hs: Remove useless code in rend_mid_introduce()

With the previous commit, we validate the circuit _before_ calling
rend_mid_introduce() which handles the INTRODUCE1 payload.

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet 2016-11-15 14:23:25 -05:00
parent 9d7505a62a
commit db77a38da2

View File

@ -143,26 +143,10 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
log_info(LD_REND, "Received an INTRODUCE1 request on circuit %u",
(unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->base_.n_chan) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit %u.",
(unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
goto err;
}
/* We have already done an introduction on this circuit but we just
received a request for another one. We block it since this might
be an attempt to DoS a hidden service (#15515). */
if (circ->already_received_introduce1) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
"Blocking multiple introductions on the same circuit. "
"Someone might be trying to attack a hidden service through "
"this relay.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
circ->already_received_introduce1 = 1;
/* At this point, we know that the circuit is valid for an INTRODUCE1
* because the validation has been made before calling this function. */
tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR);
tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_chan);
/* We could change this to MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN now that 0.0.9.x is
* obsolete; however, there isn't much reason to do so, and we're going