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cleanups in the changelog, plus ask nickm a question
svn:r12363
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ChangeLog
45
ChangeLog
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-1?-??
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Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-11-0?
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o Major features:
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- Separate "SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT_DIR" into two flags in
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edge_connection_t: want_onehop if it must attach to a circuit with
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@ -17,28 +17,29 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-1?-??
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o New requirements:
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- Drop support for OpenSSL version 0.9.6. Just about nobody was using
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it, it had no AES, and it hasn't seen any security patches since 2004.
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it, it had no AES, and it hasn't seen any security patches since
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2004.
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o Minor features:
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- Directory authorities now decide whether routers are stable enough to
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be guards based not on their MTBF or their uptime, but on their
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fractional uptime: the fraction of the time that they are online.
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(No router counts as having uptime until we've known about it for
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at least 24 hours.)
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- Directory authorities now decide whether routers are stable
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enough to be guards based not on their MTBF or their uptime, but
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on their fractional uptime: the fraction of the time that they
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are online. (No router counts as having uptime until we've known
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about it for at least 24 hours.)
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- Clients new hold circuitless TLS connections open for 1.5 times
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MaxCircuitDirtiness, since it is likely that they'll need to build
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a circuit over them within that timeframe. Previously, they held them
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open only for KeepalivePeriod.
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a circuit over them within that timeframe. Previously, they held
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them open only for KeepalivePeriod.
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- Use "If-Modified-Since" to avoid retrieving consensus networkstatuses
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that we already have.
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- When we have no consensus, check FallbackNetworkstatusFile (defaults
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to $PREFIX/share/tor/fallback-consensus) for a consensus. This way
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we start knowing some directory caches.
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- When we receive a consensus from the future, warn about skew.
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- Improve skew reporting: try to give the user a better log message about
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how skewed they are, and how much this matters.
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- When we have a certificate for an authority, believe that certificate's
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claims about the authority's IP address.
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- Improve skew reporting: try to give the user a better log message
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about how skewed they are, and how much this matters.
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- When we have a certificate for an authority, believe that
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certificate's claims about the authority's IP address.
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- New --quiet command-line option to suppress the default console log.
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Good in combination with --hash-password.
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- Authorities send back an X-Descriptor-Not-New header in response to
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@ -47,13 +48,14 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-1?-??
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- Make the "not enough dir info yet" message better.
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o Minor features (controller):
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- When reporting clock skew, and we only have a lower bound on the amount
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of skew, amount anyway, marked as a lower bound.
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- When reporting clock skew, and we only have a lower bound on
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the amount of skew, amount anyway, marked as a lower bound.
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[XXX Nick: what does this mean??]
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- Utilities:
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o Utilities:
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- Update linux-tor-prio.sh script to allow QoS based on the uid of
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the Tor prossess. See comments in scripts. (Patch from Marco Bonetti
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with tweaks from Mike Perry.)
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the Tor process. Patch from Marco Bonetti with tweaks from Mike
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Perry.
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Refuse to start if both ORPort and UseBridges are set. Bugfix
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@ -67,8 +69,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-1?-??
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on 0.2.0.1-alpha. Fixes Bug 536
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- Stop leaking a cached networkstatus on exit. Bugfix on
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0.2.0.3-alpha.
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- Stop leaking voter information every time we free a consensus. Bugfix
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on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
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- Stop leaking voter information every time we free a consensus.
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Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
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- Stop leaking signed data every time we check a voter signature.
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Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
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- Stop leaking a signature every time we fail to parse a consensus or
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@ -83,7 +85,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.10-alpha - 2007-1?-??
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- Run correctly on platforms where rlim_t is larger than unsigned
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long.
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- Run correctly on platforms where the real limit for number of
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open files is OPEN_FILES, not rlim_max from getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILES)
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open files is OPEN_FILES, not rlim_max from
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getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILES).
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Changes in version 0.2.0.9-alpha - 2007-10-24
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