Merge branch 'maint-0.3.0'

changes/bug22460_case1

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (relays, key management):
+    - Regenerate link and authentication certificates whenever the key that
+      signs them changes; also, regenerate link certificates whenever the
+      signed key changes. Previously, these processes were only weakly
+      coupled, and we relays could (for minutes to hours) wind up with an
+      inconsistent set of keys and certificates, which other relays
+      would not accept. Fixes two cases of bug 22460; bugfix on
+      0.3.0.1-alpha.
+    - When sending an Ed25519 signing->link certificate in a CERTS cell,
+      send the certificate that matches the x509 certificate that we used
+      on the TLS connection. Previously, there was a race condition if
+      the TLS context rotated after we began the TLS handshake but
+      before we sent the CERTS cell. Fixes a case of bug 22460; bugfix
+      on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
+
+

changes/bug22460_case2

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (relay, link handshake):
+
+    - When performing the v3 link handshake on a TLS connection, report that
+      we have the x509 certificate that we actually used on that connection,
+      even if we have changed certificates since that connection was first
+      opened. Previously, we would claim to have used our most recent x509
+      link certificate, which would sometimes make the link handshake fail.
+      Fixes one case of bug 22460; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.

src/common/tortls.c

@@ -705,11 +705,13 @@ tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
   return cert;
 }
 
-/** Return a copy of <b>cert</b> */
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
 tor_x509_cert_t *
 tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 {
-  return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert->cert));
+  tor_assert(cert);
+  X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
 }
 
 /** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
@@ -2047,7 +2049,8 @@ tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
   return 1;
 }
 
-/** Return the peer certificate, or NULL if there isn't one. */
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
+ * isn't one. */
 MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
 tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
 {
@@ -2059,6 +2062,24 @@ tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
   return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
 }
 
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
+ * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+  X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
+  tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+                 "getting own-connection certificate");
+  if (!cert)
+    return NULL;
+  /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
+   * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
+  X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
+  if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
+    return NULL;
+  return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
+}
+
 /** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
 static void
 log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,

src/common/tortls.h

@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ int tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls);
 void tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls);
 int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
 MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls));
+MOCK_DECL(tor_x509_cert_t *,tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls));
 int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity);
 int tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity,
                            tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now,

src/or/connection_or.c

@@ -1838,6 +1838,9 @@ connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
   s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
   s->digest_sent_data = 1;
   s->digest_received_data = 1;
+  if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
+    s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
+  }
   s->certs = or_handshake_certs_new();
   s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
   return 0;
@@ -1852,6 +1855,7 @@ or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state)
   crypto_digest_free(state->digest_sent);
   crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
   or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
+  tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
   memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
   tor_free(state);
 }
@@ -2228,7 +2232,8 @@ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
 
 /** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at
  * <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are
- * building in <b>certs_cell</b>.  Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>. */
+ * building in <b>certs_cell</b>.  Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>.
+ * (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
 static void
 add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
               uint8_t cert_type,
@@ -2246,7 +2251,7 @@ add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
 
 /** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object
  * that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>.  Set its type field to
- * <b>cert_type</b>. */
+ * <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
 static void
 add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
                  uint8_t cert_type,
@@ -2259,12 +2264,19 @@ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
                              cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
 }
 
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0;
+#else
+#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0
+#endif
+
 /** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1
  * on failure. */
 int
 connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 {
-  const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+  const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+  tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL;
   var_cell_t *cell;
 
   certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL;
@@ -2277,21 +2289,26 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
   const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
 
   /* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */
-  if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode, &link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
+  if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode,
+                           &global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
     return -1;
 
-  tor_assert(link_cert);
+  if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+    own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
+  }
   tor_assert(id_cert);
 
   certs_cell = certs_cell_new();
 
   /* Start adding certs.  First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */
   if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+    tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert);
     add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
-                  OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, link_cert);
+                  OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert);
   } else {
+    tor_assert(global_link_cert);
     add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
-                  OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, link_cert);
+                  OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert);
   }
 
   /* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */
@@ -2303,9 +2320,11 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
                    CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN,
                    get_master_signing_key_cert());
   if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+    tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert ||
+                        certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing);
     add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
                      CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK,
-                     get_current_link_cert_cert());
+                     conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert);
   } else {
     add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
                      CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH,
@@ -2338,6 +2357,7 @@ connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
   connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
   var_cell_free(cell);
   certs_cell_free(certs_cell);
+  tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert);
 
   return 0;
 }
@@ -2478,10 +2498,10 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
   memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
 
   {
-    const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL;
     const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
     const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
-    if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, &link_cert, &id_cert))
+    if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert))
       goto err;
     my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
     their_digests =
@@ -2536,13 +2556,11 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
 
   {
     /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
-    const tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+    tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
-    tor_x509_cert_t *freecert = NULL;
     if (server) {
-      tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &cert, NULL);
+      cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
     } else {
-      freecert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
+      cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
-      cert = freecert;
     }
     if (!cert) {
       log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
@@ -2553,8 +2571,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
     memcpy(auth->scert,
            tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
 
-    if (freecert)
+    tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
-      tor_x509_cert_free(freecert);
   }
 
   /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */

src/or/connection_or.h

@@ -114,5 +114,9 @@ void var_cell_free(var_cell_t *cell);
 
 void connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force);
 
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing;
+#endif
+
 #endif
 

src/or/main.c

@@ -1551,8 +1551,9 @@ check_ed_keys_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
 {
   if (server_mode(options)) {
     if (should_make_new_ed_keys(options, now)) {
-      if (load_ed_keys(options, now) < 0 ||
+      int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options, now);
-          generate_ed_link_cert(options, now)) {
+      if (new_signing_key < 0 ||
+          generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0)) {
         log_err(LD_OR, "Unable to update Ed25519 keys!  Exiting.");
         tor_cleanup();
         exit(0);
@@ -1604,6 +1605,11 @@ rotate_x509_certificate_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
     log_err(LD_BUG, "Error reinitializing TLS context");
     tor_assert_unreached();
   }
+  if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, 1)) {
+    log_err(LD_OR, "Unable to update Ed25519->TLS link certificate for "
+            "new TLS context.");
+    tor_assert_unreached();
+  }
 
   /* We also make sure to rotate the TLS connections themselves if they've
    * been up for too long -- but that's done via is_bad_for_new_circs in
@@ -2376,8 +2382,9 @@ do_hup(void)
     /* Maybe we've been given a new ed25519 key or certificate?
      */
     time_t now = approx_time();
-    if (load_ed_keys(options, now) < 0 ||
+    int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options, now);
-         generate_ed_link_cert(options, now)) {
+    if (new_signing_key < 0 ||
+        generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0)) {
       log_warn(LD_OR, "Problem reloading Ed25519 keys; still using old keys.");
     }
 
@@ -3745,7 +3752,7 @@ tor_main(int argc, char *argv[])
     result = do_main_loop();
     break;
   case CMD_KEYGEN:
-    result = load_ed_keys(get_options(), time(NULL));
+    result = load_ed_keys(get_options(), time(NULL)) < 0;
     break;
   case CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT:
     result = do_list_fingerprint();

src/or/or.h

@@ -1471,6 +1471,12 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
   /* True iff we have sent a netinfo cell */
   unsigned int sent_netinfo : 1;
 
+  /** The signing->ed25519 link certificate corresponding to the x509
+   * certificate we used on the TLS connection (if this is a server-side
+   * connection). We make a copy of this here to prevent a race condition
+   * caused by TLS context rotation. */
+  struct tor_cert_st *own_link_cert;
+
   /** True iff we should feed outgoing cells into digest_sent and
    * digest_received respectively.
    *

src/or/router.c

@@ -986,7 +986,8 @@ init_keys(void)
   }
 
   /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
-  if (load_ed_keys(options,now) < 0)
+  const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now);
+  if (new_signing_key < 0)
     return -1;
 
   /* 2. Read onion key.  Make it if none is found. */
@@ -1056,7 +1057,7 @@ init_keys(void)
 
   /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate.  Note that we need to do this
    * after we set up the TLS context */
-  if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now) < 0) {
+  if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) {
     log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
     return -1;
   }

src/or/routerkeys.c

@@ -673,6 +673,9 @@ static time_t rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration = 0;
 /**
  * Running as a server: load, reload, or refresh our ed25519 keys and
  * certificates, creating and saving new ones as needed.
+ *
+ * Return -1 on failure; 0 on success if the signing key was not replaced;
+ * and 1 on success if the signing key was replaced.
  */
 int
 load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
@@ -685,6 +688,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
   const tor_cert_t *check_signing_cert = NULL;
   tor_cert_t *sign_cert = NULL;
   tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
+  int signing_key_changed = 0;
 
   // It is later than 1972, since otherwise there would be no C compilers.
   // (Try to diagnose #22466.)
@@ -726,7 +730,23 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
     use_signing = sign;
   }
 
+  if (use_signing) {
+    /* We loaded a signing key with its certificate.  */
+    if (! master_signing_key) {
+      /* We didn't know one before! */
+      signing_key_changed = 1;
+    } else if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&use_signing->pubkey,
+                                   &master_signing_key->pubkey) ||
+               ! tor_memeq(use_signing->seckey.seckey,
+                           master_signing_key->seckey.seckey,
+                           ED25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
+      /* We loaded a different signing key than the one we knew before. */
+      signing_key_changed = 1;
+    }
+  }
+
   if (!use_signing && master_signing_key) {
+    /* We couldn't load a signing key, but we already had one loaded */
     check_signing_cert = signing_key_cert;
     use_signing = master_signing_key;
   }
@@ -886,6 +906,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
     if (!sign)
       FAIL("Missing signing key");
     use_signing = sign;
+    signing_key_changed = 1;
 
     tor_assert(sign_cert->signing_key_included);
     tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey));
@@ -922,6 +943,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
   }
 
   if (!current_auth_key ||
+      signing_key_changed ||
       EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop)) {
     auth = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
                       now,
@@ -949,7 +971,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
     SET_CERT(auth_key_cert, auth_cert);
   }
 
-  return 0;
+  return signing_key_changed;
  err:
   ed25519_keypair_free(id);
   ed25519_keypair_free(sign);
@@ -963,16 +985,18 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
  * Retrieve our currently-in-use Ed25519 link certificate and id certificate,
  * and, if they would expire soon (based on the time <b>now</b>, generate new
  * certificates (without embedding the public part of the signing key inside).
+ * If <b>force</b> is true, always generate a new certificate.
  *
- * The signed_key from the expiring certificate will be used to sign the new
+ * The signed_key from the current id->signing certificate will be used to
- * key within newly generated X509 certificate.
+ * sign the new key within newly generated X509 certificate.
  *
  * Returns -1 upon error.  Otherwise, returns 0 upon success (either when the
  * current certificate is still valid, or when a new certificate was
  * successfully generated).
  */
 int
-generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now,
+                      int force)
 {
   const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL;
   tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
@@ -984,7 +1008,8 @@ generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
 
   const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_);
 
-  if (link_cert_cert &&
+  if (force == 0 &&
+      link_cert_cert &&
       ! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) &&
       fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
                  DIGEST256_LEN)) {
@@ -1086,7 +1111,7 @@ init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key)
   MAKECERT(auth_key_cert,
            master_signing_key, current_auth_key, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, 0);
 
-  if (generate_ed_link_cert(get_options(), time(NULL)) < 0) {
+  if (generate_ed_link_cert(get_options(), time(NULL), 0) < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make link certificate");
     goto err;
   }

src/or/routerkeys.h

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
 int load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
 int should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now);
 
-int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
+int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, int force);
 
 int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
                               const char *fname);

src/test/test_link_handshake.c

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ mock_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
   if (mock_peer_cert_expect_tortls &&
       mock_peer_cert_expect_tortls != tls)
     return NULL;
-  return mock_peer_cert;
+  return tor_x509_cert_dup(mock_peer_cert);
 }
 
 static int mock_send_netinfo_called = 0;
@@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ mock_export_key_material(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
   return 0;
 }
 
+static tor_x509_cert_t *mock_own_cert = NULL;
+static tor_x509_cert_t *
+mock_get_own_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+  (void)tls;
+  return tor_x509_cert_dup(mock_own_cert);
+}
+
 /* Test good certs cells */
 static void
 test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
@@ -119,6 +127,7 @@ test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
   MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
   MOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo, mock_send_netinfo);
   MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, mock_get_peer_cert);
+  MOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert, mock_get_own_cert);
 
   key1 = pk_generate(2);
   key2 = pk_generate(3);
@@ -133,9 +142,17 @@ test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
     /* If we're making a CERTS cell for an ed handshake, let's make sure we
      * have some Ed25519 certificates and keys. */
     init_mock_ed_keys(key2);
+  } else {
+    certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 1;
   }
 
   /* c1 has started_here == 1 */
+  {
+    const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL;
+    tt_assert(!tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, NULL));
+    mock_own_cert = tor_x509_cert_dup(link);
+  }
+
   c1->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
   c1->link_proto = 3;
   tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 1), ==, 0);
@@ -278,6 +295,9 @@ test_link_handshake_certs_ok(void *arg)
   UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
   UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
   UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert);
+  tor_x509_cert_free(mock_own_cert);
+  mock_own_cert = NULL;
   memset(c1->identity_digest, 0, sizeof(c1->identity_digest));
   memset(c2->identity_digest, 0, sizeof(c2->identity_digest));
   connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
@@ -315,6 +335,7 @@ recv_certs_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *obj)
   UNMOCK(connection_or_send_netinfo);
   UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
   UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert);
 
   if (d) {
     tor_free(d->cell);
@@ -880,6 +901,11 @@ test_link_handshake_send_authchallenge(void *arg)
   or_connection_t *c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET);
   var_cell_t *cell1=NULL, *cell2=NULL;
 
+  crypto_pk_t *rsa0 = pk_generate(0), *rsa1 = pk_generate(1);
+  tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
+                                 rsa0, rsa1, 86400), ==, 0);
+  init_mock_ed_keys(rsa0);
+
   MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
 
   tt_int_op(connection_init_or_handshake_state(c1, 0), ==, 0);
@@ -905,6 +931,8 @@ test_link_handshake_send_authchallenge(void *arg)
   connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1));
   tor_free(cell1);
   tor_free(cell2);
+  crypto_pk_free(rsa0);
+  crypto_pk_free(rsa1);
 }
 
 typedef struct authchallenge_data_s {
@@ -1118,6 +1146,7 @@ authenticate_data_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *arg)
   (void) test;
   UNMOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf);
   UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
+  UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert);
   UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets);
   UNMOCK(connection_or_close_for_error);
   UNMOCK(channel_set_circid_type);
@@ -1135,7 +1164,11 @@ authenticate_data_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *test, void *arg)
     crypto_pk_free(d->key2);
     tor_free(d);
   }
+  tor_x509_cert_free(mock_peer_cert);
+  tor_x509_cert_free(mock_own_cert);
   mock_peer_cert = NULL;
+  mock_own_cert = NULL;
+
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -1149,6 +1182,7 @@ authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
 
   MOCK(connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf, mock_write_var_cell);
   MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, mock_get_peer_cert);
+  MOCK(tor_tls_get_own_cert, mock_get_own_cert);
   MOCK(tor_tls_get_tlssecrets, mock_get_tlssecrets);
   MOCK(connection_or_close_for_error, mock_close_for_err);
   MOCK(channel_set_circid_type, mock_set_circid_type);
@@ -1215,6 +1249,9 @@ authenticate_data_setup(const struct testcase_t *test)
   mock_peer_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
   tt_assert(mock_peer_cert);
 
+  mock_own_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(der, sz);
+  tt_assert(mock_own_cert);
+
   /* Make an authenticate cell ... */
   int authtype;
   if (is_ed)

src/test/test_routerkeys.c

@@ -450,8 +450,8 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
 
   options->DataDirectory = dir;
 
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, 0));
   tt_assert(get_master_identity_key());
   tt_assert(get_master_identity_key());
   tt_assert(get_master_signing_keypair());
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
 
   /* Call load_ed_keys again, but nothing has changed. */
   tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, 0));
   tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
   tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
   tt_mem_op(&auth, ==, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
@@ -474,8 +474,8 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
 
   /* Force a reload: we make new link/auth keys. */
   routerkeys_free_all();
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, 0));
   tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
   tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
   tt_assert(tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
 
   /* Force a link/auth-key regeneration by advancing time. */
   tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+3*86400));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+3*86400));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+3*86400, 0));
   tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
   tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
   tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
@@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
   memcpy(&auth, get_current_auth_keypair(), sizeof(auth));
 
   /* Force a signing-key regeneration by advancing time. */
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+100*86400));
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now+100*86400));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+100*86400));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now+100*86400, 0));
   tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
   tt_mem_op(&sign, !=, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
   tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));
@@ -520,8 +520,8 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_keys_init_all(void *arg)
   routerkeys_free_all();
   unlink(get_fname("test_ed_keys_init_all/keys/"
                    "ed25519_master_id_secret_key"));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(1, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now));
+  tt_int_op(0, ==, generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, 0));
   tt_mem_op(&id, ==, get_master_identity_key(), sizeof(id));
   tt_mem_op(&sign, ==, get_master_signing_keypair(), sizeof(sign));
   tt_assert(! tor_cert_eq(link_cert, get_current_link_cert_cert()));

src/test/test_shared_random.c

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ init_authority_state(void)
   mock_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1, NULL);
   tt_assert(mock_cert);
   options->AuthoritativeDir = 1;
-  tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, time(NULL)));
+  tt_int_op(load_ed_keys(options, time(NULL)), OP_GE, 0);
   sr_state_init(0, 0);
   /* It's possible a commit has been generated in our state depending on
    * the phase we are currently in which uses "now" as the starting
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ test_sr_commit(void *arg)
     tt_assert(auth_cert);
 
     options->AuthoritativeDir = 1;
-    tt_int_op(0, ==, load_ed_keys(options, now));
+    tt_int_op(load_ed_keys(options, time(NULL)), OP_GE, 0);
   }
 
   /* Generate our commit object and validate it has the appropriate field