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Remove the unused torrc.bridge.in. Bug 5622.
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Nick Mathewson
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changes/bug5622
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changes/bug5622
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o Removed files:
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- Remove the torrc.bridge file: we don't use it for anything, and
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it had become badly desynchronized from torrc.sample. Resolves
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bug 5622.
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@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
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## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
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## Last updated 16 July 2009 for Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha.
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## (May or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
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##
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## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
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## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
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## by removing the "#" symbol.
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##
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## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
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## for more options you can use in this file.
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##
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## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
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## Replace this with "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only as a
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## relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
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SocksPort 9050 # what port to open for local application connections
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SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
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#SocksListenAddress 192.168.0.1:9100 # listen on this IP:port also
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## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
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## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
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## all (and only) requests from SocksListenAddress.
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#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
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#SocksPolicy reject *
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## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
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## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
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## you want.
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##
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## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
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## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
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##
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## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
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#Log notice file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
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## Send every possible message to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
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#Log debug file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
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## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
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#Log notice syslog
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## To send all messages to stderr:
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#Log debug stderr
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## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
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## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
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## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
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#RunAsDaemon 1
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## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
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## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
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#DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
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## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
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## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
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#ControlPort 9051
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## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
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## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
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#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
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#CookieAuthentication 1
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############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
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## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
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## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
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## to tell people.
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##
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## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
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## address y:z.
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#HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/hidden_service/
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#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
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#HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
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#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
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#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
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################ This section is just for relays #####################
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#
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## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
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## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
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ORPort 9001
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised
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## in ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), uncomment the
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## line below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
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## yourself to make this work.
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#ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9090
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## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
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Nickname Unnamed
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## The IP address or full DNS name for your relay. Leave commented out
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## and Tor will guess.
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#Address noname.example.com
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## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
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## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
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## be at least 20 KB.
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## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
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## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
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#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
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#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
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RelayBandwidthBurst 10485760
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RelayBandwidthRate 5242880
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## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
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## Note that this threshold applies to sent _and_ to received bytes,
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## not to their sum: Setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB
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## total before hibernating.
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##
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## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
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#AccountingMax 4 GB
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## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
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#AccountingStart day 00:00
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## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
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## is per month)
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#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
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## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you
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## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google
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## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it.
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#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
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#ContactInfo 1234D/FFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
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## if you have enough bandwidth.
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DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised
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## in DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), uncomment the line
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## below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding yourself
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## to make this work.
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#DirListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9091
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## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
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## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
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## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
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## distribution for a sample.
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#DirPortFrontPage @CONFDIR@/tor-exit-notice.html
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## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
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## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
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## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
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## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
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## https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#MultipleServers
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## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
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## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
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#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
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## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
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## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
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## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
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## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
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## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
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## described in the man page or at
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## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
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##
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## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
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## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
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##
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## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
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## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
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## users will be told that those destinations are down.
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##
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#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
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#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
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#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
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#
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## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
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## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even if an
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## ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays, they probably
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## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
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## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
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## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
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BridgeRelay 1
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ExitPolicy reject *:*
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