nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

more minor commits

Browse Source 
svn:r726
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2003-11-03 02:54:52 +00:00
parent 2bd41ec8f5
commit e4e5bc601e
1 changed files with 14 additions and 12 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

26
doc/tor-design.tex
View File

@ -948,14 +948,17 @@ use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or web servers)
can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate
at the exit OR. at the exit OR.
We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of abuse. Spammers and We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of abuse. Spammers
other attackers already have access to thousands of misconfigured systems and other attackers already have access to thousands of misconfigured
worldwide, and the Tor network is far from the easiest way to launch systems worldwide, and the Tor network is far from the easiest way
these antisocial or illegal attacks. But because the onion routers can to launch these antisocial or illegal attacks. Indeed, Tor's limited
easily be mistaken for the originators of the abuse, and the volunteers anonymity may be a benefit here, because large determined adversaries
who run them may not want to deal with the hassle of repeatedly explaining may still be able to track down criminals. In any case, because the
anonymity networks, we must block or limit attacks and other abuse that %XXX
travel through the Tor network. onion routers can easily be mistaken for the originators of the abuse,
and the volunteers who run them may not want to deal with the hassle of
repeatedly explaining anonymity networks, we must block or limit attacks
and other abuse that travel through the Tor network.
To mitigate abuse issues, in Tor, each onion router's \emph{exit policy} To mitigate abuse issues, in Tor, each onion router's \emph{exit policy}
describes to which external addresses and ports the router will permit describes to which external addresses and ports the router will permit
@ -1123,10 +1126,9 @@ central point.
Rendezvous points are a building block for \emph{location-hidden Rendezvous points are a building block for \emph{location-hidden
services} (also known as ``responder anonymity'') in the Tor services} (also known as ``responder anonymity'') in the Tor
network. Location-hidden services allow a server Bob to offer a TCP network. Location-hidden services allow Bob to offer a TCP
service, such as a webserver, without revealing the IP of his service. service, such as a webserver, without revealing its IP.
Besides allowing Bob to provided services anonymously, location We are also motivated by protection against distributed DoS attacks:
privacy also seeks to provide some protection against distributed DoS attacks:
attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network as a whole attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network as a whole
rather than just Bob's IP. rather than just Bob's IP.