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r16455@catbus: nickm | 2007-11-06 12:48:00 -0500
Parse CERT cells and act correctly when we get them. svn:r12396
This commit is contained in:
parent
af60d79f5d
commit
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10
doc/TODO
10
doc/TODO
@ -34,16 +34,16 @@ Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x:
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o Add parse logic
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o Make CERT variable.
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o Make VERSIONS variable.
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- CERT cells
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- functions to parse x509 certs
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- functions to validate a single x509 cert against a TLS connection
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- functions to validate a chain of x509 certs, and extract a PK.
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o CERT cells
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o functions to parse x509 certs
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o functions to validate a single x509 cert against a TLS connection
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o functions to validate a chain of x509 certs, and extract a PK.
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o function to encode x509 certs
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o Parse CERT cells
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o Generate CERT cells
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o Keep copies of X509 certs around, not necessarily associated with
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connection.
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- LINK_AUTH cells
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. LINK_AUTH cells
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o Code to generate
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o Remember certificate digests from TLS
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o Code to parse and check
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@ -246,6 +246,17 @@ _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(RSA *rsa)
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return env;
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}
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/** used by tortls.c: wrap the RSA from an evp_pkey in a crypto_pk_env_t.
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* returns NULL if this isn't an RSA key. */
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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_crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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RSA *rsa;
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if (!(rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)))
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return NULL;
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return _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
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}
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/** used by tortls.c: get an equivalent EVP_PKEY* for a crypto_pk_env_t. Iff
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* private is set, include the private-key portion of the key. */
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EVP_PKEY *
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@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ struct rsa_st;
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struct evp_pkey_st;
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struct dh_st;
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crypto_pk_env_t *_crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(struct rsa_st *rsa);
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crypto_pk_env_t *_crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(struct evp_pkey_st *pkey);
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struct evp_pkey_st *_crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
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int private);
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struct dh_st *_crypto_dh_env_get_dh(crypto_dh_env_t *dh);
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@ -815,27 +815,22 @@ log_cert_lifetime(X509 *cert, const char *problem)
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tor_free(s2);
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}
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/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
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* certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set
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* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
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* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
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*/
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int
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tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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/** DOCDOC helper.
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* cert_out needs to be freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
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static void
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try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
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X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)
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{
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X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
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RSA *rsa;
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int num_in_chain;
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int r = -1, i;
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*identity_key = NULL;
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int num_in_chain, i;
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*cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
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if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
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goto done;
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return;
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*cert_out = cert;
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if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
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goto done;
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return;
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num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
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/* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
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* 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
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@ -845,18 +840,38 @@ tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
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"Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
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num_in_chain);
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goto done;
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return;
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}
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for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
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id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
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if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
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break;
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}
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*id_cert_out = id_cert;
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}
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/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
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* certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set
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* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
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* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
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*/
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int
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tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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{
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X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
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RSA *rsa;
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int r = -1;
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*identity_key = NULL;
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try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
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if (!cert)
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goto done;
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if (!id_cert) {
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log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
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goto done;
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}
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if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
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X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
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log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
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@ -884,6 +899,111 @@ tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
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return r;
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}
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/** DOCDOC
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*
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* Returns 1 on "verification is done", 0 on "still need LINK_AUTH."
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*/
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int
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tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
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const char *cert_str, size_t cert_len,
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const char *id_cert_str, size_t id_cert_len,
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crypto_pk_env_t **cert_key_out,
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char *conn_cert_digest_out,
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char *id_digest_out)
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{
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X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL, *cert_pkey = NULL;
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int free_id_cert = 0, peer_used_tls_cert = 0;
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int r = -1;
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tor_assert(cert_key_out);
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tor_assert(conn_cert_digest_out);
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tor_assert(id_digest_out);
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*cert_key_out = NULL;
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if (cert_str && cert_len) {
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/*XXXX020 warn on error. */
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const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char*) cert_str;
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cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_len);
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}
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if (id_cert_str && id_cert_len) {
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/*XXXX020 warn on error. */
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const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char*) id_cert_str;
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id_cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, id_cert_len);
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if (id_cert)
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free_id_cert = 1;
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}
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if (cert) {
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int cmp = 0;
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X509 *cert_tmp = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
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if (cert_tmp) {
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peer_used_tls_cert = 1;
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cmp = X509_cmp(cert, cert_tmp);
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X509_free(cert_tmp);
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}
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if (cmp != 0) {
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log_fn(severity, LD_PROTOCOL,
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"Certificate in CERT cell didn't match TLS cert.");
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goto done;
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}
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}
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if (!cert || !id_cert) {
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X509 *c=NULL, *id=NULL;
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try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &c, &id);
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if (c) {
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if (!cert)
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cert = c;
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else
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X509_free(c);
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}
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if (id && !id_cert)
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id_cert = id;
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}
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if (!id_cert || !cert)
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goto done;
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if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
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X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
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log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
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tls_log_errors(severity,"verifying certificate");
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goto done;
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}
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{
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crypto_pk_env_t *i = _crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(id_pkey);
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if (!i)
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goto done;
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crypto_pk_get_digest(i, id_digest_out);
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crypto_free_pk_env(i);
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}
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if (!(cert_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert)))
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goto done;
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if (!(*cert_key_out = _crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(cert_pkey)))
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goto done;
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{
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unsigned int len = 0;
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X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), (unsigned char*)conn_cert_digest_out, &len);
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tor_assert(len == DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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r = peer_used_tls_cert ? 1 : 0;
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done:
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if (cert)
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X509_free(cert);
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if (id_cert && free_id_cert)
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X509_free(id_cert);
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if (id_pkey)
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EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
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if (cert_pkey)
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EVP_PKEY_free(cert_pkey);
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return r;
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}
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/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is
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* expired or not-yet-valid, give or take <b>tolerance</b>
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* seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
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@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ char *tor_tls_encode_my_certificate(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *size_out,
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crypto_pk_env_t *tor_tls_dup_private_key(tor_tls_t *tls);
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int tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
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crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
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int tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
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const char *cert_str, size_t cert_len,
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const char *id_cert_str, size_t id_cert_len,
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crypto_pk_env_t **cert_key_out,
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char *conn_cert_digest_out,
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char *id_digest_out);
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int tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int tolerance);
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int tor_tls_read(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len);
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int tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n);
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command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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int n_certs = 0;
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uint16_t conn_cert_len, id_cert_len;
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uint16_t conn_cert_len = 0, id_cert_len = 0;
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const char *conn_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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const char *cp, *end;
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int authenticated = 0;
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/*XXXX020 log messages*/
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING)
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@ -633,9 +634,11 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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if (end-cp < len)
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goto err;
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if (n_certs == 0) {
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conn_cert = cp;
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conn_cert_len = len;
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id_cert = cp;
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id_cert_len = len;
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} else if (n_certs == 1) {
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conn_cert = id_cert;
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conn_cert_len = id_cert_len;
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id_cert = cp;
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id_cert_len = len;
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} else {
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@ -646,20 +649,34 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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}
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/* Now we have 0, 1, or 2 certs. */
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/* Verify that identity cert has signed peer cert in SSL, or
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* peer cert in the cell. */
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/* Verify that identity cert is self-signed. */
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/* Learn ID digest. */
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/* Learn cert digests. */
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/* Remember peer cert public key. */
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/* set received_certs. */
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if (n_certs == 0) {
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/* The other side is unauthenticated. */
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} else {
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int r;
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r = tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, conn->tls,
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conn_cert, conn_cert_len,
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id_cert, id_cert_len,
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&conn->handshake_state->signing_key,
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(conn->handshake_state->started_here ?
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conn->handshake_state->server_cert_digest :
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conn->handshake_state->client_cert_digest),
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conn->handshake_state->cert_id_digest);
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if (r < 0)
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goto err;
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if (r == 1)
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authenticated = 1;
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}
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conn->handshake_state->received_certs = 1;
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if (authenticated) {
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/* XXXX020 make the connection open. */
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}
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if (! conn->handshake_state->signing_key)
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goto err;
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return;
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err:
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;
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/*XXXX020 close the connection */;
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}
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#define LINK_AUTH_STRING "Tor initiator certificate verification"
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@ -732,7 +749,7 @@ command_process_link_auth_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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/* Okay, we're authenticated. */
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s->authenticated = 1;
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/* XXXX020 act on being authenticated: */
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/* XXXX020 act on being authenticated: Open the connection. */
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return;
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err:
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@ -633,8 +633,9 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
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* this guy; and note that this guy is reachable.
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*/
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static int
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connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
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char *digest_rcvd)
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connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
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int started_here,
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char *digest_rcvd_out)
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{
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crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
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or_options_t *options = get_options();
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@ -677,7 +678,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
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if (identity_rcvd) {
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has_identity=1;
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crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
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crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out);
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if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) {
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conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
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@ -686,12 +687,12 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
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}
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crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
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} else {
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memset(digest_rcvd, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
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memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
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conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER;
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}
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if (started_here && tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) {
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memcpy(conn->identity_digest, digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN);
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memcpy(conn->identity_digest, digest_rcvd_out, DIGEST_LEN);
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tor_free(conn->nickname);
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conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
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conn->nickname[0] = '$';
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@ -706,11 +707,11 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
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int as_advertised = 1;
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tor_assert(has_cert);
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tor_assert(has_identity);
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if (memcmp(digest_rcvd, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
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if (memcmp(digest_rcvd_out, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
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/* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
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char seen[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
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char expected[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
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base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN);
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base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), digest_rcvd_out, DIGEST_LEN);
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base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN);
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log_fn(severity, LD_OR,
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@ -728,7 +729,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
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* with the same address:port and a different key.
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*/
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dirserv_orconn_tls_done(conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port,
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digest_rcvd, as_advertised);
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digest_rcvd_out, as_advertised);
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}
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if (!as_advertised)
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return -1;
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@ -755,7 +756,8 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
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log_debug(LD_OR,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
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/* V1 only XXXX020 */
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if (connection_or_check_valid_handshake(conn, started_here, digest_rcvd) < 0)
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if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
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digest_rcvd) < 0)
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return -1;
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if (!started_here) { /* V1 only XXXX020 */
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