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106 sounds like a great proposal. let's do it.

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svn:r9547
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Roger Dingledine 2007-02-10 20:00:06 +00:00
parent 01ddb05fba
commit da041c5350
1 changed files with 11 additions and 6 deletions
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17
doc/spec/proposals/106-less-tls-constraint.txt
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Filename: 105-less-tls-constraint.txt
Filename: 106-less-tls-constraint.txt
Title: Checking fewer things during TLS handshakes
Version: $Revision: 12105 $
Last-Modified: $Date: 2007-01-30T07:50:01.643717Z $
@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ Motivation:
Later, we want to try harder to avoid protocol fingerprinting attacks.
This means that we'll need to make our connection handshake look closer
to a regular HTTPS connection. For now, about the best we can do is to
stop requiring things during handshake that we don't actually use.
to a regular HTTPS connection: one certificate on the server side and
zero certificates on the client side. For now, about the best we
can do is to stop requiring things during handshake that we don't
actually use.
What we check now, and where we check it:
@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime:
tor_tls_verify:
peer has at least one certificate
There is at lease one certificate in the chain
There is at least one certificate in the chain
At least one of the certificates in the chain is not the one used to
negotiate the connection. (The "identity cert".)
The certificate _not_ used to negotiate the connection has signed the
@ -56,16 +58,19 @@ USEFUL THINGS WE COULD DO:
an identity certificate. Internally to the code, we could assign the
identity_digest field of these or_connections to a random number, or even
not add them to the identity_digest->or_conn map.
[so if somebody connects with no certs, we let them. and mark them as
a client and don't treat them as a server. great. -rd]
[2] Instead of using a restricted nickname character set that make our
[2] Instead of using a restricted nickname character set that makes our
commonName structure look unlike typical SSL certificates, we could treat
the nickname as extending from the start of the commonName up to but not
including the first non-nickname character
including the first non-nickname character.
Alternatively, we could stop checking commonNames entirely. We don't
actually _do_ anything based on the nickname in the certificate, so
there's really no harm in letting every router have any commonName it
wants.
[this is the better choice -rd]
REMAINING WAYS TO RECOGNIZE CLIENT->SERVER CONNECTIONS: