mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 21:23:58 +01:00
Improve tolerance for dirauths with skewed clocks
Previously, an authority with a clock more than 60 seconds ahead could cause a client with a correct clock to warn that the client's clock was behind. Now the clocks of a majority of directory authorities have to be ahead of the client before this warning will occur. Relax the early-consensus check so that a client's clock must be 60 seconds behind the earliest time that a given sufficiently-signed consensus could possibly be available. Add a new unit test that calls warn_early_consensus() directly. Fixes bug 25756; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha.
This commit is contained in:
parent
d6948bc776
commit
de343b4e42
7
changes/bug25756
Normal file
7
changes/bug25756
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (error reporting):
|
||||
- Improve tolerance for directory authorities with skewed clocks.
|
||||
Previously, an authority with a clock more than 60 seconds ahead
|
||||
could cause a client with a correct clock to warn that the
|
||||
client's clock was behind. Now the clocks of a majority of
|
||||
directory authorities have to be ahead of the client before this
|
||||
warning will occur. Fixes bug 25756; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha.
|
@ -1777,10 +1777,18 @@ warn_early_consensus(const networkstatus_t *c, const char *flavor,
|
||||
long delta = now - c->valid_after;
|
||||
char *flavormsg = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/** If a consensus appears more than this many seconds before its declared
|
||||
* valid-after time, declare that our clock is skewed. */
|
||||
/** If a consensus appears more than this many seconds before it could
|
||||
* possibly be a sufficiently-signed consensus, declare that our clock
|
||||
* is skewed. */
|
||||
#define EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW 60
|
||||
if (now >= c->valid_after - EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW)
|
||||
|
||||
/* We assume that if a majority of dirauths have accurate clocks,
|
||||
* the earliest that a dirauth with a skewed clock could possibly
|
||||
* publish a sufficiently-signed consensus is (valid_after -
|
||||
* dist_seconds). Before that time, the skewed dirauth would be
|
||||
* unable to obtain enough authority signatures for the consensus to
|
||||
* be valid. */
|
||||
if (now >= c->valid_after - c->dist_seconds - EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
format_iso_time(tbuf, c->valid_after);
|
||||
|
@ -692,6 +692,62 @@ test_early_consensus(void *arg)
|
||||
UNMOCK(clock_skew_warning);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Test warn_early_consensus(), expecting no warning */
|
||||
static void
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_no(const networkstatus_t *c, time_t now,
|
||||
long offset)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mock_apparent_skew = 0;
|
||||
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
|
||||
warn_early_consensus(c, "microdesc", now + offset);
|
||||
expect_no_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
|
||||
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, 0);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Test warn_early_consensus(), expecting a warning */
|
||||
static void
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_yes(const networkstatus_t *c, time_t now,
|
||||
long offset)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mock_apparent_skew = 0;
|
||||
setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
|
||||
warn_early_consensus(c, "microdesc", now + offset);
|
||||
/* Can't use expect_single_log_msg() because of unrecognized authorities */
|
||||
expect_log_msg_containing("behind the time published in the consensus");
|
||||
tt_int_op(mock_apparent_skew, OP_EQ, offset);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Test warn_early_consensus() directly, checking both the non-warning
|
||||
* case (consensus is not early) and the warning case (consensus is
|
||||
* early). Depends on EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW=60.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus(void *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
networkstatus_t *c = NULL;
|
||||
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
(void)arg;
|
||||
c = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof *c);
|
||||
c->valid_after = now;
|
||||
c->dist_seconds = 300;
|
||||
mock_apparent_skew = 0;
|
||||
MOCK(clock_skew_warning, mock_clock_skew_warning);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_no(c, now, 60);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_no(c, now, 0);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_no(c, now, -60);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_no(c, now, -360);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_yes(c, now, -361);
|
||||
test_warn_early_consensus_yes(c, now, -600);
|
||||
UNMOCK(clock_skew_warning);
|
||||
tor_free(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define NODE(name, flags) \
|
||||
{ #name, test_routerlist_##name, (flags), NULL, NULL }
|
||||
#define ROUTER(name,flags) \
|
||||
@ -711,11 +767,13 @@ struct testcase_t routerlist_tests[] = {
|
||||
ROUTER(pick_directory_server_impl, TT_FORK),
|
||||
{ "directory_guard_fetch_with_no_dirinfo",
|
||||
test_directory_guard_fetch_with_no_dirinfo, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
||||
/* These depend on construct_consensus() setting valid_after=now+1000 */
|
||||
/* These depend on construct_consensus() setting
|
||||
* valid_after=now+1000 and dist_seconds=250 */
|
||||
TIMELY("timely_consensus1", "1010"),
|
||||
TIMELY("timely_consensus2", "1000"),
|
||||
TIMELY("timely_consensus3", "940"),
|
||||
EARLY("early_consensus1", "939"),
|
||||
TIMELY("timely_consensus3", "690"),
|
||||
EARLY("early_consensus1", "689"),
|
||||
{ "warn_early_consensus", test_warn_early_consensus, 0, NULL, NULL },
|
||||
END_OF_TESTCASES
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user