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more cleanups on r11258. looks good now.
svn:r11266
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ChangeLog
10
ChangeLog
@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.6-alpha - 2007-??-??
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proportionally less, since they already have enough load. Patch
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from Mike Perry.
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- Raise the "max believable bandwidth" from 1.5MB/s to 10MB/s. This
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will allow fast Tor servers to get more attention. Also, when we're
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upgrading from an old Tor version, forget our current guards and
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pick new ones according to the new weightings. The resulting load
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balancing improvement could raise effective network capacity by
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a factor of four. Thanks to Mike Perry for measurements.
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will allow fast Tor servers to get more attention.
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- When we're upgrading from an old Tor version, forget our current
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guards and pick new ones according to the new weightings. These
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three load balancing patches could raise effective network capacity
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by a factor of four. Thanks to Mike Perry for measurements.
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Handle unexpected whitespace better in malformed descriptors. Bug
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@ -1287,8 +1287,6 @@ get_max_believable_bandwidth(void)
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* some in the list because they exit to obscure ports. If not <b>for_exit</b>,
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* we're picking a non-exit node: weight exit-node's bandwidth less
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* depending on the smallness of the fraction of Exit-to-total bandwidth.
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* Beware: this flag is often abused to force uniform selection when
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* we are not actually choosing exits!
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*
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* If <b>for_guard</b>, we're picking a guard node: consider all guard's
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* bandwidth equally. Otherwise, weight guards proportionally less.
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@ -1358,18 +1356,14 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
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/* if they claim something huge, don't believe it */
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if (this_bw > max_believable_bw) {
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char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
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if (status) {
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base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
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status->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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} else if (router) {
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base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
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router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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log_notice(LD_DIR,
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"Bandwidth %d for router %s (%s) exceeds allowed max %d, capping",
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this_bw, router ? router->nickname : "(null)",
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status || router ? fp : "0",
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max_believable_bw);
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base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp), statuses ?
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status->identity_digest :
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router->cache_info.identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN);
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR,
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"Bandwidth %d for router %s (%s) exceeds allowed max %d, capping",
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this_bw, router ? router->nickname : "(null)",
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fp, max_believable_bw);
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this_bw = max_believable_bw;
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}
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if (is_known) {
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@ -1473,10 +1467,10 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
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", guard bw = "U64_FORMAT
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", nonguard bw = "U64_FORMAT", guard weight = %lf "
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"(for guard == %d)",
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_bw),
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_exit_bw), U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_nonexit_bw),
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_bw),
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_exit_bw), U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_nonexit_bw),
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exit_weight, for_exit,
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_guard_bw), U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_nonguard_bw),
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U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_guard_bw), U64_PRINTF_ARG(total_nonguard_bw),
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guard_weight, for_guard);
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/* Almost done: choose a random value from the bandwidth weights. */
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@ -1495,7 +1489,7 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, int for_exit, int for_guard,
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tmp += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * guard_weight));
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else if (is_exit)
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tmp += ((uint64_t)(bandwidths[i] * exit_weight));
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else
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else
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tmp += bandwidths[i];
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if (tmp >= rand_bw)
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