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Merge branch 'bug17686_v2_027'
This commit is contained in:
commit
e5754c42d1
4
changes/bug17686
Normal file
4
changes/bug17686
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor features:
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- Adjust Tor's use of OpenSSL's RNG APIs so that they absolutely,
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positively are not allowed to fail. Previously we depended on
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internals about OpenSSL behavior. Closes ticket 17686.
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@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
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#define ATTR_CONST __attribute__((const))
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#define ATTR_MALLOC __attribute__((malloc))
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#define ATTR_NORETURN __attribute__((noreturn))
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#define ATTR_WUR __attribute__((warn_unused_result))
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/* Alas, nonnull is not at present a good idea for us. We'd like to get
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* warnings when we pass NULL where we shouldn't (which nonnull does, albeit
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* spottily), but we don't want to tell the compiler to make optimizations
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@ -153,6 +154,7 @@
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#define ATTR_NORETURN
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#define ATTR_NONNULL(x)
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#define ATTR_UNUSED
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#define ATTR_WUR
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#define PREDICT_LIKELY(exp) (exp)
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#define PREDICT_UNLIKELY(exp) (exp)
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#endif
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@ -267,8 +267,7 @@ crypto_init_siphash_key(void)
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if (have_seeded_siphash)
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return 0;
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if (crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key)) < 0)
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return -1;
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crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key));
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siphash_set_global_key(&key);
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have_seeded_siphash = 1;
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return 0;
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@ -321,7 +320,8 @@ int
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crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
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{
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if (!crypto_global_initialized_) {
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crypto_early_init();
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if (crypto_early_init() < 0)
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return -1;
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crypto_global_initialized_ = 1;
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@ -2421,34 +2421,41 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void)
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memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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if (rand_poll_ok || load_entropy_ok)
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if ((rand_poll_ok || load_entropy_ok) && RAND_status() == 1)
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return 0;
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else
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return -1;
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}
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
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* success, -1 on failure, with support for mocking for unit tests.
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Supports mocking
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* for unit tests.
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*
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* This function is not allowed to fail; if it would fail to generate strong
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* entropy, it must terminate the process instead.
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*/
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MOCK_IMPL(int,
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MOCK_IMPL(void,
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crypto_rand, (char *to, size_t n))
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{
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return crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n);
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crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n);
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}
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
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* success, assert on failure. Most callers will want crypto_rand instead.
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Most callers
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* will want crypto_rand instead.
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*
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* This function is not allowed to fail; if it would fail to generate strong
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* entropy, it must terminate the process instead.
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*/
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int
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void
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crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n)
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{
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int r;
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if (n == 0)
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return;
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tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
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tor_assert(to);
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r = RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)to, (int)n);
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if (r == 0)
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crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating random data");
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return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
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tor_assert(r >= 0);
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}
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/** Return a pseudorandom integer, chosen uniformly from the values
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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "torint.h"
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#include "testsupport.h"
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#include "compat.h"
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/*
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Macro to create an arbitrary OpenSSL version number as used by
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@ -119,10 +120,10 @@ typedef struct crypto_dh_t crypto_dh_t;
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/* global state */
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const char * crypto_openssl_get_version_str(void);
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const char * crypto_openssl_get_header_version_str(void);
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int crypto_early_init(void);
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int crypto_early_init(void) ATTR_WUR;
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int crypto_global_init(int hardwareAccel,
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const char *accelName,
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const char *accelPath);
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const char *accelPath) ATTR_WUR;
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void crypto_thread_cleanup(void);
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int crypto_global_cleanup(void);
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@ -269,9 +270,9 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
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uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len);
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/* random numbers */
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int crypto_seed_rng(void);
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MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
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int crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n);
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int crypto_seed_rng(void) ATTR_WUR;
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MOCK_DECL(void,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
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void crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n);
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int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
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int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
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int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max);
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@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
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{
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uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
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if (crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
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return -1;
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crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
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/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
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* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
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@ -517,8 +517,7 @@ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *,
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goto error;
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{ /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
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if (crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)) < 0)
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goto error;
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crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
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if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
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goto error;
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if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
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@ -7335,8 +7335,7 @@ init_cookie_authentication(const char *fname, const char *header,
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/* Generate the cookie */
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*cookie_out = tor_malloc(cookie_len);
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if (crypto_rand((char *)*cookie_out, cookie_len) < 0)
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goto done;
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crypto_rand((char *)*cookie_out, cookie_len);
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/* Create the string that should be written on the file. */
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memcpy(cookie_file_str, header, strlen(header));
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@ -2256,8 +2256,7 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
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auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
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if (crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge)) < 0)
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goto done;
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crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
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auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
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auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
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@ -3442,8 +3442,7 @@ handle_control_authchallenge(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
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tor_free(client_nonce);
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return -1;
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}
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const int fail = crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN);
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tor_assert(!fail);
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crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN);
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/* Now compute and send the server-to-controller response, and the
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* server's nonce. */
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@ -193,8 +193,7 @@ handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce, size_t client_nonce_len,
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return -1;
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/* Get our nonce */
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if (crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
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return -1;
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crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN);
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{ /* set up macs */
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size_t hmac_s_msg_len = strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST) +
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@ -1616,7 +1616,6 @@ rotate_x509_certificate_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
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/* We also make sure to rotate the TLS connections themselves if they've
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* been up for too long -- but that's done via is_bad_for_new_circs in
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* run_connection_housekeeping() above. */
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return MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL;
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}
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@ -1626,7 +1625,10 @@ add_entropy_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
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(void)now;
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(void)options;
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/* We already seeded once, so don't die on failure. */
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crypto_seed_rng();
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if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to re-seed RNG, but failed. We already "
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"seeded once, though, so we won't exit here.");
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}
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/** How often do we add more entropy to OpenSSL's RNG pool? */
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#define ENTROPY_INTERVAL (60*60)
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@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ fast_onionskin_create(fast_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
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{
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fast_handshake_state_t *s;
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*handshake_state_out = s = tor_malloc(sizeof(fast_handshake_state_t));
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if (crypto_rand((char*)s->state, sizeof(s->state)) < 0) {
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tor_free(s);
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return -1;
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}
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crypto_rand((char*)s->state, sizeof(s->state));
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memcpy(handshake_out, s->state, DIGEST_LEN);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -56,8 +53,7 @@ fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
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size_t out_len;
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int r = -1;
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if (crypto_rand((char*)handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN)<0)
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return -1;
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crypto_rand((char*)handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN);
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memcpy(tmp, key_in, DIGEST_LEN);
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memcpy(tmp+DIGEST_LEN, handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN);
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tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
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log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
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if (crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Couldn't produce random cookie.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
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return -1;
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}
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crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
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/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it,
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* and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */
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@ -269,11 +269,7 @@ rend_encrypt_v2_intro_points_basic(char **encrypted_out,
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tor_assert(client_cookies && smartlist_len(client_cookies) > 0);
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/* Generate session key. */
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if (crypto_rand(session_key, CIPHER_KEY_LEN) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate random session key to encrypt "
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"introduction point string.");
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goto done;
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}
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crypto_rand(session_key, CIPHER_KEY_LEN);
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/* Determine length of encrypted introduction points including session
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* keys. */
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@ -335,11 +331,7 @@ rend_encrypt_v2_intro_points_basic(char **encrypted_out,
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REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE;
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i < REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE - 1; i++) {
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client_part = tor_malloc_zero(REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN);
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if (crypto_rand(client_part, REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate fake client entry.");
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tor_free(client_part);
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goto done;
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}
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crypto_rand(client_part, REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN);
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smartlist_add(encrypted_session_keys, client_part);
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}
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/* Sort smartlist and put elements in result in order. */
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@ -643,7 +643,10 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
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reset_perftime();
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crypto_seed_rng();
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if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0) {
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printf("Couldn't seed RNG; exiting.\n");
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return 1;
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}
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crypto_init_siphash_key();
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options = options_new();
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init_logging(1);
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@ -309,15 +309,14 @@ test_ext_or_cookie_auth(void *arg)
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tor_free(client_hash2);
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}
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static int
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static void
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crypto_rand_return_tse_str(char *to, size_t n)
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{
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if (n != 32) {
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TT_FAIL(("Asked for %d bytes, not 32", (int)n));
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return -1;
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return;
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}
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memcpy(to, "te road There is always another ", 32);
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return 0;
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}
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static void
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@ -390,8 +390,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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init_logging(1);
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network_init();
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crypto_global_init(1, NULL, NULL);
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crypto_seed_rng();
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if (crypto_global_init(1, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
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printf("Couldn't initialize crypto subsystem; exiting.\n");
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return 1;
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}
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if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0) {
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printf("Couldn't seed RNG; exiting.\n");
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return 1;
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}
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rq = replyqueue_new(as_flags);
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tor_assert(rq);
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@ -272,7 +272,10 @@ main(int c, const char **v)
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return 1;
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}
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crypto_set_tls_dh_prime();
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crypto_seed_rng();
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if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0) {
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printf("Couldn't seed RNG; exiting.\n");
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return 1;
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}
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rep_hist_init();
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network_init();
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setup_directory();
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