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fix the latest bug: don't explode when some router declares a
bandwidthburst of 500 gigabytes. this bug seems to have taken down most of the network. oops. svn:r3523
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a035032f09
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@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static config_var_t config_vars[] = {
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VAR("AllowUnverifiedNodes",CSV, AllowUnverifiedNodes, "middle,rendezvous"),
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VAR("AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, AuthoritativeDir, "0"),
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VAR("BandwidthRate", MEMUNIT, BandwidthRate, "1 MB"),
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VAR("BandwidthBurst", MEMUNIT, BandwidthBurst, "48 MB"),
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VAR("BandwidthBurst", MEMUNIT, BandwidthBurst, "5 MB"),
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VAR("ClientOnly", BOOL, ClientOnly, "0"),
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VAR("ContactInfo", STRING, ContactInfo, NULL),
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VAR("ControlPort", UINT, ControlPort, "0"),
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@ -1414,11 +1414,11 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *options)
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log(LOG_WARN,"BandwidthBurst must be at least equal to BandwidthRate.");
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result = -1;
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}
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#if 0
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if (2*options->BandwidthRate > options->BandwidthBurst) {
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log(LOG_NOTICE,"You have chosen a BandwidthBurst less than twice BandwidthRate. Please consider setting your BandwidthBurst higher (at least %d), to provide better service to the Tor network.", (int)(2*options->BandwidthRate));
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result = -1;
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}
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#endif
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if (options->_MonthlyAccountingStart) {
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if (options->AccountingStart) {
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@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ void connection_bucket_refill(struct timeval *now) {
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conn = carray[i];
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if (connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(conn)) {
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conn->receiver_bucket += conn->bandwidth;
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth;
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//log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Receiver bucket %d now %d.", i, conn->receiver_bucket);
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}
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@ -848,8 +848,7 @@ static int connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(connection_t *conn) {
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if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
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return 0; /* only open connections play the rate limiting game */
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tor_assert(conn->bandwidth > 0);
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if (conn->receiver_bucket > 9*conn->bandwidth)
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if (conn->receiver_bucket >= conn->bandwidth)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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@ -114,9 +114,11 @@ int connection_or_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn)
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*/
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static void
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connection_or_init_conn_from_router(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *router) {
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or_options_t *options = get_options();
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conn->addr = router->addr;
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conn->port = router->or_port;
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = router->bandwidthburst;
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
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conn->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(router->identity_pkey);
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crypto_pk_get_digest(conn->identity_pkey, conn->identity_digest);
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conn->nickname = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
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