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Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-gitlab/mr/638'
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dd272b6ef4
5
changes/ticket40694
Normal file
5
changes/ticket40694
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Major bugfixes (onion service):
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- Set a much higher circuit build timeout for opened client rendezvous
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circuit. Before this, tor would time them out very quickly leading to many
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unnecessary retries and thus more load on the network. Fixes bug 40694;
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bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
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@ -133,11 +133,6 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
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return 0;
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}
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/* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */
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if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
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@ -334,7 +329,6 @@ circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn,
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{
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origin_circuit_t *best=NULL;
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struct timeval now;
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int intro_going_on_but_too_old = 0;
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tor_assert(conn);
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@ -353,15 +347,6 @@ circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn,
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continue;
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origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
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/* Log an info message if we're going to launch a new intro circ in
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* parallel */
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
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!must_be_open && origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out &&
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!circ->marked_for_close) {
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intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1;
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continue;
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}
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if (!circuit_is_acceptable(origin_circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose,
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need_uptime,need_internal, (time_t)now.tv_sec))
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continue;
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@ -374,11 +359,6 @@ circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn,
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}
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
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if (!best && intro_going_on_but_too_old)
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log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "There is an intro circuit being created "
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"right now, but it has already taken quite a while. Starting "
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"one in parallel.");
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return best;
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}
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@ -450,8 +430,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
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* circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed
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* custom timeouts yet */
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struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff,
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close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
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cannibalized_cutoff, c_intro_cutoff, s_intro_cutoff, stream_cutoff;
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close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff,
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cannibalized_cutoff, c_intro_cutoff, s_intro_cutoff, stream_cutoff,
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c_rend_ready_cutoff;
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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struct timeval now;
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cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
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@ -531,13 +512,19 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
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/* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */
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SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (9/6.0) + 1000);
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/* For circuit purpose set to: CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED.
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*
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* The cutoff of such circuit is very high because we end up in this state if
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* once the INTRODUCE_ACK is received which could be before the service
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* receives the INTRODUCE2 cell. The worst case is a full 3-hop latency
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* (intro -> service), 4-hop circuit creation latency (service -> RP), and
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* finally a 7-hop latency for the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to arrive (service ->
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* client). */
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SET_CUTOFF(c_rend_ready_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * 3 + 1000);
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SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms());
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SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000);
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SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
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MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000,
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options->SocksTimeout * 1000));
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bool fixed_time = circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options());
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *,victim) {
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@ -568,8 +555,12 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
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cutoff = c_intro_cutoff;
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else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
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cutoff = s_intro_cutoff;
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else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND)
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cutoff = stream_cutoff;
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else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
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/* Service connecting to a rendezvous point is a four hop circuit. We set
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* it explicitly here because this function is a clusterf***. */
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cutoff = fourhop_cutoff;
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} else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)
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cutoff = c_rend_ready_cutoff;
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else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING)
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cutoff = close_cutoff;
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else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened &&
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@ -580,9 +571,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
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else
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cutoff = general_cutoff;
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if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)
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cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff;
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if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_GT))
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continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */
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@ -754,52 +742,30 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
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}
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}
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/* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough along in
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* connecting to its destination, and we haven't already flagged it as
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* 'timed out', flag it so we'll launch another intro or rend circ, but
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* don't mark it for close yet.
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*
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* (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout
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* period above, so we won't close them in the next call to
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* circuit_expire_building.) */
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if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) {
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/* Special checks for onion service circuits. */
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switch (victim->purpose) {
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
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/* We only want to spare a rend circ iff it has been specified in an
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* INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. */
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if (!hs_circ_is_rend_sent_in_intro1(CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim))) {
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break;
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if (hs_circ_is_rend_sent_in_intro1(CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim))) {
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continue;
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}
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FALLTHROUGH;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
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/* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
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"as timed-out HS circ",
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
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/* The connection to the rendezvous point has timed out, close it and
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* retry if possible. */
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Rendezvous circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
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"as timed-out, closing it. Relaunching rendezvous attempt.",
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(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
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victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
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victim->purpose);
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TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
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continue;
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/* We'll close as a timeout the victim circuit. The rendezvous point
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* won't keep both circuits, it only keeps the newest (for the same
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* cookie). */
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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}
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/* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far
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* enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing
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* it. */
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if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) &&
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victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
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"as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.",
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(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
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victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
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victim->purpose);
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TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
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hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
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continue;
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}
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if (victim->n_chan)
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log_info(LD_CIRC,
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@ -205,34 +205,10 @@ struct origin_circuit_t {
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* (in host byte order) for response comparison. */
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uint32_t pathbias_probe_nonce;
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/** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
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* according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
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* been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
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* its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous
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* circuit.
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*
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* (We clear this flag for client-side rendezvous circuits when they
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* are 'joined' to the other side's rendezvous circuit, so that
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* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit can put client streams on
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* the circuit. We also clear this flag for service-side rendezvous
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* circuits when they are 'joined' to a client's rend circ, but only
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* for symmetry with the client case. Client-side introduction
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* circuits are closed when we get a joined rend circ, and
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* service-side introduction circuits never have this flag set.) */
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unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1;
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/** Set iff this circuit has been given a relaxed timeout because
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* no circuits have opened. Used to prevent spamming logs. */
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unsigned int relaxed_timeout : 1;
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/** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a
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* new connection attempt has been launched. We consider launching
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* a new service-side rend circ to a client when the previous one
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* fails; now that we don't necessarily close a service-side rend
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* circ when we launch a new one to the same client, this flag keeps
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* us from launching two retries for the same failed rend circ. */
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unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1;
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/** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the
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* RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */
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uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT];
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@ -126,11 +126,6 @@ finalize_rend_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *hop,
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hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
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hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
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/* Now that this circuit has finished connecting to its destination,
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* make sure circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch is willing to return it
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* so we can actually use it. */
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circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0;
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/* If congestion control, transfer ccontrol onto the cpath. */
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if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->ccontrol) {
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hop->ccontrol = TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->ccontrol;
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@ -438,16 +433,6 @@ can_relaunch_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
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/* XXX: Retrying under certain condition. This is related to #22455. */
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/* Avoid to relaunch twice a circuit to the same rendezvous point at the
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* same time. */
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if (circ->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) {
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log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been retried. "
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"Skipping retry.",
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safe_str_client(
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extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)));
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goto disallow;
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}
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/* We check failure_count >= hs_get_service_max_rend_failures()-1 below, and
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* the -1 is because we increment the failure count for our current failure
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* *after* this clause. */
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@ -689,7 +674,7 @@ hs_circ_service_get_established_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
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* - We've already retried this specific rendezvous circuit.
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*/
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void
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hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
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@ -699,10 +684,6 @@ hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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goto done;
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}
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/* Flag the circuit that we are relaunching, to avoid to relaunch twice a
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* circuit to the same rendezvous point at the same time. */
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circ->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1;
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/* Legacy services don't have a hidden service ident. */
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if (circ->hs_ident) {
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retry_service_rendezvous_point(circ);
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
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int hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
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const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie);
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void hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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void hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
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origin_circuit_t *hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(
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const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip);
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@ -3675,6 +3675,9 @@ hs_service_circuit_cleanup_on_close(const circuit_t *circ)
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hs_metrics_close_established_rdv(
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&CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->hs_ident->identity_pk);
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
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hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ));
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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