs a packet filter.

svn:r19356
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Appelbaum 2009-04-21 07:55:07 +00:00
parent 7f4bfe5107
commit f33f2e9591

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ relay. Only authorized users should be able to communicate with the private
bridge. This should be done with Tor and if possible without the help of the
firewall. It should be possible for a Tor user to enter a secret key into
Tor or optionally Vidalia on a per bridge basis. This secret key should be
used
used to authenticate the bridge user to the private bridge.
1.x Issues with low ports and bind() for ORPort
@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ will not trigger a response from Tor. With base32 encoding it should be
possible to encode SPA as valid DNS requests. This should allow use of the
public DNS infrastructure for authorization requests if desired.
2.x Ghetto firewalling with opportunistic connection closing
Until a user has authenticated with Tor, Tor only has a UDP listener. This
listener should never send data in response, it should only open an ORPort
when a user has successfully authenticated. After a user has authenticated
with Tor to open an ORPort, only users who have authenticated will be able
to use it. All other users as identified by their ip address will have their
connection closed before any data is sent or received. This should be
accomplished with an access policy. By default, the access policy should block
all access to the ORPort.
2.x Timing and reset of access policies
Access to the ORPort is sensitive. The bridge should remove any exceptions
to its access policy regularly when the ORPort is unused. Valid users should
reauthenticate if they do not use the ORPort within a given time frame.
2.x Additional considerations
There are many. A format of the packet and the crypto involved is a good start.