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hs: Remove useless code in rend_mid_introduce()
With the previous commit, we validate the circuit _before_ calling rend_mid_introduce() which handles the INTRODUCE1 payload. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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@ -143,26 +143,10 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
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log_info(LD_REND, "Received an INTRODUCE1 request on circuit %u",
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(unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
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if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->base_.n_chan) {
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log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
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"Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit %u.",
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(unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
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goto err;
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}
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/* We have already done an introduction on this circuit but we just
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received a request for another one. We block it since this might
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be an attempt to DoS a hidden service (#15515). */
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if (circ->already_received_introduce1) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
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"Blocking multiple introductions on the same circuit. "
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"Someone might be trying to attack a hidden service through "
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"this relay.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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return -1;
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}
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circ->already_received_introduce1 = 1;
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/* At this point, we know that the circuit is valid for an INTRODUCE1
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* because the validation has been made before calling this function. */
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tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR);
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tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_chan);
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/* We could change this to MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN now that 0.0.9.x is
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* obsolete; however, there isn't much reason to do so, and we're going
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